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STRUCTURAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL FORCES IN THE
ETIOLOGY OF CORPORATE CRIME

Beti Thompson, Ph.D.
Western Michigan University, 1981

In an effort to gain understaniing of the etiology of corporate
crime, a theoretical framework for examining the problem has been
developed.

This framework includes structural features such as a

capitalistic organization of society, the importance of political
economy, the importance of market structure, and the importance of
corporate influence over the legal environment, in understanding
corporate crime.

Corporations within this society are affected by

the structural features of society.

Organizations are organized

according to capitalistic principles and effectively force their
employees into certain kinds of actions and activities.

It was

theorized that such organizational factors might have an influence
on corporate crime.
Data for this study came from the Ford Pinto criminal case.
Analyzing various data from Ford documents, NHTSA documents, trial
transcripts, etc., a number of research questions, which were
guided by the theoretical framework, were raised.

The data showed,

that in this case study, structural factors such as the profit
motive, the ability of corporations to influence the political and
legal environments in which they operate, and market structure were
influential in the ability of Ford to manufacture and sell a defec-
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tive automobile.

In addition, organizational factors, such as the

hierarchy of goals, the normative environment of the organization,
and the basis for decision-making within the Ford organization, were
examined for their explanatory power in understanding corporate
crime.
A number of directions for further research and examination
were discovered.

The theoretical framework can be further refined

and developed through such research.

The problem of corporate crime

cannot be ignored; it is a costly and serious problem for all people
in society today.

Through an understanding of the etiology of

corporate crime, some mechanisms of control of this serious
problem may be developed.
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CHAPTER I

The Problem

The focus in criminology, from its inception, has been on tra
ditional "street" crimes, best exemplified by the FBI Uniform Crime
Rates which characterize activities such as assault, burglary, rob
bery, car theft, murder, etc. as criminal.

While such crime cannot

be minimized, another broad area of crime has largely been ignored.
Sutherland, in the 1930s, first coined the term "white-collar crime"
to refer to "violations of law by persons in the- upper socio
economic class...in the course of [their] occupations]

(1949, p. 9).

Examination of such crime has not been multitudinous since Suther
land’s time; with the notable exception of Geis, the topic has been
largely dormant until recent years.

In the 1970s, the topic ex

perienced a rebirth; Clinard and Yeager (1980) have delineated a
number of reasons for the renewed interest.

These include a recog

nition of the power and the impact of the corporation, publication
of corporate violations, recognition of corporate responsibility,
movements by consumer groups, and reawakening of Marxist/conflict
theories.
The broader rubric of white-collar crime is bifurcated into
two major sections:

white-collar crime on the part of individuals

and white-collar crime on the part of corporations.

Clinard and

Quinney (1973) have called these two types of crime 1) occupational
crime, which includes crimes committed by individuals in the course

1
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of their occupation for their own personal gain, and 2) corporate
crime, which refers to crimes committed by corporate officials and/
or representatives intended to serve the corporate interests.

This

distinction is crucially important since disparate advantages to
commit crimes accrue to individuals and corporations.

The serious

ness and magnitude of corporate crime, that is, crimes committed by
corporate officials in the corporate interest, exceed those of
occupational crime.

This may be at least partially attributed to

the power of corporations.

The power of corporations in American

society greatly enhances their ability to achieve their own ends,
regardless of the impact of their activities on the public.

Clinard

and Quinney note:
...the nation's leading corporations are commit
ting destructive acts against man and nature.
Specifically, all of this is being done syste
matically and repeatedly, rather than randomly
and occasionally. The crimes are being committed
as a standard operating procedure. In order to
ensure profits at a minimum of expense, these
corporations are willfully engaging in crime.
The corporations themselves as legal entities,
as well as some of the corporate officials who
make specific decisions, are criminal. And what
is most frightening is that once these systematic
crimes become normal operating procedure, they
are not the responsibility of any one individual
in the corporation. Rather, they are corporate
crimes, in the sense that the corporation itself
is criminal (1973, p. 212).
The relatively new field of corporate crime is plagued with
controversy and many issues.

The consequences of corporate cime,

for example, are difficult to ascertain and to measure.

A key is

sue in the field involves the definition of corporate crime and
important divergencies concerning the appropriate area of study,
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exist.

An additional issue of controversy is found in explanations

of the etiology of corporate crime; some theorists tend to focus
on individual explanations of such crime, while others seek ex
planation in certain organizational characteristics of the corpora
tion or the societal structure within which the organization exists.
These issues are the foci of this research.
Research in the area of corporate crime is hampered by the
lack of accessibility to the inner structure and workings of large
corporations.

Occasionally, however, criminal actions on the part

of corporations become public knowledge.

This may result in the

publication, through trials, newspaper accounts, television broad
casts, etc., of certain procedures, structures, and actions within
a large corporation.

When this occurs, valuable information may

become available to researchers who are attempting to develop under
standing of corporate crime.

This research was initiated by such a

public disclosure of a corporate crime.
In this research, a case study of the Ford Motor Company will
be used in an attempt to identify various processes involved in the
commission of corporate crime.

The Ford Motor Company was tried,

in early 1980, in criminal court in the State of Indiana for reck
less homicide in the deaths of three young women who were killed in
an automobile accident when their Ford Pinto automobile burst into
flames after being rear-ended.

Two months earlier, the National

Highway Traffic Safety Administration had forced Ford to "volun
tarily" recall the Pinto for its faulty fuel system.
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The voluntary recall Is only part of a larger story.

Evidence

had previously been presented (Dowie, 1977) which suggested that
Ford continued to market a product even though the dangers of the
product were known by Ford engineers and executives.

Further

evidence uncovered by civil suits (e.g., Grimshaw, 1978) Indicated
that Ford could have avoided the dangers of the Pinto before the
first one was manufactured.

National Highway Traffic Safety Admin

istration records (1969-1977) showed that Ford lobbied for eight
years against implementation of a standard for rear-end impacts.
(See also Dowie, 1977.)

Numerous civil suits have been filed against

Ford; the Grimshaw case in California resulted in a verdict against
Ford of $128 million, $125 million of which were punitive damages.
During the Ford criminal trial, much information concerning
the structure and processes of a large corporation was disclosed.
The trial supplied an interesting arena of research for the examina
tion of etiological explanations of corporate crime.

The criminal

trial and related materials furnished the data for this study.
Through examination of these data, this research will, hopefully,
contribute to a theoretical explanation of the various factors in
volved in the etiology of corporate crime.
An endeavor of this sort reflects, to a great extent, the
philosophical position of the researcher and his/her general frame
work of thought.

Such positions should be clearly elucidated to

avoid misunderstandings between researcher and audience.

To that

end, the philosophical and paradigmatic frameworks used to guide
this research will be clearly specified in the following section.
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Knowledge and Values In the Social Sciences

An underlying Issue within the field of sociology Is the place
of values In the sociological enterprise and the relationship of
these values to knowledge.
with values.

Sociologists have long been concerned

Historically, European sociologists, with the notable

exception of Marx, were primarily concerned with theoretical under
standing; that is, knowledge came first and meliorism was secondary,
if not peripheral.

In the U.S., early sociology took on a more

reformist nature which led to substantial interest in social prob
lems.

With the rise of structural-functionalist thought, American

sociologists adopted a more theoretical orientation to their dis
cipline.

In this view, the sociologist could be an objective ob

server and isolate himself/herself from the society under observa
tion.

As Gouldner (1970) put it, "Seemingly subordinating his own

claims to personal priority, in apparent conformity to a higher,
selfless principle, the theorist puts himself forward modestly, as a
discoverer of consensus rather than an originator of ideas" (p. 17).
Objectivity and value freedom were, and still often are, associated
with sociology for some decades.

In the early 1960s, the value-

free position again became an issue of discussion and many theorists
(e.g., Becker, Goldner, Friedrichs) began questioning the ability
of sociologists to be value free.

The controversy continues today.

Value-free sociologists maintain that sociologists, like other
scientists, can isolate values from their research.

The one value

such scientists pursue is science (Ross, 1965, p. 425) and the
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ultimate goal of science is "truth."

Thus, in such a view,

sociologists are truth-seekers who are immune from or able to put
aside value-orientations.

From this viewpoint, one's personal

orientations, beliefs, and societal context can be overcome when
pursuing truth through the practice of science.
Opponents of. this view see value-freedom as a myth (Gouldner,
1964) and argue that sociologists are influenced by personal
preferences and biases in all aspects of their work.

Nicolaus (1968)

argues that there never has been "...objective seeking-out of social
truth or reality...the eyes of the sociologists...have always
been turned downwards, and their palms upwards" (1968, p. 275).
Nicolaus says that criminologists have traditionally studied the
lower (subordinate) classes (thus, the "eyes down"), but have also
found financial advantage from the upper classes.
this must of necessity involve values.

He adds that

Becker (1967) states that it

is impossible for sociologists to do research without involving
personal sympathies.

Becker advocates explicit support for the

"underdog."
Is it possible to separate ideas from values?

Karl Marx

believed that ideas are closely related to the relations of economic
life.

He saw ideas as transitory and placed them within a histori

cal context.

Ideas, according to Marx, "...are the reflection,

direct or sublimated, of the material interests that impel men in
their dealings with others" (Coser, 1971, p. 45).

In developing a

sociology of knowledge, Marx tied the ideas of a society to the so
cial roles and social classes within the society and posited that
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the economic infrastructure of the society is the ultimate determi
nant of the particular societal superstructure (Marx, 1967).

The

societal superstructure consists of the values, ideas, and culture
of the particular society.

Ideas too, in his view, are shaped by

the infrastructure of society.

The ideas of different societies

will vary because of the differential superstructure; a capitalist
society will develop different ideas than a feudalistic or a
socialist society.
of knowledge.

This is extremely important in the development

Knowledge, from this perspective, is not a reality

"out there," but rather a dynamic process which changes as societa'1.
infrastructures change.
Mannheim carried on the legacy of Marx by developing a sociolo
gy of knowledge which was not necessarily tied to the economic in
frastructure of society, but was based on the premise that all ideas
are influenced by an individual's or group's social and historical
environment.

Mannheim considered societal structures very important

to thought, and argued that all thought is influenced and determined
by structural conditions within a society.

According to Mannheim,

"...in the formulation of concepts, the angle of vision is guided
by the observer's.

Thought, namely, is directed in accordance with

what a particular group expects" (1936, p. 245).

Gunnar Myrdal

(1969) took the position one step further and observed that knowl
edge is itself a value and furthermore, has the potential to change
values (1969, p. 19).
Manis (1976) carries on this position and argues that "values
cannot be compartmentalized from knowledge" (p.. 33).

He argues that
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the two interact and that knowledge can alter values as values can
determine knowledge.
according to Manis.

Scientific knowledge is a value in itself,
From this position, it is not difficult to see

how the scientific methods of accumulating knowledge are also
pervaded with values.

As Manis (1976) says, "...from the standpoint

of society, these thedry-policies (of science) tell us what to do,
what to believe, and what to value" (1976, p. 40).

Facts, then, are

arbitrary and greatly influenced by values, which are determined by
the particular structures of societies.
The new leftists of the sixties and seventies were quick to
take up the position of Marx and Mannheim.

Friedrichs (1970) dis

cusses the return to Marxism in the sixties and says, "... the grad
uate generation of the sixties tended to see itself in humanistic
terms rather than simply in the value-free garments that had come to
be associated with the behavioral sciences" (1970, p. 34).

Fried

richs goes on to describe the subsequent conflict within sociology as
a paradigm clash between the priestly paradigm which advocates the
objective viewing and determining of social reality, and the proph
etic paradigm which includes an "awareness of the value-laden
choices and implicit commitments" of the sociologists.

Friedrichs

sees the sociologist as prophet, someone who is aware of the values
and commitments which are involved in shaping and discovering social
reality.

It is the sociologist’s duty, according to Friedrichs, to

encourage a humanistic sociology through the shaping of a humanistic
ideal which seeks to solve the problems and inequities within
society.
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Gouldner (1970) more eloquently than most recognizes the inter
weaving of ideas and social forces.

"The old society maintains it

self through theories and ideologies that establish its hegemony
over the minds of men, who therefore do not merely bite their
tongues, but submit to it willingly" (Gouldner, 1970, p. 5).

Gould

ner calls for social scientists to take social responsibility for
their actions.

Sociologists, like all people, are influenced by

the social and historical context of their lives, and furthermore
have the power and ability to influence that social and historical
context.
In the field of deviance, the issue of values has been examined
by many theorists.

Liazos (1972) discusses the manner in which

values have kept sociologists from studying "covert institutional
violence" in favor of research on "nuts, sluts, and preverts."
Liazos argues that grants and research priorities have been focused
on explaining and understanding those individuals who violate cer
tain norms, such as norms of heterosexuality, drug use, mental
health, etc., while other forms of deviance, such as white collar
and corporate crime, poverty, etc., which are largely perpetrated
by an unjust governing system, are ignored by researchers.

Thio

(1973) discusses the class bias in the study of deviance and argues
that the bias "tacitly supports the power elite..." (1973, p. 1).
In the field of criminology, Quinney has urged the utility of
studying values in law creation.

The Schwendingers (1970, 1977) not

only emphasize the importance of values, but also urge a melioristic
stance; that is, sociologists and criminologists are obliged to in
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sure the egalitarian principle for all persons.
Few sociologists, however, have been comfortable with an ex
plicit statement of values.

This may be seen as a product of the

differential philosophies of sociologists.
phies place different emphasis on values.

These varying philoso
For some sociologists,

values are contaminating and the sociologist must be divorced from
values if a body of knowledge is to be developed.

For other

sociologists, values are closely intertwined with knowledge and are
used as the basis for establishing goals for a society.

The recog

nition of the symbiotic relationship between values and knowledge
lead some sociologists to a distinct philosophical position in which
the interrelationships between knowledge and the social context is
recognized.

The latter mode is the value position held by this

researcher.

This position allows one to be holistic and consider

all aspects of social phenomena.

Within this philosophical posi

tion, an understanding of the sources of knowledge and the values
which surround and influence knowledge is possible; such under
standing enhances explanations of social phenomena.
Just as values are closely intertwined with knowledge the
perspective and method one utilizes for discovering knowledge or
"truth" will shape one's perception of the world.

Sociologists

rely on the scientific perspective to disclose "reality."

The

scientific perspective is an approach to knowledge based on
empiricism, generalizations, and verification.

Observations about

reality are made, verified by other observers, and then ordered,
through logical interrelationships, into theories which are then
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tested by other observers and observations.

The scientific

perspective will produce different interpretations of the world
than other ways of knowing (e.g., religion, intuition, common
sense).

One's beliefs as to the origin of the universe, for exam

ple, will differ depending on whether one follows the scientific
view (evolution) or the religious view (creation).

There are only

truths within particular ways of knowing.
Given the position that there are only truths within particular
ways of knowing, one is hard-pressed to find utility in scientific
research.

The utility, however, lies in an application of knowledge

and research to the material conditions of the social phenomenon
under investigation.

The test involves the ability of different

perspectives to accurately explain what appears to be reality.

The

relevance of certain theoretical positions to the actual conditions
of the phenomenon under study can and must be weighed and evaluated.
Some theoretical positions will have more explanatory power in the
real world than others.

While values are necessarily involved in

the evaluation of different ways of knowing, a careful application
to the real world provides some idea of the relevance of a partic
ular view.

Paradigms

Within the scientific perspective, there are also divergent
ways of interpreting a phenomenon.

Most individuals order their

thoughts and beliefs within a certain framework.
these frameworks paradigms.

Kuhn (1962) calls

Paradigms supply a structure, a concep
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tual framework, for pursuing a line of inquiry.

Ritzer (1975) has

extended Kuhn's ideas to sociology and sees a paradigm as:
...a fundamental image of the subject matter
within a science. It serves to define what should
be studied, what questions should be asked, and
what rules should be followed in interpreting
the answers obtained. The paradigm is the
broadest unit of consensus within a science and
serves to differentiate one scientific community
(or subcommunity) from another. It subsumes,
defines, and interrelates the exemplars, theories,
and methods and instruments that exist within
it (1975, p. 7).
Kuhn sees paradigm replacement as necessary for the growth of
knowledge.

In his view, a paradigm endures until a number of

anomalies become evident.

As these anomalies become increasingly

difficult to explain, a new paradigm emerges which can better ex
plain the phenomenon under study.

Kuhn uses as an illustrative

example, the controversy between the geo-centric Ptolemaic view of
the universe and the solar-centric Copernican view of the universe;
as the Ptolemaic view became increasingly inadequate in explaining
the movement of the planets, the Copernican model gained credibil
ity.

Kuhn uses this to point out that there may be in existence,

at any one time, contradictory paradigms; most importantly, however,
one's view of the world is shaped by the particular paradigm em
braced by the individual.
A paradigm dispute occurs when alternate paradigms exist with
in a science at a particular time.

If the fundamental image of the

subject matter differs between competing paradigms, a number of
tactics are used to support one paradigm at the expense of another.
Szymanski and Goertzel (1979) note techniques for descrediting al
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ternate views.

These include a belief that the alternate view is

concerned with material which simply isn't problematic (thus,
"supporters of another paradigm need not be taken seriously because
they are naive, unscientific, ignorant, ideological, or biased"
Szymanski & Goertzel, 1979, p. 4), a reassignment of the work to
another discipline (e.g., Marxists belong in economics), and rein
terpretation of opposing views (e.g., Gove's "testing" of labeling
theory).
The field of sociology is currently in the midst of such a
paradigm dispute.

The arguments are essentially based in the dif

ferent philosophical positions of sociologists.

The differing posi

tions result from views of the world which disclose disparate
realities.

In sociology, there are two competing paradigms.

(It

must be noted that some theorists, such as Ritzer (1975), perceive
multiple paradigms in sociology.

The position taken here is con

gruent with Kuhn's notion that two paradigms are in conflict at any
one time.)

The two competing paradigms have been various dubbed

order versus conflict, consensus versus conflict, functionalist
versus conflict, and conservative versus radical.

The major dif

ferences between the two paradigms involve their basic assumptions
of society.
The conservative view is based on a perception of society as
ordered, enduring, and integrated.

The main question concerning

this perspective is the problem of social order— how is it main
tained?

A primary assumption of this view is that societies share

certain consensually defined values which are at the heart of the
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society and upon which most members of the society agree.

In

dividuals who violate these core norms suffer from faulty sociali
zation and require sanctioning so that the system is not overly dis
rupted.

Within this view, the functionalist position is extremely

important.

Every element of the system has a function and contrib

utes to the maintenance of the system.
the consensus of its members.
world-view.

Societal order depends on

(The paradigm provides the basic

Within the conservative paradigm, there are many

theoretical perspectives which may differ somewhat in explanations
of reality.

Merton, for example, was quite concerned with

explaining "dysfunctions" within this paradigm and developed a
theory of social disorganization to explain how system maintenance
could be broken down.

The important point, however, is that

theorists within the conservative paradigm base their work on the
assumptions of the paradigm.)
The radical or conflict view is based on the work of Marx
which covers the spheres of history, economics, and political
science as well as sociology.

Thus, the radical view urges a

holistic examination of other disciplines, times, and space as well
as a focus on society as an entire system.

(This is not to say

that conservative sociology is necessarily nonholistic; to the
contrary, some conservative sociologists such as Weber and Parsons
emphasized a holistic orientation.

Modern sociologists, however,

tend to ignore holism and fragment their studies into smaller
pieces.)

The key distinction between the two approaches lies in

their assumptions of how society is ordered.

The basic assumptions
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of the radical view are nicely summarized by Dahrendorf (1958);
social change and social conflict are ubiquitous, every element in
society contributes to change, and every society rests upon the
constraint of some members by others.

Rather than focusing on

shared values and norms, this view places importance on the study of
interest groups, differential power, and economic structure as ex
ploitive mechanisms to constrain others.

(As with the conservative

paradigm, theorists within the radical paradigm may develop diver
gent perspectives which may lead to substantial variations among
theories within the paradigm.

The point again, however, is that

radical theorists hold certain basic assumptions about the nature of
society.)

A Paradigm For Corporate Crime

Examination of corporate crime can occur within both paradigms,
but with different foci of study and different results.

Within the

conservative/consensus framework, criminal corporate activities are
perceived as anomalies within a system of shared norms and values
and are exceptions which should not occur too often.

The study of

such crime, in this view, would focus on such activities as deviant
behavior.

Such a view, based on natural order, might rerult in

examination of breakdowns in social control, psychological, maladies,
etc.

In treating such behavior as deviant, the real conditions of

the phenomenon may be overlooked.

Evidence suggests that corporate

crime is not really exceptional in American society.

In a recent

study, Clinard and Yeager (1980), using a legalistic definition,
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found that in the years 1975 and 1976, 60% of 582 corporations and
477 manufacturers were charged with violations of criminal, civil,
and/or regulatory codes; of these, some 47% had multiple violations.
These were only official actions and according to Clinard and
Yeager (1980), "...are probably only the tip of the iceberg of total
violations..." (p. 111).

The scope of such activities is also

limited by Clinard and Yeager's legalistic framework for ascertain
ing what type of activity is criminal.
The real conditions indicate that the relevance of the conserv
ative view in explaining corporate crime is somewhat suspect.

Cer

tainly, the heavy incidence of corporate crime suggests that the
conservative model is deficient in explaining and understanding the
etiology of corporate crime.
The radical paradigm emphasizes the power of some over others
and the ability of certain individuals and groups to implement
their will over the will of others.

Within the area of corporate

crime, examination of these^factors is crucially important.

Large

corporations have a significant impact on the lives of all members
of society.

They have become behemoths capable of influencing most

institutions within society.

To pretend that they represent "core

values" and norms of societal members (ala Friedman, 1962 and
Epstein, 1972) is naive; they, more than any other entity, sig
nificantly shape the political, economic, and social climate of
society.

The radical paradigm more closely fits the material con

ditions of corporate crime.

Corporate crime, as prevalent as it

appears to be, suggests the unequal power distribution in society.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Radical sociology, with its emphasis on the understanding of power
relations more closely approximates the real conditions, existing
in American society, which enable corporations to so easily commit
crimes.

The radical paradigm is the basic framework used in this

endeavor.

(Within a paradigm, many theories may be found.

separate theories are not at issue here.
of thought is the radical paradigm.

These

The organizing framework

This suggests the direction of

the research, the kinds of questions to be asked, the issues to ex
plore, etc.

Specific theories will be discussed later.)

Consequences of Corporate .Crime

There are now on record a substantial number of case studies
documenting the real and potential consequences of corporate crime.
Vandivier (1972), for example, has documented the manipulation of
data in the case of Goodrich brakes which could have led to deaths
or injuries of test pilots when the faulty brakes failed.

Gellert

(1981) discussed the refusal of Eastern Airlines to replace and/or
repair faulty autopilots which were responsible for at least one
major airline crash.

McCarthy (1972) has delineated the financial,

physical, and emotional costs to one individual who purchased de
fective General Motor buses.

Elliot (1981) pointed out the hazards

of unsafe construction sites.

The list could be continued at

length, but the important issues revolve around the lack of public
recognition of the consequences of corporate crime, the lack of con
cern about corporate crime, and the unique types of consequences
connected with corporate crime,

as Geis (1973) noted, in reference
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to deterring corporate crime, "The first prerequisite for imposing
heavier sanctions on corporate criminals involves the development
of a deepening sense of moral outrage on the part of the public"
(1978, p. 282).
Ross, as early as 1907, was aware of the tolerance of the pub
lic to white-collar crime when he commented that the "criminaloid"
(his term) had "not yet come under the effective ban of public
opinion" (1907, p. 48).

Such opinions continue to the present.

Yet, data on public recognition of the consequences of corporate
crime are relatively scarce.

Rossi et al. (1974) studied a 1972

sample of Baltimore residents who had ranked the seriousness of 140
crimes.

While there was not much approval for white-collar criminal

offenses, such offenses ranked lower in seriousness than more tra
ditional offenses (i.e., violent crime, crime agaiust property, drug
peddling, etc.).

A 1980 replication of the Rossi study by Cullen,

Link, and Polanski found that "...white-collar crime has increased
in seriousness more than any other offense category, but that it is
still viewed as less serious than most other forms of illegality"
(1980, p. 1).

They also point out a few particular areas where

concern has become more apparent; these are violent offenses (e.g.,
acts which have the potential of physically harming persons such as
manufacturing and selling harmful products, refusal to repair
machinery of rental units, etc.) and corporate price-fixing.
Schrager and Short (1980) note that public perception rates crimes
with physicial impacts as more serious than crimes with an economic
impact, though the latter is most often the focus of study for
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students of white-collar crime.

Clinard and Yeager (1980) present

findings by Wolfgang (1979) and the National Survey of Crime
Severity (1978) which indicate that "(t)he public today regards
white-collar and corporate crime as serious offenses— in fact as
equal to, and even more serious than, many "ordinary" crimes such
as burglary and robbery" (1980, p. 5).

Until this recent study,

however, concern with white-collar and corporate crime has been
minimal.
According to Conklin (1977), a primary reason for past public
tolerance of white-collar crime "...may be because the offenses
themselves and their impact on society are difficult to comprehend"
(1977, p. 17).

Conklin cites the problems of diffused victimization

(both over time and individuals), hidden costs, lack of direct con
frontation, and difficulty in perceiving corporations as acting en
tities as being at least partially responsible for lack of recogni
tion of the consequences of business crime.

Clinard and Yeager

(1980) argue that the public exhibits less fear of the long term
effects of corporate crime; for example, one is less threatened by
or fearful of perhaps dying from a debilitating pollution-caused
disease than one is by encountering a mugger in a dark alley.

Vic

tims can also, according to Clinard and Yeager, be unaware of their
own victimization (e.g., "puffery," monopoly-pricing, etc.).

Fin

ally, the authors note the relative absence of professional in
terest (by criminologists) in the study of corporate crime as
perhaps perpetuating a lack of public recognition of the conse
quences of corporate crime.

Schrager and Short (1980) concur and
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state:
It may be comforting to believe that we merely
measure the existing state of opinion in society
at large. In the case of white-collar crime it
seems evident that we have failed to ask the
proper questions that would delineate the dimen
sions on which seriousness is judged. The con
sequences of this error are compounded when we
then proceed to infer lack of public concern
about the phenomenon, and therefore transfer
to the public responsibility for the lack of
attention given these offenses (1980, p. 29).
While Schrager and Short urge the education of the public as to the
harmful consequences of
education

such crime, it should not be inferred that

is sufficient to stir "moral outrage."

the lack of concern with corporate
The consequences of corporate

crime is

As Conklinnoted,

a complex

crime are enormous

business.
and far more

harmful in terms of economic and physical costs than are the con
sequences of traditional crime (Geis, 1974; Schrager and Short, 1978
Clinard and Yeager, 1980; Conklin, 1977).

Clinard and Yeager (1980)

point out that the largest single robbery in the United States in
volved $4 million stolen from the Lufthansa warehouse.

This con

trasts with oil company overcharges in 1979 which exceeded $1 bil
lion and admitted Lockheed bribes of $30
Yeager, 1980, p. 8).

The physical

to

costs of

$38 million (Clinardand
corporate

crime also

outweigh those of traditional crimes; environmental pollution, for
example, costs many lives per year.

Conklin (1977) estimates the

costs of business crime to be $40 billion annually and contrasts
that figure with the $3 to $4 billion estimated to be the combined
costs of larceny, burglary, robbery, and auto theft.
number of types of consequences of corporate crime.

There are a
These may be
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described as economic impacts, physical impact, and social im
pacts.

Economic Impacts

The economic impacts of corporate crime are difficult to ac
curately ascertain (due to problems of examining large corporations,
diffusion of victims, etc.).

Indications of the severity of the

economic exploitation, however, can be isolated.

The New York

Times ran a survey (1979) which indicated that violations of federal
laws cost "billions of dollars" (Clinard and Yeager, 1980, p. 8).
A subcommittee on antitrust (Philip Hart, chair) determined that
federal law violations resulted in additional annual costs of $174
to $231 billion to consumers (Clinard and Yeager, 1980, p. 8).

The

Department of Justice estimated such costs as between $10 and $20
billion annually (Clinard and Yeager, 1S80, p. 8).

In addition, the

IRS reports that unreported corporate income costs the government
$1.2 billion annually (Clinard and Yeager, 1980, p. 8).

Such es

timates verify the observations of individuals who have long studied
white-collar and corporate crime.

Geis (1973) mentioned the "enor

mous financial burden" (p. 281) of corporate crime.

Sutherland (1949)

stated that financial costs were paid by "...consumers, competitors,
stockholders, and other investors, inventors, and employees,...
the State, in the form of tax frauds and bribery of public officials"
(p. 217).

Green, Moore, and Wasserstein (1972) noted that "Mil

lions of dollars are involved in antitrust crime, government kick
backs, and securities frauds..." (p. 527).
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22
Physical Impacts

The physical impacts of corporate crime are even more out
standing than the economic consequences.

Over 100,000 deaths per

year are attributed to occupationally related diseases, the majority
of which are caused by the willful disregard of government health
and safety laws (Schrager and Short, 1978).

Elkins (1976) notes

that the increasing harm caused through pollution and dangerous
consumer products requires drastic steps on the part of the law.
Physical harm may befall three groups:

employees, consumers, and

the general public (Schrager and Short, 1978).
Employees may suffer from unsafe working conditions which may
not be readily recognized; "black lung," cancer, and liver ailments
are some of the delayed consequences to employees.

Agran (1979) has

researched and documented industrial related cancers and states that
the "...U.S. and international authorities have estimated that 80%
of human cancers, perhaps even 90%, are environmentally induced...
the vast majority...derive from direct and indirect exposure to in
dustrial carcinogens" (p. 433).

While Agran cannot establish a true

cause and effect relationship, he cites evidence of exposure to
carcinogens among employees of fiberglass plants, rubber plants,
steel plants, asbestos manufacturers, uranium and other mineral
mines, and the plastics industries, and relates such exposure to the
increased incidence of cancers.
In addition to the physical impact of exposure to carcinogens,
employees may also be subject to dangerous and/or unsafe working
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conditions.

Elliot (1981) documents the dangers to construction

workers when OSHA rules and regulations are ignored.

Mine safety

rules are often ignored resulting in disasters such as the Scotia
mine where 26 miners were killed (Caudill, 1980).

Schrager and

Short (1978) note that "...more than one-half of all work accidents
are caused either by illegal safety violations (thirty percent) or
by legal but unsafe conditions (twenty-four percent)" (p. 413).
Consumers also suffer the physical consequences of corporate
crime.

Consumers seldom have the expertise to decide if products

are physically safe, and they generally rely on regulatory agencies
to detect harmful products.

Many industries acknowledge this; a

spokesperson for the automobile industry comments that "...the
automobile is a technically complex product, and most consumers do
not have the time nor the inclination to become experts on its
technical aspects" (White, 1977, p. 179).

Regulatory agencies, how

ever, may leave unsafe products on the shelf while determinations
of safety are made— a process that may take some time.

Certain

birth control pills, for example, were kept on the market despite
findings which showed potential harm to consumers and were not
removed until more conclusive findings were reached.

In Michigan,

PBB contamination was not only concealed from the public, but con
taminated animals were allowed to be sold while determination of
levels of harmfulness were being made (Spitzer, 1977).

The Ford

Pinto was sold for eight years while the NHTSA attempted to certify
its deficiencies (Dowie, 1977).

MER/29 was kept on the market

despite its serious and sometimes fatal side effects (Ungar, 1972).
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Until fairly recently, and indeed to some extent today, the
doctrine of caveat emptor prevailed, effectively making the consumer
responsible for actions on the part of corporations.

Magnuson and

Carper (1968) document many cases of consumer fraud and conclude
that "...the dishonest steal quietly off to count their loot, while
the injured consumer is sacrificed..." (p. 43).

They discuss the

lack of legal recourse available to victims of fraud and argue that
caveat emptor is often the order of the day.

Braithwaite and Condon

(1979) echo this concern and argue that consumers, the victims, are
traditionally blamed for their own victimization.

Typical examples

include flammable nightware for children where parents may be blamed
for not watching the child and keeping him/her from a fire, when in
fact the garment is "needlessly flammable."

The "nut behind the

wheel" ideology, prevalent in the auto industry, blames drivers
rather than unsafe automobiles for auto mishaps.

As Braithwaite and

Condon conclude, "The ideology of individualism seeks to locate blame
individually, even for injuries to persons that are the outcome of
institutional arrangements..." (1979, p. 233).
sumers are twofold:

The dangers to con

firstly, consumer health and safety may be

threatened by unsafe products, and secondly, consumers have the ad
ded burden of being blamed when their health and safety are affected
by unsafe products.
The general public is also victimized by corporate crime.
vironmental pollution affects almost everyone.

En

Many environmental

risks are unknown to and/or beyond the control of the general
public.

Oil spills, nuclear and chemical wastes are common phenom
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ena in contemporary times and have some effect on total populations.
Threatening conditions are not often discerned by the general public,
rendering it incapable of dealing with the condition.

Nader (1970),

for example, equates "smogging" with mugging and claims the problem
has taken on the proportions of a "massive crime wave" (p. viii) and
argues that "the efflux from motor vehicles, plants, and incinera
tors of sulpher oxides, hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide, oxides of
nitrogen, particulates, and many more contaminants amounts to com
pulsory consumption of violence by most Americans..." (p. viii).
Further examples abound.

Jacobson (1980) notes that American food

manufacturers have added to and/or changed the typical American diet
so that serious health problems result.

Greer (1980) documents the

pollution of the Calumet river and its impact on surrounding en
virons.

Acid precipitation has been shown to have caused the pollu

tion of lakes in the Adirondacks so that fish can no longer live
there ("Acid from the sky," 1980).

All of these examples of en

vironmental destruction are threatening to the general public.

Social Impacts

A more intangible aspect (in terms of measurement) of the con
sequences of corporate crime involves what Geis (1974) calls the
"social costs" of such crime.

These costs revolve primarily around

the cynicism so prevalent in American society today.

While such

cynicism is not solely due to the power of corporations, there is
some sense among the populace that the American economic system does
not realize the ideals it purports to provide.

Ramsey Clark (1970),
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former attorney general of the United States, argues that whitecollar crime breaks down faith In people, especially those who hold
positions of trust.

He argues that white-collar crime "questions

our moral fiber" (p. 38).

Nader, Green, and Seligman (1977)

Itemize a number of social consequences of white-collar crime.

In

cluded in the list are discrimination, "white-collar" blues,
political power which ignores the wishes of individuals, invasion
of privacy, deceptive information, irresponsible technology, and the
concentration of wealth and income.

Edelhertz (1978) argues that

such crime "can have a serious influence on the social fabric and on
the freedom of commercial and interpersonal transactions" (p. 49).
Clinard and Yeager (1980) point out that corporate crime poses a
serious threat not only to the "moral fabric" of society, but also
to the survival of the American capitalist system.

"When the rules

of the game by which the free enterprise system operates, par
ticularly the basic tenets of free and open competition, are dis
regarded, the entire system is endangered" (p. 11).
The consequences of corporate crime are indeed great and in
clude not only economic costs, but also physical costs and social
impacts.

Detecting these consequences has not been easy and it is

only in recent years that there is more public concern with these
activities.

The consequences far exceed the consequences of tra

ditional crime-.

This is not to say that traditional "street" crime

should be ignored; it too threatens the economic, physical, and
social well-being of the American public, however, an examination
of the consequences of "crime in the suites" demonstrates that
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such crime is also serious and deserves closer scrutiny.

Definitional Divergencies

Defining corporate crime is currently an issue of controversy.
While there is some agreement among contemporary sociologists as to
thr need for an examination of corporate crime, there is little,
if any, consensus as to how this should be done.

Almost all current

texts or readers dealing with corporate crime preface their endeavors
with an explanation of the problems of definition.

Geis and Meier

(1977), for example, devote the first chapter and parts of the final
chapter of their book to the definition of white-collar crime and
the controversial aspects of definition.

Clinard and Yeager (1980)

treat the definitional issue in the first chapter while Geis and
Scotland (1980) spend some time in their introduction reviewing the
"... inordinate amount of attention to problems of definition" (p.

11).
There is certainly some basis for the concern of scholars with
the definitional issues.

Definitions serve a number of purposes.

In order to proceed with theoretical analysis of a phenomenon,
conceptually clear definitions are required.

These help to delineate

the parameters of a field so one knows what is being discussed.
Unfortunately, definitions may also instill blinders as well as
removing others.

Jackall (1980) notes "By insisting on a strict

definition of the field, the "legalists" claim not only to stake
out a sharply focused field of inquiry but also to avoid the
moralistic pitfalls which have beset the sociology of deviance.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

In

28
the process, however, they may have excluded some of the most
Interesting, if ambiguous, issues from examination" (p. 355).
Geis and Stotland (1980) concur with this view and attest that
"...definitions also inevitably represent somewhat arbitrary con
clusions superimposed upon individualistic "real" matters.

In short,

definitions both clarify and obfuscate, lighting up one segment of a
situation at the expense of pushing another into the shadows"
(p. 11).
The controversy over definitions is seen by Aubert (1977) as
innately important in itself.

Aubert argues that the ambivalence

over definition is itself of sociological interest; through exam
ination of such ambivalence, the process of "...important norm con
flicts, clashing group interests, and maybe incipient social change
..." (p. 268) can be discerned.

Thus Aubert believes examination of

white-collar crime should begin with the ambivalent attitudes rather
than by classification of "crimes" and "not crimes."

A similar ap

proach is taken by Carson (1980) in an attempt to skirt the defini
tional issue.

The position taken by Aubert and Carson is an attempt

to understand the features of corporate crime which make definition
so difficult.

Both Aubert and Carson urge an interactionist ap

proach which seeks to understand the processes involved in defining
certain activities as criminal.

While their approach does not

result in a definition of corporate crime, it does show the struggle
within the area to realize a common definition of the phenomenon.
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29
Historical Views

The field of white-collar crime has been plagued by defini
tional problems since its origin as a field of study.

Ross (1907)

identified the appropriate field when he 'noted that crimes,
tolerated by the public, were committed by individuals who "occupy
the cabin rather than the steerage of society" (p. 30).

Ross

dubbed such criminals as "criminaloids" and identified a number of
their characteristics which facilitated their ability to commit
white-collar crime.
Sutherland (1940) first identified a phenomenon which he called
"white-collar crime" when he noted the inability of theories of
crime causation to account for crimes by individuals in high status
positions.

Sutherland argued that people in high status positions

committed crimes comparable in seriousness to traditional crimes,
but that these people were differentially viewed and sanctioned
because of their positions.

"Because of their social status, they

have a loud voice in determining what goes into statutes and how the
criminal law as it affects themselves is implemented and adminis
tered" (Sutherland, 1940, p. 45).

Sutherland stated that white-

collar crime is "real criminality...violation of the criminal law"
(p. 49).

He, thus, implicitly defined white-collar crime in terms

of law, and more specifically, the criminal law.

Sutherland urged,

however, that criminologists broaden the concept of crime from
"conviction in the criminal courts" to include sanctions by adminis
trative or regulatory agencies and "convictability" (when criminal
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action occurs but the perpetrator is not convicted) as indicators
of crime (1940, pp. 5-6).

He also added a social component by say

ing that white-collar crime occurred in civil violation only when it
resulted in some social injury.

Sutherland's major contribution is

seen to be the identification of the phenomenon, emphasis on the
upperworld or "respectable classes" as perpetrators of crimes, and
identifying linkages between occupational position and the criminal
act.
In reaction to Sutherland, Tappan (1947) argued that only those
activities legally proscribed can be considered crimes; that is,
"antisocial behavior" is a phrase laden with subjective value judg
ment and is therefore unsuitable as an area of study.

Tappan ar

gues, furthermore, that the appropriate individuals for study are
only those7criminals who have been adjudicated (1947, p. 277), since
they provide a sample of all criminals.

Tappan's view is extremely

conservative for by his definition and research guidelines, there
are few, if any, criminals who may be considered white-collar
criminals.

The dearth of studies dealing with white-collar crime is

thus natural, since there are so few adjudicated white-collar
criminals.
Despite Tappan, Sutherland's notion of white-collar crime
dominated the field (small as it was).

Hartung (1950) further

refined the definition by requiring that white-collar crime be
limited to proscribed acts with sanctions, adding that sociologists
"cannot properly be concerned in criminology with what should be
criminal, but only with what is criminal" (p. 156).

Lane (1953)
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also supports the view that criminal and civil violations consti
tuted the field of white-collar crime as did Quinney in an early
work (1964).
A major problem in the field was pointed out by Newman (1958)
who noted that the definition of white-collar crime could be broad
ened to include all occupational levels, not merely Sutherland's
"respectable classes."

Clinard and Quinney (1973) took heed of this

suggestion and divided Sutherland's field into two types:
tional crime and corporate crime.

occupa

Occupational crime was to include

those crimes committed by individuals in the course of their occupa
tions for their own self-interest, while corporate crime included
those illegal activities committed by corporations or corporate of
ficials intended to serve the interests of the corporation.

This

useful distinction tends to prevail today and its conceptualization
contributed a great deal in separating individual acts from or
ganizational acts (to be discussed in more detail later).

Contemporary Views

The current state of the definitional dilemma is best des
cribed by Jackall (1980) who says, "Perhaps the most fundamental
dispute is the definitional one over what actually constitutes the
purview of the field" (pp. 354-355).

There are a number of basic

issues involved in finding a solution to this quandary.

Defining Criminology.

A basic issue involves the appropriate

field of criminology; that is, is criminology more than mere legal
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ism?

Sutherland never intended for the study of white-collar crime

to be a separate and unique field of criminology; rather, he argued
for an expanded scope of criminology.

He used, as an example, the

addition of the field of juvenile delinquency to criminology even
though delinquency is quite often different than criminal viola
tions.

Similarly, in posing an arena of white-collar crime, he

went outside of the strict criminal law to include civil violations.
His intentions were "...an attempt to reform the theory of criminal
behavior...." (1940, p. v) so that all types of criminal behavior
could be explained.
His view has been shared by other sociologists.

Burgess (1950)

in response to Hartung's examination of wartime offenses in the meat
industry, argues that there are and should be distinctions between
legalistic and sociological positions.

Burgess prefers to look at

sociological differences between law violators and defines that as
an appropriate field of study.

Blumberg (1974) states that crim

inology is more than legalism; in his view, social and historical
factors are also important in determining definitions of crime.
Blumberg, further, sees a legalistic definition as overly simplistic;
rather, he argues, the field of criminology must question and examine
the process whereby social order is created, especially in terms of
distribution of power.

Such an examination will reveal the process

of criminalization.
The discussion of what is appropriate for the field of crim
inology is evident within the area of corporate crime.

Criminol

ogists within this area of study have tended to divide themselves
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into two basic frameworks:
harm framework.

a legalistic framework and a social

The legalistic view relies on legal definitions of

crime (this may include criminal and civil violations) as delinea
ting the parameters of the field of corporate crime while the so
cial harm view uses broader criteria (often idiosyncratic) to set
the boundaries of the field.

In addition to these two broad frame

works, a small group of writers have sought to redefine the field
and thus sidestep the definitional issue.

These will be more care

fully examined below.

Legalistic Views.

The legalistic view is based on the premise

that crime is whatever the law defines it to be.

Implicit in such a

view is the notion that the state or government is value-neutral and
the law is a means of achieving the good of the majority.

The view

hinges on value-consensus, with theorists arguing that the law, in
some way, reflects the common good or collective sentiments of
society.

Again, implicit in this view, is the belief that there

exists underlying or basic values of society— consensual values—
which should be reflected in law.

Such a position has been taken by

many students of corporate crime.

Sutherland, for example, restric

ted his definition to acts that were proscribed through criminal law,
civil law, or administrative agencies.

Hartung (1950) limits his

definition to "...a violation of law regulating business..."
(p. 154).

Newman (1958) restricts the field to deviations from

administrative and regulatory laws.

Edelhertz (1970) restricts his

definition to an "...illegal act or series of illegal acts..." (p.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

34
3).
Geis (1974) confines his definition to legally defined crimes,
but also Includes those acts committed by persons or groups with
high status positions which are criminal in nature but subject to
other administrative decisions.

He omits acts deemed socially harm

ful (but not illegal) because of the "definitional quicksand" in
volved.

Jackall (1980) also is concerned over expanding the defini

tion of corporate crime, arguing that inclusion of social harm
criteria are "morally problematic."
since it avoids "moral pitfalls."

He prefers the legalistic view
Schrager and Short (1978) sug

gest a definition which has room for social harm criteria, but
preface that definition by including only "illegal acts" (p. 411).
In effect, they have added to the murkiness of the definitional
problem by requiring that acts be both illegal and socially "have a
serious physical or economic effect" (p. 412).

Numerous other

theorists have used and supported the legalistic view (e.g., Clinard,
Quinney, and Conklin).

A recent statement used by Clinard and

Yeager (1980) in their comprehensive examination of corporate crime
typifies current legalistic thought.

"A corporate crime is any act

committed by corporations that is punished by the state, regardless
of whether it is punished under administrative, civil, or criminal
law" (p. 16).

Social Harm Views.

Within this position, the legal responsibil

ity of individuals and groups is not necessarily synonymous with
moral, ethical, or responsible behavior (See, for example, the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

35
Schwendingers, 1970).

The Interrelationship between Interest groups

and the law-making process preclude value-consensus and tend to
produce laws which are favorable to certain groups at the expense
of others.

This emphasis has only recently gained importance in

criminology and the sociology of law.

Some early criminologists

(e.g., Bonger, Sutherland, & Tannenbaum) were troubled by the
unquestioned acceptance of law as arbiter of behavior and raised is
sues which questioned the value-consensus approach.

Honigman (1959),

a contemporary sociologist, rediscovered the connection between
"value-conflict and legislation."

In his view, law as the determiner

of conflicts runs the risk of not being value-neutral.

"It is pos

sible that the moral power of a legislature or legislator may be so
great that the act of legislation converts a section of the popula
tion to new beliefs and in so doing removes support from a set of
conflicting values" (1959, p. 36).
Chambliss (1971) argues that the state cannot be value-free,
either in enforcement or creation of law.

He finds the origin of

laws not in some natural law or consensus, but in certain interest
groups which are closely connected to the political and economic
structure of society.

"...(E)very detailed study of the emergence

of legal norms has consistently shown the immense importance of
interest-group activity, not "the public interest," as the critical
variable in determining the content of legislation" (Chambliss &
Seidman, 1971, p. 73).
Because of the belief that law does not always reflect social
concerns, nor necessarily advance values important to all members of
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society, radical theorists reject a legalistic definition of cor
porate crime.

Clinard and Quinney (1973), for example, argue that

law may be oppressive.

Quinney (1975) also adds that law tends to

preserve existing systems rather than reflecting the wishes of the
public.

He adds that law must be demystified.

Platt (1975) adds

that it is not feasible to "accept the fiction of neutral.law" (p.
103).

Goff and Reasons (1980), after presenting an empirical exam

ination of Canadian combines (antitrust) laws, determined that the
hegemony of ruling elites results in support of "the general in
terests of capitalism rather than necessarily the specific in
terests of particular capitalists" (p. 136).

This often results in

the state receiving great pressure to support business to the pos
sible exclusion of the public.

In their view, crime cannot be

examined without looking at the social, political, and economic con
text in which it occurs.
While many theorists are content to criticize the existing
system, some others attempt to broaden the concept of criminality
to compensate for the biased legal order.

The Schwendingers (1970)

argue that corporate crime in capitalist societies is often rewarded
and that reliance on legalistic views ignores a large group of ac
tivities which are socially harmful.

They wish to supplant legalis

tic views with a human values or "natural rights" approach.

They

loosely define crime as a violation of politically-defined human
rights.

Included among these human rights are food, shelter,

clothing, dignity, self-determination, and challenging work.

While

the Schwendingers recognize that their definition is cursory and
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arbitrary, they add, "In this process of redefining crime, criminol
ogists will redefine themselves, no longer to be the defenders of
order but rather the guardians of human rights.

In reconstructing

their standards, they should make men, not institutions, the measure
of all things" (p. 138).

Platt (1575) also urges a human rights

definition of crime and argues that "The State and legal apparatus,
rather than directing our investigations, should be a central focus
of investigation..." (p. 103).

Turk (1977) summarizes the radical

position by noting that "criminality is behavior that exploits
vulnerable others, whether or not it is defined as crime in legal
formulas or practice" (p. 216).

Redefiners.

A number of theorists dodge the issue of legalis

tic versus social harm definitions by redefining the activities of
large corporations and their agents.

Sutton and Wild (1979),

for example, wish to avoid the labeling of activities as criminal
and ” ... contend that social scientists should set aside these emo
tions and attempt an empathetic or intuitive understanding from
within (verstebeo)..." (p. 314).

In their view, study of the ac

tivities, without judgment, is the appropriate solution to defini
tional problems.

Jackall (1980) argues that a legalistic defini

tion, the proper field for the study of criminology, is inadequate
for examination of corporate activities which occur within a larger
moral context.

He sees the appropriate field of study as being not

criminology, but "the sociology of corporate and government scan
dal" (p. 355).

Pepinsky (1974) urges a broader definition of white-
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collar crime, arguing that Sutherland’s definition is not adequately
conceptualized and does not eliminate social bias.
proposes to broaden the area to one of exploitation.

Pepinsky
In his view,

exploitation is a process to "deprive others of the use of private
property" (p. 230).

Challenges to "an alleged use of private prop

erty" (p. 229) are as important as a focus of study as the actual
act of deprivation.

Pepinsky

wishes to combine all kinds of acts

for "conceptual unity;" thus,

no new field is created but better

explanation of human behavior

may be derived.

Ermann and Lundman (1978)
deviance.

argue that the appropriate field is

Their focus is on organizational acts which come to be

defined as deviant; in fact, they emphasize that "organizational
acts, however much they are abhored by the authors of this book,
our readers, or others, are not deviant until they are consensually
defined as deviant by others" (pp. 17-18).

While such a definition

may raise some methodological issues (how many make a consensus?
what others?), it effectively eliminates the legalism versus social
harm issue.

A Working Definition

The problem of definition is not easily resolved and one is
tempted to be content with Geis and Stotland's (1980) "intuitively
satisfying understanding" of the subject.

They argue, with some

validity, that white-collar crime is a "broad term that encompas
ses a wide range of offenses, abuses, and crime whose outer bounda
ries are as yet ill-drawn and perhaps not precisely definable" (p.
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11).

The problem of setting parameters is somewhat minimized, how

ever, when the scholar and/or researcher recognizes the inherent
biases and the reification involved in setting definitions.
In keeping with a radical/Marxist framework, definitions based
on legal views will not be sufficient to define the field of cor
porate crime.

Legalistic views do not consider the power of'

corporations and/or a ruling elite in formulating and enforcing
law.

Such views are largely ahistorical and do not include in their

parameters a study of the origin of law which is vital to an under
standing of corporate power.
A working definition of corporate crime must be based on an
understanding of the political economy of the United States and
the resultant impact of that political economy on the legal system.
Thus, a social harm criterion-based definition is seen as more via
ble for this research.

Such a definition includes behaviors (de

tected or not) which violate the legal code (criminal, civil, or
administrative), but expands the parameters to include actions which
may not be illegal, but nevertheless contribute to the economic,
physical, or social deprivation of individuals within society.
Such a definition expands the scope of criminology as advocated by
Blumberg (1974), to question and examine the process whereby order
is created.
The working definition will also be confined to corporate
crime; that is, activities by corporations or their agents or offi
cials which are intended to serve corporate rather than individual
aims.

(Sometimes the two may overlap; the key determinant, however,
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as to whether an action is corporate crime is dependent on whether
or not the action was intended to serve the corporation's interest.
In other words, individual white-collar crime may, under the right
circumstances, also be corporate crime.

Such intent may not be

easily ascertained, nor indeed, conscious on the part of the in
dividual.

The distinction may be somewhat simplistic, yet it

provides a criterion by which one can attempt to measure certain
actions.)

This is congruent with the Ciinard and Quinney (1973)

distinction between occupational and corporate crime.
A major problem in using a social harm definition is that
"harm" is a value-laden term.

The Schwendingers (1970) have side

stepped the issue by requiring that rights be politically determined
(some sort of political consensus, one supposes).

More importantly,

the Schwendingers claim some rights are basic human rights and ac
tions which violate such rights are criminal.

While there may be

arguments as to what constitutes human rights, a working defini
tion should include activities which violate these human rights.
Recognizing that agreement on the definition is not likely, but
simultaneously recognizing that some parameters should be set, the
following working definition of corporate crime is offered:
Corporate crime consists of actions by cor
porations or their agents or officials which
are in the corporate interest and which destroy
or threaten to destroy the basic liberties of
individuals or groups within society, whether
or not those actions are constrained by the
legal system.
The basic liberties of individuals or groups must be care
fully examined.

A purely "natural rights" perspective allows the
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inclusion of almost any corporate behavior as criminal; this ob
viously broadens the definition too much.

When speaking of basic

liberties! the notion of degrees may help clarify the definition.
Dworkin (1977) advocates the arrangement of rights into a
hierarchy so that some rights are superordinate to others.
Any political theory...may arrange the collec
tive goals, individual rights, and individual
duties in such a way as to make one set of
these fundamental and the others derivative.
It will, for example, argue that citizens must
have certain duties because these are necessary
to protect the rights of others or to secure
a collective goal, or it may argue that they
must have certain rights, or pursue certain
collective goals...(Dworkin, 1977, pp. 13-14).
Using a notion of hierarchy, the basic liberties of individuals or
groups may be evaluated to determine the extent to which collective
good is threatened.

Antitrust legislation, for example, limits the

basic liberty of porift making, but does so for the economic good of
the larger society.

In such a case, then, group liberties predomi

nate over the best interests of the corporation.
tion,which threatens the basic

Forcedintegra

liberties of some individuals en

hances the community as a whole (or is purported to) and is thus not
a violation of basic liberties when considered from a group perspec
tive.
This is congruent with the Marxian perspective which also is
concerned with the common good.

Weichelt (1975) sums up the impor

tance of a hierarchy of "good:"
...the free unfolding of the personality does
not take place at the expense and to the
detriment of others, and where selfish motives
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and corresponding measures cannot transform
the freedom into non-freedom for others, but
where each disposes of all possibilities for
promoting his personal inclinations, talents,
and abilities, thanks to the orientation on
the common good (Weichelt, 1975, pp. 6-7).
Thus, the hierarchy of rights must be considered in determining
what is crime.
Dworkin, furtherfore, recognizes the changing nature of
laws, arguing that concern over behaviors and laws "...will, of
course, have a different content at different times, because it will
be aroused when the actual law, or some proposed law, seems...un
just" (1977, p. 7).

The nature of crime, then, is contingent on

societal conditions, a hierarchy of liberties and rights, and the
recognition of "unjust" acts.

This poses limitations for the above

definition of corporate crime.
Crime, from such a view, is not static; thus, neat categoriza
tions of what is and what is not crime cannot be made.

Each case

must be considered on an individual basis and examined so that it
may be ascertained to what extent basic liberties have been violated.
It must be further determined to what degree of importance such
violation is offensive to the "communal good."

It is probably

impossible to produce a definition which applies on a universal
basis.

Nevertheless, an individual examination of cases may define

some large areas of violation.

For example, few people would argue

that, in the hierarchy of rights, pollution poses a dangerous threat
to individuals which is justified by the rights of corporations to
make profits.

Such actions, then, fall within the scope of the
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definition offered for corporate crime.

Similarly, there is some

logic to affirmative action, for though it may threaten the personal
rights of an individual belonging to a predominant social group in
society, it addresses the higher rights of other groups which oc
cupy lower statuses in American society.

Problems will occur within

"grey" areas; that is, areas where it is difficult to ascertain a
hierarchy of rights.
moment, unsolved.

This problem must be left, at least for the

The dynamic nature of society implies that

hierarchies of rights also shift and change.

The working definition

should not be taken as an indication of absolute, determination of
criminal or noncriminal behavior; it simply supplies a framework for
this research and is considered more satisfying than Geis and Stotland's (1980) "intuitive satisfying understanding."

Organizational Aspects of Corporate Crime

The study of corporate crime has been largely confined to
the study of individuals who commit such crimes.

Sutherland (1940)

in identifying the phenomenon of white-collar crime, examined seven
ty large corporations which had been administratively or legally
sanctioned, and developed an explanatory theory of white-collar
crime based on differential association; that is, white-collar crime
is learned in interaction with other white-collar criminals.

Al

though Sutherland recognized (and devoted a chapter in his book to)
the many factors such as social disorganization, age of corporation,
corporate position in the economic structure, etc. which could
supplement individual explanations of white collar crime, he focused
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on the individual level, arguing that the individual learns to com
mit crime and if conditions are favorable, commits such crime on
an individual basis.

Sutherland's (1940) theory has received

limited support from Clinard (1946) in a study of violations of war
time regulations, Lane (1953) in a study of regulation violations
in the shoe industry, and Geis (1967) in a study of the heavy elec
trical equipment price-fixing case.
Differential association focuses on the individual and the
social-psychological processes of learning.

Many sociologists

argue that such an explanation cannot be adequately applied to cor
porate crime; rather, there is in the criminological literature an
increasing emphasis on organizational explanations of such crime.
Quinney (1964) advocates the establishment of a typology to
more accurately separate offenders and offenses.

Leonard and Weber

(1970) studied illegalities in car dealerships and cited the im
portance of market structure and the corporate organization's
response to it, in commission of such crime.

Schrager and Short

(1978) have recognized the importance of the organizational aspects.
They urge criminologists to see organizations as potentially
criminogenic and call for an examination of organizational charac
teristics.

Ermann and Lundman (1978) argue that an organizational

level of analysis is needed to explain corporate deviance.
The notion of organizational crime or deviance is becoming
increasingly important in this field.

Coleman (1974) argues that

corporations are made up of positions, not individuals who tem
porarily occupy those positions, and that the power of an organiza
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tion lies in its structure.
sui geoeris.

Coleman (1974) sees organizations as

In his view, cases such as the heavy electrical equip

ment antitrust case are examples of corporate malfeasance rather
than crimes on the part of individuals who are employed by the
corporation.

Coleman also points out the increasing recognition of

this phenomenon by noting the emergence of "juristic persons" which
are legal descriptions of organizations or other entities which may
be culpable under the law.

The importance of the concept of or

ganizational, rather than individual, crime cannot be minimized and
will be further discussed in the next chapter.
such a view are clear.

Some implications of

Within such a framework, in criminal courts

individuals within organizations will not necessarily be held solely
responsible for the consequences of organizational activities.

In

terms of explanation, new theoretical views will be necessary as
most contemporary theories of crime are concerned with the indivi
dual and his/her act.

Theories must be developed which can explain

how and why an organization can act in deviant ways.

An organiza

tional explanation does not preclude an individual explanation— in
deed, individual behavior should not be dismissed in terms of its
contribution to the explanation of corporate crime— but promises
to enhance explanations made on the social-psychological level.

Structural Aspects of Corporate Crime

Organizations, such as corporations, must operate within the
larger society; the structure of the larger society has a sig
nificant impact on the goals, values, and structure of the corpora
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tion.

In understanding corporate crime, it is vitally important to

ascertain the type and extent of influence of this external societal
structure upon the nature of the organization.

Modern, industrial

ized societies develop specific and unique economic and political
systems which result in the development of certain types of or
ganizations.

An examination of these economic and political

systems may help to determine the nature and extent of their in
fluence on the corporation and its activities.
In the United States, the polity and the economy have combined
to form a political economy where the polity is more responsive to
business than to the public interest.

Parenti (1974) sees a blur

ring of the public and private sectors and acknowledges that
government is responsible for the economic state.

The major reason

for the existence of a political economy responsive to business is
that the economic sector, represented by large corporations, has
an advantage in promoting its own interests.

This advantage is a

common thread throughout all aspects of the American state system.
Corporations are able to manipulate political decisions which give
them economic advantages (e.g., witness the recent loans to the
Chrysler Corporation).

Additionally, they are able to manipulate

the legal environment in their own interests.
Evidence shows many interlocks between the government and
business (Freitag, 1975; Useem, 1977; Domhoff, 1967).
are an important factor in the law-making process.

Corporations

In an examina

tion of government policy-making, Freitag (1978) determined that the
interests of large corporations consistently win out.

Even when
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laws are passed which are seemingly antithetical to the corporate
power argument, the corporations have the ability to manipulate, if
not the law, then enforcement of the law, to maintain their advan
tage.

The Sherman

antitrust law is a good example of a "manipula

ted’1 legal proscription.
of the antitrust movement.

There is some argument as to the origins
Some theorists, such as Gunton

(1888),

argue that antitrust legislation was actually initiated by business
in an effort to restrict industrial enterprise and competition,
while others, such as Dudden (1957), argue that the law was ini
tiated by "trust-busters" or anti-monopolists.

Regardless of the

source of the initial impetus, the law was passed.

Business, how

ever, had some influence in shaping the legislation and when it
passed, the law emphasized conduct rather than structure (Barnett,
1980).

This meant that monopolistic structures could exist as long

as conduct of those structures was not monopolistic; the implica
tions are staggering when one considers the possibilities of con
cealing behaviors and activities, the difficulty in finding in
dividuals to press charges, and so on.

Furthermore, no funds were

allocated to enforce Sherman, no cases were filed until 1907, and
six of the first seven cases were filed against labour rather than
business.

McCormick (1977) summarizes the Sherman antitrust law

by calling it a "symbolic crusade" (ala Gusfeld) rather than meaning
ful legislation.
The United States economy is based on capitalistic principles
which have led to the development of particular organizations with
capitalistic goals.

Capitalism requires profit and profit requires
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ever-expanding markets and resources.

Corporations, existing with

in the capitalist system, have as their primary activity the
maximization of profit and growth.

A result of unrestrained

capitalism is the growth of a concentrated economy where monopolies
or oligopolies dominate industries (Hunt & Sherman, 1975).

The

rules of "free enterprise" no longer apply in such an economy where
markets are controlled by one or a few industries.

The implication

of a concentrated market is that the
...effects are complicated as well as profound.
It is not just that the American economy has
grown more slowly than it should in the recent
past, but that it has grown in the wrong ways...Measures that simply fuel corporate growth—
without redefining the goals of that growth and
changing the process through which it is achieved— will not solve problems that are in
herent in the nature of our kind of economic
growth itself (Skolnick & Currie, forthcoming).
Theinfluence of the capitalistic

structure must be examined for its

contribution to organizational goals which help shape the activities
of the organization.
In addition to the influence of the larger society upon cor
porations, the economic structure of that society will also deter
mine the environment within which corporations operate.

The United

States economy is based on the "market" where individuals exchange
goods and services.

The particular market structure of an industry,

the pattern of the exchange of goods and services, will help deter
mine operating principles for corporations.

In the United States,

the market structure for many industries is concentrated.

In the

auto industry, for example, the two largest automakers, Ford and
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General Motors, had annual sales of 43 and 63 billions of dollars
(Fortune 1979 directory) which placed them among the fifty largest
economic concerns (countries or corporations) in the world and well
ahead of many countries.

In 1936, one-half of all manufacturing was

controlled by one percent of American corporations; that same one
percent, by the late 1970s, controlled two-thirds of all manufac
turing (Skolnick & Currie, forthcoming, pp. 6-7).

In the auto in

dustry, a concentrated market means that "...well over nine out of
ten motor vehicles in America are made by 4 companies, as are threefourths of the tires and three-fourths of the petroleum products
that make them run" (Skolnick & Currie, forthcoming, p. 10).

The

implication of a concentrated market structure is that the market
forces intended to provide a free choice for consumers as well as
incentive for improving products and reducing product costs, are no
longer operative.

This results in great freedom for the large

corporation to force its products and prices on the populace with
little or no control through competition from other corporations
within that industry.

It is not unreasonable to assume, then,

that the shape of the market structure may contribute to certain
types of behavior on the part of organizations.
In sum, the etiology of corporate crime unites a number of fac
tors at different levels.
cussed in the next chapter.
analysis.

These factors will be more carefully dis
The factors occur at two levels of

At the structural level, factors such as capitalism, the

political economy, the legal environment, and the market structure
of an industry are important features of the total environment
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within which corporations operate.

At the organizational level,

corporate goals, the hierarchy of goals, and normative environments
guide the activities of a corporation's employees.

These structural

and organizational levels of analysis are the foci of this research.

Summary of Intent

The effects of the structural and organizational factors
delineated above upon the etiology of corporate crime will be ex
amined by looking at a case study of the Ford Pinto.

The Ford Pinto

criminal trial provided a rich source of data concerning the or
ganizational decision-making process.

Inaddition, the structural

environment within which Ford operated, can be determined through a
variety of resources such as automotive journals, government records,
etc.

The manufacturing of an unsafe automobile falls within the

definition of corporate crime set forth earlier in this chapter.
While it is difficult to pose hypotheses at this point, some
general research questions relating the factors discussed earlier to
the specific criminal action of Ford can be suggested:
1.

What aspects of capitalism were influential in the ability

of Ford to commit this crime?

Specifically, what influence did the

capitalist characteristic of the "maximization of profit" have on
Frod's action?
2.

Did the prevailing political economy influence the ability

of Ford to take this action?

Specifically, were political actions

(e.g., lobbying) used to promote Ford's interests over the interests
of others?
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3.

What was the legal environment within which Ford existed?

Did Ford attempt to manipulate that environment?
4.

What was the state of the market structure of the auto

mobile industry at the time of Ford's action?
centrated or threatened?

Was the market con

Did the market structure influence Ford's

activities?
5.

What features of Ford's internal organizational structure

may have been influenced by the structural forces?
internal structure support such actions?

How did Ford's

What key elements of Ford'

organization helped contribute to a "normative environment" in which
criminal activities could occur?
These will be the primary issues addressed in this research.
Hopefully, examination of these issues and questions will provide
some preliminary understanding of the factors crucial to the develop
ment of a theoretical explanation of the etiology of corporate
crime.
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CHAPTER II

The Theory

Organizations must exist within the larger society.

In order

to understand the etiology of corporate crime, the nature of the
organizational environment must be examined.

An understanding of

the macro factors leading to the development of organizations within
the United States will provide this structural framework.

Through

such examination, factors related to organizational crime may be
isolated.

Capitalism

Capitalism is a system wherein one class owns the "means of
production," such as factories, tools, machinery, and the capital
to purchase raw materials, and another class, the workers, who sell
their labor.

The workers do not belong to the owners of the means

of production, but are dependent on them in the sense that the
owners must purchase their labor

so that the workers might acquire

the basic necessities of life since they "own nothing productive but
their labor power" (Sherman and Wood, 1979, p. 361).
Capitalism developed out of European feudalism.

While there

is some dispute as to the reasons for the development of capitalism
(Weber, for example, cited Protestantism as well as social institu
tions as responsible for the development of capitalism), common
threads in the literature revolve around colonial expansionism, the
52
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growth of a craftsmen class, and the growth of technology (See
Sherman & Wood, 1979 and Szymanski & Goertzel, 1979).

As the feudal

population grew and demands for export products (such as wool) in
creased, more and more "free labourers" came to the cities.

The

craftsmen within the cities hired some of these laborers and found
they could increase their production, and subsequently, their
profits.

Within a short time, the advantages of centralized produc

tion were realized and small-scale production was recognized as
wasteful and inefficient.

Capitalists, who evolved from state or

monarch sponsored artisans, soon entered into competition with one
another.

Competition led to technical innovations in an attempt to

make products superior and/or more profitable.

A shortage of human

labor (because many peasants were still on the land) motivated even
more innovation and new energy sources, such as water power, were
discovered.
capital.

The innovations, in turn, led to more concentration of

The cycle continued and led to and fed the industrial

revolution.
Competitive capitalism has an inherent contradiction.

As

Syzmanski and Goertzel (1979) note:
The inherent logic of competitive capitalism
meant that the least efficient producers were
constantly being forced out of business by the
more efficient, the size of enterprises in
creasing in the process. The size of businesses
increased, both because the more efficient were
buying up the least efficient and because as
technology developed, a larger and larger minimum
investment was necessary. The result of this
process was the undermining of the competitive
basis of early capitalist productive relations
and their succession in the latter part of the
nineteenth century by monopoly relations (p. 85).
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In short, the competition required for technological innovation and
growth, by the late nineteenth century vanished almost completely
as business entry requirements became prohibitive.

Monopolies,

rather than competitive industries, were the norm and an attitude
of "laissez faire" prevailed.
Within the United States, a number of different trends
preceded,

the development of the modern corporation.

According to

Hurst (1970, 1977) three major stages of corporate development can
be identified prior to the late nineteenth century.

During the

first half of the century, there existed a distrust of granting
groups powers beyond that of individuals.

As a result, "formal

public policy jealously guarded the grant of corporate status for
doing business" (Hurst, 1977, p. 239).

Special charters were

necessary during this time when a deep-seated belief in the self
regulation of the market was predominant.

From about 1840 to 1970,

"special charters" became commonplace and were generally not much
more than permission to do business, and corporate entities came to
be seen as "simply a handy, utilitarian instrument for doing busi
ness, which the community welcomes" (Hurst, 1977, p. 240).

The

third stage, which developed in the last quarter of the century,
recognized the utility of the corporation, but also recognized that
some restrictions and regulations were necessary so that a free
market could exist.
During this time, there were some government attempts to regu
late the economy (such as Sherman antitrust in the late 1800s), but
the state's role was largely relegated to the preservation of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

property rights and law and order and to control over unions and
workers.

A common view was that the laws of the market con

trolled the economy and that the state should not overly interfere
in this process.
By the end of the nineteenth century, states, led by New
Jersey and Delaware, were openly welcoming corporations into their
borders.

As Hurst (1977) notes, "Moved by desire for the revenue

from chartering fees, New Jersey and Delaware set off a competi
tion among states to offer charter terms more and more favorable
to corporate enterpreneurs at the expense of protection of inves
tors and the general public" (1977, p. 241).
sions were largely dropped.

The regulatory provi

The results were impressive; Means

(1972) shows mergers in manufacturing and mining increased from
less than fifty in 1896 to 1200 in 1899.

Despite Sherman Antitrust

and other regulatory measures, a prevalent belief, reflected in
corporate law, was that corporate power should be regulated in the
interests of the corporate managers rather than the public in
terest (Hurst, 1977).
The depression of the 1930s caused another stage in the de
velopment of the capitalistic economic system.

The depression

showed that the "invisible hand" of the market and the interests of
corporate managers were fallacious as methods of regulating the
economy.

In reaction, the state took a more explicitly active role

in controlling the economy.

Under the "New Deal," the power of big

business could ostensibly be controlled by the state which supposed
ly reflected the wishes of the public (See Lazarus, 1973).

Unfor
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tunately, however, as economic stability and predictability became
the operative goals of the state, big business also benefitted.
Some authors additionally argue that regulatory reforms of the New
Deal era were the result not of public pressure, but industry pres
sure.

Lazarus (1973), for example, states that industry "wanted

to stabilize competitive and/or technologically volatile markets,
and in this hope they have not been disappointed" (1973, p. 217).
Regardless, the controlled economy works largely to the benefit of
the capitalist class.

State involvement during the New Deal meant

that interest rates could be regulated, prices and wages could be
regulated, the state took over unprofitable sectors, and trade
unions were somewhat controlled (Szymanski & Goertzel, 1979).
The type of corporation which is prevalent in American society
today has been greatly influenced by historical trends.

These

trends have led to the development of a goal-oriented type of cor
poration with specific goals of profit-maximization which shape the
activities of the corporation.

Furthermore, the corporation oper

ates within a political and legal environment which encourages the
attainment of those corporate goals and activities.

The type of

corporate capitalism which has resulted requires an examination of
many pertinent factors.
capitalism:

Among these are two principles of

private ownership and the profit motive.

Capitalism and Private Ownership

Capitalistic societies are characterized by private ownership
of property.

Justifications and rationalizations of such private
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ownership have been abundant throughout history.

The Lockean view

justified private ownership by stating that "...private property
is based upon, and derives its sanction from, the labor of the
owner" (Sweezy, 1949, p. 197).

Locke argued that as property was

based in labor, it became a "natural right" which must be protected
by the state.
Another view of private property was offered by Burke, who
argued that "prescription— a legal term which is roughly synonymous
with traditional occupancy or possession— is the only safe title
to anything; it embodies the experience of the ages and has the
great advantage of stability, which comes with custom and habit"
(Sweezy, 1949, p. 200).

Such a view, embedded in traditional and

legal perscription, looked to the state to defend such titles.
Another argument advanced in support of private ownership con
tinues to be important today.

"According to this theory, private

property is a convention which men obey, and ought to obey, because
it is in their best interests to do so" (Sweezy, 1949, p. 198).
Much of this view is based on an emphasis on individuality and a
particular view of the nature of man.

Scholars of the time (e.g.,

Hume and later Bentham) viewed human nature as selfish; individuals
were motivated by pleasure and repulsed by pain.

Private owners

(and other elites) were motivated by their self-interests and de
veloped ambitions, which if allowed to see fruition, would lead to
personal economic growth.

This view was at least part of the basis

of utilitarian theory.
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The implications of private ownership are significant for the
development of corporate capitalism.

Rights, be they "natural,"

historical, or based on individual ambition, imply a need for en
forcement of those rights.

The role of the state in defining and

enforcing those rights becomes crucial.
In capitalistic societies, the state is seen as having cer
tain obligations in terms of enforcing private ownership rights.
Adam Smith (1937) argued that protection of rights of ownership
could only be beneficial to society:
...he intends only his own gain, and he is in
this, as in many other cases, led by an in
visible hand to promote an end which was no part
of his intention. Nor is it always the worst
for society that it was not a part of it. By
pursuing his own interest he frequently pro
motes that of society more effectively than when
he really intends to promote it (Smith, 1937,
p. 423).
The duty of the state, according to Smith, in terms of its
obligations to the economy consisted of supporting and undertaking
huge, expensive public institutions which would not be profitable if
financed by individuals in the private sector.

The state, rather

than ignoring these public needs, was to take over where private en
terprise would not become involved (such as the areas of communica
tion, highway transportation, etc.).

Interpretation of Smith’s

notion of government’s role (and there is some controversy as to his
intent) has resulted in public institutions (e.g., currency, com
munication systems, etc.) which aid in the accumulation of private
property.

The philosophy of laissez faire capitalism, while ex

pounding the virtues of a free market, hands-off economy, actually
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supported the capitalists' interests.
As the state continued to support the rights and interests of
capitalism, the economy of this society became increasingly
politicized.

Best and Connolly (1976) argue that all aspects of the

economy, including production, work, exchange, and consumption, have
become politicized.

Many social theorists (e.g., C. Wright Mills,

Alvin Gouldner, and William Chambliss) agree that the economy is
greatly politicized and does not operate as a free market; rather,
the economic sector receives much support from the political sector.
(This will be more closely examined later.)
The politicized economy results in state enforcement, as well
as state support, of capitalistic interests.

As Lefcourt (1971, p.

2) states, "...priorities of law enforcement and in the criminal
court (show) criminal courts protect existing economic, political,
and social relations."

Recent examinations of the interlocks be

tween the economic and political sectors illustrate the state's in
ability to be an impartial arbiter of public or individual interests.
(See, for example, Domhof, 1967 & 1978; Freitag, 1975; Useem, 1977.)

Capitalism and the Profit Motive

An inherent element of capitalism is the profit motive.

The

basis of the capitalistic system is to maximize one's profits.
effects of this are enormous.

The

Hunt and Sherman (1978) claim the

profit motive to be the predominant impetus behind the industrial
revolution.

"Thus profit seeking was the motive that, stimulated

by increasing foreign demand, accounted for the virtual explosion
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of the technological innovations that occurred in the late 18th
and early 19th centuries..." (Hunt & Sherman, 1978, p. 33).

(Their

view neglects to take notice of the scientific revolution in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries which also contributed substan
tially to the industrial revolution.)
While the origins of the profit motive remain a matter of dis
pute, the strength .of the profit motive in business is seldom ques
tioned.

As Sweezy (1949) so aptly put it:
We must be clear on one point: the making of
profits remains the objective of the corpora
tion as such. Within the economic and legal
framework of capitalism there is no other pos
sible goal for a business unit to pursue, what
ever its form may be. In order to convince our
selves that this is the case, it is necessary
only to reflect that if the officials of a
corporation were to deliberately set out to
pursue some other objective— say, the maximum
welfare of the community in which its factories
happened to be located— a shareholder would be
able to go into court and set an injunction
restraining them from following this course on
the ground that they were failing in their
legal obligation to manage his property with
reasonable diligence and prudence. In other
words, the law imposes on corporate officials
a positive obligation to make profits...
(Sweezy, 1949, pp. 209-210).

Similarly, Jacques Maisonrouge has stated:
A corporation is a business structure whose
sole reason for existence is the earning of
profits by manufacturing products for as lit
tle as possible and selling them for as much
as possible (Quoted in Barnet and Mueller, 1974,
p. 24).
Max Weber (1958) also succinctly stated that the primary goal of
capitalism was "for the pursuit of profit and ever renewed profit"
(Weber, 1958, p. 59).
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The implications of the profit motive are significant within
many spheres.

An extremely important implication is the effect of

the profit motive on organizational goals.

Organizations, within a

capitalist system, can have a variety of goals.
distinguished a hierarchy of goals:

Etzioni (1961) has

utilitarian goals are associa

ted with production and profit, order and control goals are associa
ted with state bureaucracies of social control, and cultural goals
are associated with education, religion, and socialization.

The

utilitarian goals are the goals which are important in understanding
how the possibility of corporate crime may arise.
Utilitarian goals emphasize, within the larger society, produc
tion and profit.

To the extent that such goals are dominant they

may override other goals.

Although organizations exist within a

social context— a context which has sets of values and societal
goals— the emphasis on utilitarian goals of production and profit
may supersede societal goals.

For example, the American legal sys

tem, which is ideally based on the predominant societal values, re
quires that business organizations and corporations refrain from
monopolistic practices.

A corporation, though operating within

this social milieu, may consider its utilitarian goal of profit
making to be its first and highest priority.

When this situation

occurs, the probability of corporate crime, to attain that goal,
may increase.

Gross (1979), for example, sees the utilitarian

goal of profit making as being crucially important in the under
standing of corporate crime.

He states, "...when private organiza

tions have trouble reaching their profit.goals, they engage in il-
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legal acts to try to do so" (Gross, 1979, p. 200).

Corporate Capitalism

The ability to commit corporate crime can be enhanced by a
system of corporate capitalism.

(This is not to say that corporate

crime cannot exist in other types of economic systems; rather, cor
porate capitalism provides a milieu in which opportunities for cor
porate crime are prevalent.)

A number of events, based on private

ownership and the profit motive, have occurred within American
society and have led to. the development of corporate capitalism.
The spirit of capitalism requires a free market.

In such a

market, individual capitalists and small businesses compete with
each other for a share of the market.

Under such conditions, the

"invisible hand" of the market, through supply and demand, will
result in high quality goods at the most reasonable prices.

Com

petition will enable consumers to select from a number of sources of
merchandise, and those producers who are most efficient in produc
tion will have lower costs, resulting in a higher volume of
business.

With the possible exception of capitalism in the early

stages of the industrial revolution, such a practice of capitalism
has seldom if ever existed.
Through the process of modernization, a number of trends have
appeared.

The great depression of the thirties pointed out the

relationship of the economic sector to the rest of social life.
This was an inevitable outcome of the industrial revolution and
capitalism.

As technology became increasingly developed, speciali

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

zation of tasks became increasingly more common.

This led to a

high degree of interdependence between members of society who had
to rely on others for their basic needs of survival.

As this

interdependence became institutionalized, the social power of par
ticular groups, especially those controlling the production of
needed goods, increased.

During the depression of the thirties,

this power was aptly demonstrated when huge factories lay idle.
A realization of the interdependence of societal institutions
and the amount of power wielded by business entrepreneurs led the
government to intervene.

Regulation of industries, government

subsidies, and other government interference in the economic order
resulted in a final death blow to the free market system.

This,

coupled with an increasingly sophisticated and costly technology,
led eventually to the consolidation of power of the giant corpora
tions which exist in our society today.
The rapid technological growth so prevalent in the last two
centuries has resulted in less, rather than more, competition.
The costs of research and development are prohibitive for small in
dustries, indeed, even large industries depend on state support
(through the public sectors of the military, communications, federal
grants, etc.) to subsidize their research and development.

Small

business enterprises have difficulty surviving in such an economic
and technological environment and the result has been, in many in
dustries, a market controlled by oligopolies; that is, a few large
corporations dominate their markets.

(See Galbraith, 1967, for a

detailed explanation of the influence of technology upon the de-
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velopment of oligopolies.)
The implications of corporate capitalism are enormous.

The

interdependence of societal institutions continues within such a
system.

In an oligopolized market, the power of the corporations

has been magnified, so much so that John Powers, a corporate execu
tive for Pfizer’s, has stated that the multinational corporations
are "agents of change, socially, economically, and culturally"
(Quoted in Barnet and Mueller, 1974, p. 31).

The power of cor

porations, then, extends beyond the economic sphere; it delves into
the social, cultural, and, most importantly, the political aspects
of human life.

There no longer exists a sharp demarcation between

the public and private sectors.

The implication is that the "pri

vate" sector has all the rewards and advantages of being private,
but none of the responsibilities of being private; that is, the
state is to look out for preservation of the sphere within which
private corporations operate and corporations are not necessarily
accountable for their actions (such as pollution, shoddy products,
etc.).

The motive for the existence of the private corporation is

profit making, while the public sector must be concerned with the
public good.

This ideal separation, which does not exist in reali

ty, fosters an emphasis on utilitarian goals of profit making to
the exclusion of goals of public interest.

As a result, corpora

tions can and have engaged in behavior which may be socially dis
ruptive.

As Barnet and Mueller conclude:
The underlying reason for the socially dis
ruptive effects of global corporations is that
they still are treated as private organizations
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despite their increasingly public role. Public
authorities are incapable of dealing with them
because our laws are still based on the old myths
of nineteenth century free-market capitalism in
which private entrepreneurs take private risks
for private rewards...The free market is large
ly a historical relic... (Barnet and Mueller,
1974, p. 374).

Political Economy

The influence of the overlapping of private and public
sectors has implications for the etiology of corporate crime.

Ross

as early as 1907, was concerned with the criminal actions of higher
class members of society— those who "occupy the cabin rather than
the steerage of society"— who had the power to shape law and defini
tions of behavior to their own interests.

By the late 1930s,

Sutherland had presented his notion of a broader criminology which
included an examination of white-collar crime and recognized the
influence of certain groups of people on the law-making process.
In the 1970s, a revived interest in the origin of law led many
criminologists (e.g., Quinney, Chambliss, Shover) to examine the
relationship between law and powerful groups within society.

Work

ing within the conflict paradigm, such theorists view the legal
system as reflecting the will of certain, elite groups who attempt
to maximize their own interests.

In the area of corporate crime,

examinations of the interrelationship of elites and the legal sys
tem have been made by B e i m e (1979), Shover (1979), Snider (1979),
and Goff and Reasons (1978).
A primary dispute permeating the field of corporate crime
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revolves around Its definition (See Chapter One).

Crucial to this

definitional controversy is a recognition by some theorists that
legalistic views are biased since the legal system is not based on
consensus but rather on the differential power of certain groups.
Many theorists of this viewpoint argue that political influence is
closely tied to economic influence.

Theorists within the conserva

tive paradigm argue that political and economic sectors may overlap,
but are distinct.

Milton Friedman (1962) is one of the most vocal

s.pokespersons for the conservative position.

He argues that the

economy and the polity are separate and distinct even though they
may occasionally affect each other.

The business of business is

profits, according to Friedman, and economic freedom will result in
political freedom.

In this view, the role of government is to pro

tect the public interest by protecting economic freedom and political
freedom.

This view of the role of government is echoed by many.

The polity, according to Parenti (1980) is to protect the public
interest and insure that the private sector does not wield undue
power.

Ermann and Lundman (1978) state that government agencies are

intended to serve the public.

Clinard and Yeager (1980) echo the

theme by stating that the public gives the government license to
represent the public and, furthermore, the public believes in the
need for government to tend to public interests.
The reality of the role of government, however, is considerably
different.

The polity and the economy are not separate.

Parenti

(1980) spends an entire volume examining the relationship between
the polity and the economy and concludes that "the bulk of public
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policy is concerned with economic matters" (1980, p. A).

Parenti

argues that the separation of public and private interests is ar
tificial and adds:
Politics and economics are but two sides of
the same coin. Economics is concerned with
the allocation of scarce resources for competing
ends, involving conflicts between social classes,
and among groups and individuals within classes.
Much of politics is a carry-over of this same
struggle. Both politics and economics deal with
questions affecting the material survival, pros
perity, and well-being of millions of people...
(1980, p. A).
Best and Connolly (1976) argue that the United States economy is in
creasingly politicized though the populace may be unaware of it.
They point out the power element involved and state, "Underlying
market transactions in the American economy are power relations that
subordinate the worker to the owner, the consumer to the producer,
the small producer to the large corporation and the community in
terests to private interests" (1976, p. xi).
Epstein (1966) notes that the interdependence of public and
private institutions is permanent.

Arguing that this mixed or po

litical economy became overt after World War II, Epstein identifies
a number of developments "relevant to an understanding of the
changes in recent patterns of corporate political involvement" (p.
38).

Among these are official government roles in maintaining

economic stability (e.g., Employment Act of 19A6), an increase in
military and foreign aid expenditures causing an increase in federal
economic activity, enormous costs of technological developments
which have resulted in collaboration between government and busi
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ness* and public pressure on the government to "do something" about
social problems.

Because of the resultant political economy* cor

porations are able to effectively act in the political arena.

The

desire of corporations to deal with public authority in a way
favorable to corporate interests is inevitable.

As Epstein notes,

"No other single factor has functioned more effectively to neces
sitate and to legitimate corporate political involvement..." (1966,
p. 61).
Sutton and Wild (1980) argue that pluralism simply doesn't
work.

Pluralism is only effective if all sectors of society have

access and ability to influence law-making.

Equating the influence

and power of giant multinational corporations such as General
Motors, Standard Oil, or International Telephone and Telegraph with
the influence of the general public is synonymous with claiming
equal power for both parties when "elephants dance among the
chickens."

Interlocks

Examinations of interlocks between the polity and the economic
sector have occupied at least a portion of American sociologists
since C. Wright Mills advanced his theory of a power elite.

Clinard

and Yeager (1980) have examined the interlocks in the oil industry.
Freitag (1975) studied United States cabinet members and secretaries
who held office from 1897 to 1973.

Utilizing a number of resources,

Freitag established that a high percentage of interlocks existed
between cabinet members and business (76.1%).

He further broke
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down the data to party differences, cabinet posts, direction of in
terlocks, and interchange between elites and concluded that his
study provided support for the elitist position which is based on
the view that only a small number of people control the power within
American society.

Useem (1977) also addressed the problem of con

centrated power by looking at the interlocks between the business
elite and nonbusiness institutions (government, research organiza
tions, philanthropic organizations, etc.).

He concluded that there

is a structure in U.S. society by which an elite class can become
disproportionately involved in governance.

He further verified the

higher extent of interlocks between government and business.

Jensen

(1972) termed the connection between business and government one of
"musical chairs" whereby top government officials and corporate
directors exchange positions of power.

Some pertinent examples in

clude Clarence D. Palmby who moved from a position as assistant
secretary of agriculture to vice-president of the Continental Grain
Company.

While in government, Palmby visited Russia; after joining

Continental, a $1 billion grain deal between Russia and Continental
was consumated.

Katzenbach, former head of the Justice Department,

now oversees the defense of IBM in an antitrust suit which was
initiated when he was head of the Justice Department.

James

Needham, Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission
under Nixon, is now chairman of the New York Stock Exchange.
In spite of some arguments against interlocks, the evidence
shows that large corporations and their agents are intricately in
volved in politics and the formation of laws.

Epstein argues that
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this is an accomodative process with laws and regulations influenced
by large corporations.

Shover (1979), in an attempt to explain the

apparent contradiction of corporate influence and the regulatory
process, notes that corporations may initially oppose regulations,
but eventually realize that some regulation is inevitable and change
tactics so as to shape legislation to their own benefit.

Shover

examines coal mining regulations which exhibited such a process.
His findings are echoed by Graham in a study of amphetimine regula
tion.

The State

Some may argue that the regulation process is somewhat anti
thetical to the ruling elite position which holds the view that laws
are shaped by the economic elite to legitimate the established
structure.

An understanding of the relationship requires an exam

ination of the state.

The state and its origin, role, and nature,

has long been of interest to social philosophers.
the state are fundamentally twofold:

Perceptions of

the conservative view, in

which the state is perceived as the governing mechanism representing,
for the most part, the consensual views of societal members; and the
Marxian view, in which the state is seen as a coercive system which
expresses the economic substructure of society.

For both positions,

the state may be conceptualized as an institution concerned with
governing, policing, judiciary functions, and administrative service
within society.

The major disagreement arises in regard to the

origin of the state, and by implication, the role of the state.
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The Marxian view, arising largely in reaction to Hegel's
perception that the state

is "logically prior to the individual"

(Giddens, 1971, p. 5), is

based on the idea that the rtate develops

out of the antagonistic nature of the relations of production and
constrains individuals within society rather than representing com
munal interests.
And out of this very contradiction between
the
interest of the individual and that of the com
munity, and at the same time as an illusory
communal life, always based, however, on the
real ties existing in every family and tribal
configuration— such as flesh and blood, language,
division of labour on a large scale and other
int.erests-.-and especially, as we shall enlarge
upon later, on the classes, already determined
by the division of labour, which in every mass
of men separate out, and of which one dominates
all the others, it follows that all struggles
within the State...are merely the illusory forms
in which real struggles of the different classes
are fought out among one another (Marx, 1972, pp.
53-54).
For Marx, the state was not representative of the citizens of socie
ty until "the various disabilities of civil life which affect[ed]
[the citizen] politically [were] removed" (Arthur, 1972, p. 11).
The bourgeois state, which expresses the economic structure of
capitalist society, according to Marx, sanctions the interests of
the prevailing economic class.

"The bourgeois state is nothing but

a mutual insurance pact of the bourgeois class both against its
members taken individually and against the exploited class" (Marx,
quoted in McMurty, 1978, p. 105).
Marx points out, however, that such an analysis should not be
construed to imply that the state always overtly and simply carries
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out the wishes of any particular capitalist Interests.

Marx argues

that the state must be concerned with the collective interests of the
economic elite.

"Just because individuals seek only their particular

interest, which for them does not coincide with their communal in
terest, the latter will be imposed on them as an interest 'alien'
to them, and 'independent' of them, as in turn, a particular,
peculiar 'general' interest; or they themselves must remain within
this discord..." (Marx, 1972, p. 54).
Marx planned to write a more thorough exposition of the role of
the state, but his work remained incomplete.

Some contemporary

Marxists have attempted to clarify the nature of the state.

Miliband

(1969), for example, addresses the role of the state "in light of the
concrete socioeconomic and political and cultural reality of actual
capitalist countries" (p. 6).

Miliband acknowledges the presence of

an economic dominant class, but notes that the important issue is
whether or not this class is a ruling class with the ability to shape
aspects of society in its own interest.

"This question is a dif

ferent one altogether, namely whether this dominant class also ex
ercises a much greater degree of power and influence than any other
class; whether it exercises a decisive degree of political power;
whether the ownership and control of crucially important areas of
economic life also insures its control of the means of political
decision-making in the particular political environment of advanced
capitalism" (Miliband, 1969, p. 58).

Miliband argues that the state

system, composed of the government, the administration, including
public corporations, banks, and regulatory agencies, military and
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police, the judicial system, subcentral government, and parliamentary
assemblies, has a fundamental commitment to capitalism and this
commitment limits actions.

Government intervention in business af

fairs, for example, is geared to the purpose of helping the capi
talist enterprise, and business can generally rely on the good will
of government.
blatant.

Such support, however, is not always explicit or

To the contrary, government and state servants are usually

viewed as neutral, however, as Miliband notes, the prevailing con
servative ideology in capitalist societies permeates all levels of
the government and the rest of the state system.

This is not to say

that homogeneity is the rule; rather, arguments and apparent con
servative thought.

Exceptions and divergent interest groups do ex

ist, but their power is largely dependent on the good graces of the
state; at times, the state will placate such groups by granting their
wishes.

The important point is that, in the long run, the capitalist

interests are upheld by the state.
Freitag (1978) notes that simple identification of the state and
members of the ruling class does not satisfactorily support the
ruling elite position.

The Marxist alternative to power elite and

pluralist theory focuses on relationships between classes.

"The

determination of the existence of a ruling class is not proven by
demonstrating the presence of individuals who are members of an
upper social class or business elite in positions of political
authority...Rather, the proof lies in an examination of the processes
of policy formation and those issues which are excluded from this
process.

It is not to be confined to the study of observable out-
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comes...the primary interest of the ruling class is the preserva
tion of the capitalist system..." (1979, p. 14).

The answer as to

whether a ruling class exists depends on attempts to promote a cer
tain class' interests.
Freitag urges an examination of policy formation processes to
ascertain the existence and influence of a ruling class.

In this

way, all influences on policy making (private sector, working class,
government, other organizations) must be explored so that changes in
policy can be determined.

Such changes must then be examined in

terms of whether or not broader social change occurred as a result
of the change in policy.
Freitag urges the study be made in terms of the state and its
origins, policy and its origins, processes of decision making and
administration, and the role of individuals.

Freitag also presents

an analytical example in which the Great Strike of 1877 and its rela
tion to the formation of the Interstate Commerce Commission is ex
amined.

Utilizing this example, he points out that the state is

used as an instrument of repression by capitalist interests and yet
simultaneously provides some relief for the working class.
the state has a contradictory role.

Thus

Ultimately, however, the state

is both instrumental and structural; in the long run, the state pre
serves the status-quo even though some policy making may be specif
ically or temporarily detrimental to ruling interests.

Reasons and

Goff (1980) point out that hegemony of the ruling class does not
mean homogeneity of the ruling class; rather, inter-elite conflict
occurs which gives an appearance of pluralism.

The heterogeneity of
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the elites and their interests will sometimes overlap the public in
terest.

The state is bound to support capitalist interests and cor

porations are able through interlocks and instrumental and structural
control of the state to shape laws which rationalize their own en
terprise (Shover, Graham).

As Snider so aptly said, the state is

"ou'muscled" in its interactions with the corporate elite;
The relationship of the state and the capitalist interest is
a complex one.

The relationships is not merely structural nor

instrumental, but some subtle combination of the two which results
in many actions which sometimes appear to be at odds with the
capitalist interest.

Indeed, the state is somewhat independent of

these interests as indicated by its ability to somewhat control
capitalist endeavors.

Nevertheless, it is clear that while the role

of the state is mixed, many theorists (Freitag, Graham, Shover) have
presented evidence which suggests that the state supports, either
directly or indirectly, capitalist interests.
The implications of the Marxist conception of the state on the
power of corporations within a capitalist society can be identified
by an examination of the legal system (part of the state) which pur
ports to control the activities of corporations.
Since the State is the form in which individuals
of a ruling class assert their common interests...
it follows that the State mediates in the forma
tion of all common institutions and that the
institutions receive a political form. Hence
the illusion that law is based on the will, and
indeed on the will divorced from its real
basis— on free will. Similarly, justice is in
its turn reduced to the actual laws (Marx, 1972,
p. 80).
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It follows, for Marx, that limits on corporate behavior are largely
dependent on the state; to

the extent that limiting behavior isin

the collective interest of

the economic elite, laws will be es

tablished to control corporate
ever, that occasionally it

behavior.

It must be reocgnized, how

may be in the interest of the ruling

economic class to control corporate activities.

Marx discussed, for

example, the "ten hour" legislation in England which limited working
hours of the labor forces.

Though superficially it was against the

interest of the economic elite, it preserved the labor force required
by bourgeois industrialists (Marx, 1902, pp. 805-814).

The limits on

corporate activities, then, in the Marxian sense, are dependent upon
the collective and general interests of the economic substructure.
If corporate activities threaten those collective interests, the
state, through the legal institution, may place restraints upon
corporate power.

There is, as previously discussed (Miliband,

Freitag) no simple explanation for the activities of the state; the
state is a complex system which in the long run supports the
capitalists' collective interests.
The corporation, as has been shown, operates within a complex
economic system which fosters private property (and the enforcement
of rights to private property) and the profit motive.

These factors,

along with the ever-increasing and sophisticated and costly tech
nology and the interdependence of social institutions have resulted
in corporate capitalism.

Corporate capitalism is accompanied by a

real overlap between the private and public sectors, but an ideal
image which separates the public and private sectors.

Thus, cor-
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porations function as though they are private and pursue the primary
goal of profit making, while they relegate social responsibility to
the public sector.

It is not difficult to see how such a system may

encourage illegal and/or criminal behavior in an attempt to maximize
goals.

The above factors, however, are not inclusive; other struc

tural factors may also encourage corporate crime.

Market Structure

A market system is a system where the exchange of money and the
determination of prices occurs within specified patterns which are
governed by informal and formal norms.

The market structure refers

to those particular features of a market which may affect price de
termination, supply and demand, and the potential profits for any
particular industry.

"At all points the guiding force is the

capitalists' constant search for profits.

The decisions concerning

which goods to produce (or even whether to produce), what imports
to buy, what wages to pay, and so forth are all determined by the
criterion of profitability.

All economic relations between people

are mediated by the institution of the market" (Hunt & Sherman, 1978,
p. 160).
There are a number of salient features in the determination of
market structure.

As previously stated, many corporations within

this society operate within oligopolistic markets.

As White (1977)

points out, "The size distribution of firms in the industry tells
us something about the likelihood of oligopolistic interdependence
and implicit or explicit coordination of behavior.

The fewer the
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firms, the more concentrated is the market structure..." (White,
1977, p. 181).

Thus, an oligopolistic market will have a different

market structure than a competitive market.

While there is some

controversy as to price determination in an oligopolistic market
(see, for example, E'las, 1967), the fact that such industries
operate within a profit making environment suggests that price de
termination is regulated by profits.

Hunt and Sherman (1978) argue

that oligopolistic industries recognize their interdependence and
act together in monopolistic fashion, to set prices.

"...The large

corporations prevent price competition, although they do compete
through alleged quality differences and advertising.

With no price

competition, the sellers of a given commodity have an interest in
seeing that price or prices established are such as to maximize the
profits of the group, so each product is priced as if it were sold
by a single monopoly corporation" (Hunt & Sherman, 1978, p. 277).
Such price determination and profit making depends on the
stability of the oligopolistic market.

Events which threaten the

market may have severe impact on individual shares of the market.
Corporations may resort to criminal or illegal activities to sta
bilize the market and return it to its profitable status.
The automobile industry is typical of an oligopolistic market.
In the United States, three automobile manufacturers (General Motors,
Ford, and Chrysler) dominate the market.

During the years from

1951 to 1955, the big three had 90.5% of the automobile market, other
domestic firms had 8.9%, and imports had the remaining 0.6% (White,
1977, p. 180).

By 1970, however, imports had crept up to capture
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10.6% of the market (White, 1977).

This was largely due to the in

creased popularity of compact cars which were not available in the
1960s from the big three.

This disruption of the automobile market

structure led to the entry of Ford and General Motors into the com
pact car field (Ford Pinto and G. M. Vega).
dominated by the profit motive.

The market structure is

When profits are threatened, as they

were by the ever-growing share of the market captured by imports,
industries must attempt to regain control of the market.

When the

share of the market is substantial, as it was in this case, the pos
sibilities of crime or illegal behavior to regain control of the
market share increase.
possible alternative.

Collusion, through "price leadership" is one
Shoddy, unsafe, but competitively priced

products are another possibility.
The market structure, coupled with the primary motive of capi
talism, profit making, are structural factors which may lead to or
encourage corporate crime.

Corporate crime, or the possibility of

corporate crime, is also influenced by the organizational structure
of American industry.

Organizational Aspects

Historically, criminology has focused on the study of the in
dividual criminal.

Corporate crime has been no exception; the study

of such crime has been largely confined to the study of individuals
who commit such crimes.

Sutherland (1940) in identifying the phe

nomenon of white-collar crime, examined seventy large corporations
which had been administratively or legally sanctioned and developed
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a theory of white-collar crime based on differential associaton; that
is, white-collar crime is learned in interaction with other whitecollar criminals.

Sutherland's (1940) view of such crime is con

fined to individuals; the individual learns to commit crime and if
conditions are favorable, commits such crime by himself/herself.
Similarly, Geis (1978) continues to emphasize the importance of iden
tifying criminally responsible corporate officials and argues that
blaming the corporation is an anthropomorphic practice.

In sum,

many theorists urge that individuals involved in corporate crime
be identified and trie.d for their crimes.
In recent years however, some theorists have come to view the
organization as an acting entity which is responsible for the activities of its members.

Ermann and Lundman (1978), for example, argue

that a sociology of organizational deviance is required.

Coleman

(1978) notes that corporations are "juristic persons" and more than
the sum of their parts.

Reiss (1978) says "...we have been pre

occupied with defining persons as deviant at the expense of examining
organizational deviance" (p. 35).

Thus, there are indications that

there is a shift in thinking from examining the individual criminal
to the criminal organization.
Such a trend should not be surprising in light of the tremendous
importance of corporations in shaping the world and influencing world
views.

Baran and Sweezy (1966) point out the influence of American

corporations on the lives and activities of people throughout the
world.

Barnet and Mueller (1974) note that the global corporation is

"the most powerful agent for the internationalization of human
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society” (1974, p. 13) and that corporations are instruments of so
cial progress.

Ermann and Lundman (1978) maintain that organiza

tions intended to serve the public interest have too much power and,
in fact, do little to serve the public interest.

Clinard and Yeager

(1980) describe corporations as having "awesome aggregates of wealth
and such vast social and political power” (p. 3).

This power is seen

by Gross (1978) as contributing to inherent criminogenesis of an or
ganization.
A major issue in this field is whether organizations can be
acting entities or whether individuals should be blamed for corporate
crime.

There is a prevailing ideology in the United States that in

dividuals are responsible for their behavior, whether they are vic
tims (Braithwaite and Condon, 1980) or perpetrators (Geis, 1978).
"The ideology of individualism seeks to locate blame individually,
even for injuries

to persons that are the outcome of institutional

arrangements... it

is not capitalism which

is seento be at fault, nor

is it the members of the ruling class...it is the victims" (Braith
waite and Condon, 1980, p. 233).

Geis (1978) demands "...isolating

the offender from reinforcement and rationalization of his behavior,
of making him appreciate that nobody morally sanctions corporate
crime..." (p. 287).

Similar views of focusing on the individual have

been advocated by Ross, Sutherland, and others.
The idea of looking for organizational culpability, however, is
not without historical precedence.

Sutherland urged the trial

of accessories as

well as individuals who had the final responsibil

ity in committing

crimes.

He muddles the issue of etiology between
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organizations and individuals by recognizing that actors are often
anonymous and that rational behavior is the order of the day within
large organizations.

Sutherland appears, however, to take a nomi

nalist perspective (Sherman) and appears to view organizations as a
collection of individuals who separately make decisions concerning
their individual participation in corporate crime.
Haworth (1959) argues that organizational activites are not
always reducible to individuals.

He distinguishes between the or

ganization as a collection of individuals and the organization as an
acting entity.

Organizational acts, in his view, are the outcome of

the organization’s patterns of functions and unaffected by the
personal qualities of the individuals involved (Note, however, that
such actions may not always be conscious nor identifiable).

The

pattern of functions is characteristic of the organization itself
and individuals are interchangeable,

"...in the degree that this

interchangeability occurs, not individuals as such, but organizations
must be credited and blamed for activity" (Haworth, 1959, p. 61).
The power of an individual within the organization is related to the
function of the position he/she occupies; the position gives the in
dividual the right and duty to act in a certain way.

Haworth

acknowledges that individual and organizational acts may overlap
dependent on the contribution of each in the power to act.

When the

organizational contribution, in the power to act, is dominant, then
attempts to change the act by changing the individuals involved are
useless.

Personnel change in such acts is often irrelevant.

Thus,

Haworth points out the folly of reductionism and concludes that in
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certain circumstances organizations are acting entities.
March and Simon (1958) address the issue of individual acts by
looking at the context in which such acts occur.

In their "theory

of domination" they show how the organizational environment is con
trolled by superiors in an attempt to influence the activities and
decisions of employees.

This includes techniques such as control

of communications, fostering ideological commitments, and indoctrina
tion into the organization.
Coleman (1978) bases his argument on Weber's theory of bureau
cracy and concludes that large contemporary corporations fit Weber's
model.

"One of the central elements of the new corporate actors of

modern society is that persons in them are replaceable" (Coleman,
1978, p. 26).

Coleman traces the history of law to determine that

law recognizes "juristic persons" which include corporations and
other organizations.

The interests of these juristic persons may

clash with the interests of "natural persons."

Coleman urges an

examination of these new "corporate actors" (another term for juris
tic persons) and the emergence of the social structure in which their
relationships with natural persons occur.

His major focus is summed

in his concluding remark, "The point is that the power held by cor
porate bodies...is in the hands of no person, but resides in the
corporate actor itself" (Coleman, 1978, p. 27).
Ladd (1970) notes, "a distinctive mark of such (formal) or
ganizations is that they make a clear-cut distinction between the
acts and relationships of Individuals in their official capacity
within the organization and in their private capacity.

Decisions of
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individual decision-makers within an organization are attributed to
the organization and not to the individual.
impersonal.

In that sense they are

Individual office-holders are in principle replaceable

by other individuals without affecting the continuity or identity
of the organization.

In this sense it has sometimes been said that

an organization is immortal" (Ladd, 1970, p. 488).

Ladd goes on to

say that this structure of organizations, which impersonalizes the
individual, distinguishes it from other social systems.
Beginning with the premise that organizations are acting enti
ties, then, many theorists have attempted to show how and why or
ganizations, rather than individuals, are responsible for organiza
tional activities.

There are a number of issues involved in the

assignment of responsibility, but three main issues dominate the
field.

Inability to Assign Individual Guilt

Many case studies show the difficulty of assigning individual
guilt where irresponsible and criminal corporate acts are concerned
(e.g., Geis, 1977; Maltz & Polluck, 1980; Vandivier, 1972).

Often,

due to a particular corporate environment, individuals may not be
able to resist general orders to "solve a problem" even if it in
volves criminal acts.

In addition, products and decisions are often

made on an incremental basis, with no one individual responsible for
the ultimate product or decision.

Elkins (1976), for example, admits

that cases exist where individuals may be held responsible, but he
also sees the large corporation as an unique structure which may
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hamper identification of any particular individual as criminally
responsible.

"The size and structural diffusion of the m o d e m cor

poration often masks "individual" responsibility and makes it ex
tremely difficult to investigate and successfully prosecute corporaterelated crimes" (Elkins, 1976, p. 96).
Stone (1975) spends a great deal of time arguing against in
dividual culpability.

Individuals within a corporation shed their

uniqueness and become part of an elaborate subsystem.

Through such

subsystems, a number of factors prevent those individuals who have
final responsibilities for decisions from being culpable for those
decisions.

These factors include 1) a limited knowledge of everyday

decisions (by those at the "top"), 2) a natural screening process of
information to those at the top (by others who wish to keep their
jobs), 3) a legal system which discourages knowledge by those at the
top (not knowing is often equivalent to not being culpable), 4) the
ability of other social characteristics (such as being well-dressed,
upperclass, etc.) to influence evaluations of criminal acts, and
5) the tendency of the corporation to provide protection for the in
dividual.

Collective Goals

Some theorists differentiate between instances of individual
guilt and instances of organizational guilt.

Such views often are

concerned with the goals of a particular behavior; individual goals,
or activities that result in gains for the individual are not
necessarily organizational acts.

Organizational acts and culpability
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occur when individuals act in the interest of the collective goals
of the organization.

Gross (1978) says that organizations "coor

dinate effort toward the attainment of collective goals" (p. 56).
Hopkins (1979) also distinguishes between individual and collective
goals, maintaining that when an individual acts on behalf of the
corporation or in accordance with its norms, then the corporation
rather than the individual is responsible for the activities.
Nachmias and Rosenbloom (1980) add that corporations and other
bureaucratic structures develop a "collective personality" which does
.not belong to any individual within the corporation.

Collective

goals congruent with this personality include a drive for survival
(even if new goals must be created to justify the existence of the
organization) and a drive for rationality.

Ermann and Lundmann

(1978) also stress the importance of the collective goals and or
ganization.

One of their prerequisites for organizational deviance

is that the activity is "supported by the internal operating norms
of the organization" (p. 7).

In other words, activities congruent

with collective goals are organizational, not individual, activities.

Organizational Processes

A variety of organizational characteristics go into the or
ganizational process of decision-making.

This process has been seen

by some to be indicative of organizational rather than individual
responsibility for activities.

Vaughn (1980) cites variables such

as size, wealth, impersonality, internal structure, delegation of
authority, subunit autonomy, and specialization as various organiza
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tional characteristics which will have some impact on the decision
making process.

As she notes, organizational characteristics, as well

as environmental conditions and a legitimating ideology, have resulted
in more opportunities for criminal behavior as a part of the struc
ture of the organization.
Most examinations of organizational processes in relation to
corporate crime occur within the Weberian perspective of formal ra
tionality.

Ladd (1970) emphasizes that organizations are structured

by specific goals whose attainment is possible through organizational
decision-making.

Utilizing Weber's ideal type description of

bureaucracy in action, Ladd notes that organizations are a "languagegame model" of decision-making.

The purpose of the model is to point

out that decision-making occurs within a specific environment; that
is, certain "rules" determine what may be done.

Like the game of

chess, for example, moves are analyzed by such rules.
formal organizations, the rule is rationality.

In the case of

Individuals do not

make organizational decisions, rather the decisions are made in the
interest of the organization by its representative or agent.

More

importantly, in Ladd's view, the goals of the organization determine
the responsibility of the organization when decisions are made.
(Again, it must be noted that such actions are often not conscious
and may not be easily identified.)

An example, used by Ladd, is the

knocking down of an opponent's chess piece; such an action is out
side the rules of the game.

Similarly actions of individuals out

side of the organization's rules make no sense.
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Sutton and Wild (1980) also use a Weberian framework and argue
that rationality is the key for large organizatons.

They argue that

corporations "rationally" need to shape and control decision-making
in order to meet their goals.

Braithwaite and Condon (1980) share

the concern with the importance of rationality for large corpora
tions, but point out that "contrary to the theory of liberalism, a
practical consequence of businessmen rationally seeking their selfinterest is that a lot of workers and consumers are needlessly killed
and injured" (p. 249).

Clinard and Yeager (1980) discuss the "cul

ture of the corporation" as one that may encourage corporate crime.
Corporate goals and norms, for example, may be perceived by lower
level workers and/or subunits as absolute requirements.

Bureaucracy

makes the individual dispensable and by removing the only real check—
whistle-blowers— the normative structure (which may be rational but
criminal) of the corporation remains intact.

Ethics, or morality,

are almost inevitably secondary to the corporate goals of profit,
growth, and security.
An important implication of the focus on rationality for the
field of corporate crime is that "the very rationality which makes
bureaucratic structures effective administrative tools seems to erode
moral consciousness" (Jackall, 1980, p. 356).

Morality is generally

not relevant within the organizational decision-making process.

Or

ganizations, as rational entities, are similar to machines and one
cannot expect morality from a machine.

The rules of decision-making

within an organization are violated if individuals allow their own
moral scruples to interfere with the goals of the organization.

The
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problem comes down to a basic contradiction for individuals:

or

ganizational decisions governed by rational efficieicy versus in
dividual standards of morality.

Ladd determines that organizations

are not moral entities.
Needleman and Needleman (1979) have used the ideas of organiza
tions as acting entities and rationality to devise two models of or
ganizational criminogenesis.

They argue that organizations may be

either crime-coercive or crime-facilitative.

Crime-coercive or

ganizations are those most concerned with profit making.

Individuals

in such systems are pawns and subject to the goals of the organiza
tion.

Needleman and Needleman argue that such a model fits only

isolated cases, and that a more realistic view may be the crimefacilitative model.

Such a model is based on rationalism which may

lead to "criminal activity as an unwelcome but unavoidable cost of
doing business" (Needleman & Needleman, 1979, p. 521).
Obviously there is considerable evidence that individuals cannot
always be held responsible for corporate crime.

Indeed, the idea of

organizations as acting entities has gained much credence.

Many

theorists have presented the view that rationality and the attainment
of goals at all costs become the standard operating procedure for
large organizations.

More important, however, is the distinction

between rationality and morality which shows organizations as large
ly bereft of morality and producing relationships which are "purely
mechanistic and materialistic ones" (Ladd, 1970, p. 512).

This is

not to imply that rationality and morality are mutually exclusive; a
truly rational view would include morality as part of the basis for
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decision-making.

In many m o d e m corporations, however, the two ap

pear to be antithetical with rationality devoid of morality.

The

erosion of moral consciousness enhances the possibilities of cor
porate crime.
As has been shown, organizations operate within a social and
economic milieu which makes certain, often conflicting, demands upon
the organization.

It has already been shown that a capitalistic

environment and market structure make specific demands on corpora
tions:

primarily profits.

To the extent that this is the primary

and overriding goal of an organization, it may result in other goals
being pushed into the background or being disregarded while the
primary goal is sought.
A caveat must be made here. While the theory as presented here
is largely confined to a capitalistic structure, it may be broadened
to include societies organized on different economic structures.
"Profits," in American society, tend to be thought of in terms of
monetary gain; in fact, however, profits may imply and/or include
other rewards.

In some state-socialist societies such as Hungary

and Yugoslavia, there is some evidence that prestige, autonomy,
and/or self-management are important goals of productive organiza
tions (Szelenyi, 1978).

Conceivably, such goals may be construed as

part of the "profits" of a particular organization.

Abstracting the

notion of profits to include other valued societal commodities, then,
may make the theory applicable to non-capitalist societies as well
as capitalist ones.
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Formal organizations tend to achieve effectiveness and ef
ficiency through rationality (in the manner described by Weber).

An

assumption of such rationality is that precise, clear-cut, rankordered goals can be found within such an organization.
this "neutrality of goal-development.")

(Weber calls

Unfortunately, such goals

are often stated as though the organization exists within a social
vacuum.

As previously discussed, the primary goal of business or

ganizations appears to be the making of profits.
precise and prioritized.

Such a goal seems

Organizations, as elements of society,

however, have a responsibility to that society at least in terms of
survival.

Without society, the organization would die.

zation, then, must not threaten societal survival.

The organi

Rationality, as

a decision-making tool, within such a context must include an
element of morality so that decisions are congruent with the public,
as well as the private interest.

Thus, there are contextual values

and goals which, at least implicitly, govern the goals of the or
ganization.

To the extent that such conceptual goals are not recog

nized, the organizational goals will take precedence, often result
ing in actions contrary to contextual goals.
Friedman's vitriolic attack on the social responsibility of
business shows a basic misunderstanding of this problem:
The view has been gaining widespread acceptance
that corporate officials and labor leaders have
a "social responsibility" that goes beyond
serving the interests of their stockholders or
their members. This view shows a fundamental
misconception of the character and nature of a
free economy. In such an economy, there is one,
and only one, social responsibility of business
— to use its resources and engage in activities
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92
designed to increase its profits, so long as
it stays within the rules of the game, which
is to say, engages in open and free competi
tion, without deception or fraud (Friedman,
1962, p. 133)
What Friedman does not understand is that organizations must have
a degree of responsibility for their actions.
ity may threaten their very existence.

Lack of responsibil

Friedman would have the con

sumer make the rational judgment as to the value of the organiza
tional product or outcome.

He naively assumes that consumers are

qualified to make such choices.
ing the automobile.

White disagrees, at least concern

"The automobile is a technically complex

product, and most consumers do not have the time nor the inclina
tion to become experts on its technical aspects" (White, 1977, p.
179).

The old notion of caveat emptor is unrealistic in today's

highly technical society.

The buyer cannot be aware of the entire

spectrum of implications of a product.

The organization must recog

nize the contextual values and goals of a society if it wishes to
have long term survival.

Organizations, thus, operate within a com

plex environment that not only mandates the making of profits, but
also requires the organization to be responsible for its actions in
terms of possible effects on the rest of society.
If organizations lose sight of social values, they may operate
entirely on the basis of organizational goals.

When the primary

goal is profit making, the goal may be pursued while violating both
the contextual goals and lesser or lower-order organizational goals.
The Ford Motor Company, for example, demanded the rapid production
of a compact car when it perceived its share of the market threatened
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by imports (Dowie, 1977).

Although Ford also has a goal of producing

a "safe" car (at least in conformity with government standards),
evidence suggests that the profit motive was, in this case, a higherorder goal.

Upon discovery of a serious safery defect in the Pinto,

Ford conducted a cost-benefit analysis of the problem— a practice
that is common in industry regulated by rationality.

Setting a

value on human life and calculating the estimated lives to be lost
or injuries to occur versus the cost of correcting the defective
fuel system, the cost-benefit analysis showed greater profitability
in continuing to manufacture the automobile and "pay off" survivors
and their families, than in recalling, correcting, and/or retooling
the fuel system of the Pinto (From Ford Internal Memorandum cited
in Dowie, 1977, p. 24).

Obviously, in this case, the goal of profit

was primary.
Goals are not the only aspect of organizational structure which
may influence the possibility of organizational crime.

The nature

of organizational communication is ideally characterized by internal
integrity; that is, ideally, accurate processing of information
within the organization can and does occur.
seldom found in the real world.

The ideal, however, is

Distorted communication is a real

possibility in organizations, especially when higher-order goals
(such as profit making) take precedence over accurate communication.
Communication may be distorted through a number of factors.
The size and complexity of the organization may prevent ac
curate transmission of information.

Deliberate distortion of com

munication by individuals within the organization may have reper-
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cussions throughout the organization.

Communication distortion may

encourage executives who tell engineering personnel to "handle
problems" but "meet the objectives" may be interpreted in ways quite
divergent from the executive perception of the communication.

To

the extent that such communication ambiguities occur, the opportuni
ties for corporate crime may be enhanced.
Organizational factors, then, must also be seen as potential
contributors to corporate crime.

Organizational goals and or

ganizational communication are of vital importance in determining
the activities of the corporation.

Toward an Explanatory Model

In developing a theoretical explanation of corporate crime,
the focus will be on the structural and organizational levels.

A.t

the structural level, the capitalist economic system is based on
profit and private ownership.

The "profit motive," a prime feature

of capitalism, must be examined for its contribution to corporate
crime.

The profit motive was seen as the single most important

function of corporations.
and legal.

It was viewed as essential, "natural,"

The utilitarian goals of production and profit were seen

to occupy a crucially important role in the corporation, and to the
extent that they supersede other goals, the possibilities of cor
porate crime increase.
The capitalist economic system with its focus on private owner
ship has led to the politicization of the economy as the "rights" of
private ownership must be protected.

Such a political economy is
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almost blatantly on the side of the capitalists and this has severe
implications in terms of the freedom of corporations to achieve
their goals.

With increased interlocks between government and busi

ness, the political sector no longer effectively controls the
economic sector, but greatly supports it.

To the extent that such

interlocks exist for specific industries, the possibilities of
corporate crime, within those industries, are enhanced.
The political economy, with the subsequent power of corpora
tions to shape the legal environment in which they operate, also may
influence a corporation's ability to commit corporate crime.

The

legal environment can be affected by corporations operating in a
political economy which supports the corporate goals of profltmaximization.

To the extent that a corporation is able to directly,

as well as indirectly influence and shape the legal environment, the
possibilities of corporate crime increase.
Corporate capitalism, with its lack of a free market and its
ability to influence other major social institutions, is another
factor affecting corporate crime.

The development of oligopolies

with their control over some markets, the economy and employment,
exemplify again the increasing politicization of the economy and
its influence on social life.

The market structure, particularly

eligopolistic markets, of American industry must also be examined
for its potential contribution to corporate crime.

The importance

of the market structure in shaping activities of corporations can
hardly be overemphasized.

When market structures are threatened or

change, corporations may act to maintain or increase their share of
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the market.

The extent to which the existing market structure is

threatened increases the possibilities of corporate crime.
At the organizational level, the hierarchy of goals within an
organization is extremely important in forming the normative en
vironment of the organizations.

The hierarchy of goals within an

organization must be ascertained in order to understand organiza
tional pushes which may lead to corporate crime.

For example, to

the extent that organizational goals of profit making override other
goals such as fair trade practices, safety, and/or social responsi
bility, the likelihood of corporate crime to achieve those over
riding goals increases.

In addition, organizations which are in

fluential in the public sector, yet operate as though they are
private, may pursue profit making to the exclusion of public in
terest.

To the extent that the public interest is not congruent

with private profit making, the possibilities of corporate crime may
increase.
Within the organization, knowledge of internal processes are
also important to gain understanding of corporate crime.

An im

portant issue is the normative environment of the organization and
the way in which the operating procedures are transmitted to per
sonnel within the organization.

The internal processes of goal-

ordering and the hierarchy of responsibility must be examined, as
well as the communication system by which such standards are com
municated throughout the organization.

The study of the internal

processes must also include an examination of the organizational
decision-making processes.

A study of the "rules" by which deci-
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sions are made may be useful in understanding how rationality
(without morality) may lead to corporate crime.
The factors which have been reviewed may have an impact on the
etiology of corporate crime; that is, they may result in structural
and organizational environments which enable corporations to act in
ways which threaten the economic and/or physical well-being of in
dividuals within society.

When such environments exist, the pos

sibility of corporate crime increases.
The following figure illustrates how the structural and or
ganizational factors listed above may be combined in an attempt to
explain the etiology of corporate crimei
The following research questions more specifically focus and
clarify the direction of this research.

Answers to these questions

may help to ascertain the utility of the theoretical model and may
also contribute to refinement of the problem.
Structural Level
1.

How did the two principles of capitalism affect the

behavior of Ford?
a.

How was Ford influenced by the principle of

maximization of profit?
b.
economy?

What influence did Ford have on the political
Were there interlocks between Ford and the

political sector?
2.

Did Ford attempt to manipulate the prevailing legal

environment?

Were political actions taken to promote Ford's

interests?
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Figure 1: An Explanatory Model
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3.

How was the market structure of the automobile industry

influential in Ford's action?

Was the market stable, con

centrated, and/or threatened?

Was Ford's share of the market

threatened?
Organizational Level
4.

What was the hierarchy of goals within the Ford organiza

tion?

Did the utilitarian goals of production and profit super

sede other goals?

Did the corporate goals of private profit

making clash with public interest goals?
5.

What was the normative environment of the Ford organization?

What were the important goals?
6.

How were these transmitted?

How were decisions made within the Ford organization?

was rationality valued?

How

What were the rules for decision

making?
These are the key questions to be addressed in this research.
Answers to these questions will enable a clarification of and refine
ment of the model proposed for an explanation of the etiology of
corporate crime.

The model is intended to serve as a theoretical

guide for the examination of these issues; it is not intended that
the model be tested, but rather that it supply an organizing frame
work for the study of this phenomenon.
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CHAPTER III

The Methods:

Part 1^

Part 1

Research in the social sciences has recently been characterized
by a bifurcation of methods.

The positivistic tradition, empha

sizing rigor and value-neutrality has been the dominant position
while conflict methods, emphasizing holism and ideology, are emer
gent in their influence on the social sciences.

The distinction

between positivistic methods and conflict methods parallels the
dispute between the theoretical positions of functional and conflict
sociology.

Sociologists, in their emphasis on the dominant para

digm, have not sufficiently defined nor developed the scope, unique
ness, and utility of conflict methods.

Before proceeding to a dis

cussion of the "hard" methods used in this study, an attempt will be
made to address the unique philisophical bases of conflict methods.

Paradigmatic Differences

The primary differences between the functional and conflict
explanations of social behavior may be found in their basic assump
tions of society.

The functional approach is based on the assump

tions that society is a lasting system, it is well integrated, every
element within the society has a function, and that society rests
on the consensus of its members.

The conflict view is based on the
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assumptions that social change and social conflict are ubiquitous,
every element in society contributes to change, and every society
rests upon the constraint of some members by others (Dahrendorf,
1958).
The controversy between the two approaches takes on paradigma
tic dimensions.

Kuhn (1962) developed the notion that knowledge

does not grow in a linear fashion, but rather, grows as theoretical
revolutions occur within science.

Ritzer (1975) has applied and

elaborated upon Kuhn’s ideas within the field of sociology.

Ac

cording to Ritzer, a paradigm is:
...a fundamental image of the subject matter
within a science. It serves to define what
should be studied, what questions should be
asked, how they should be asked, and what rules
should be followed in interpreting the answers
obtained (Ritzer, 1975, p. 7).
A paradigm dispute occurs when the fundamental image of a subject
matter changes.

The dispute between functionalism and conflict has

reached that point.

The functionalist or value-consensus approach

looks at society in terms of social order and shared values.

The

fundamental image of the conflict approach is one of interest groups,
differential power, and constaint of societal members.

The assump

tions of each position prevent effective communication between the
positions, since proponents of each view study different phenomena
which may be viewed as irrelevant by proponents of the opposing
view.

A consequence of a paradigm dispute is that much rhetoric

results.
The lack of common ground is further perpetuated by a lack of
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agreement concerning methodology.

Value-consensus theorists stress

a positivistic, scientific methodology, while conflict theorists
are more likely to use alternative techniques such as historical
research and qualitative methods.

Their studies are then criticized

because they do not adhere to positivistic methods.

Paradigms tend

to be selective in developing a methodology, usually picking one
which is best suited for their image.

Like the focus of study,

paradigm methodology may have little or no relationship to the
methodology of alternate paradigms.
The functional theoretical view is based in the philosophical
position of positivism.

Positivism is a specific way of knowing.

It is based on the belief that knowledge is gained from sensory
experience.

The methods of the physical sciences, that of empiricism

and quantitative techniques, are seen as appropriate ways of viewing
and understanding the world.

Ways of knowing which are not posi

tivistic (e.g., metaphysical

speculation, subjective knowledge,

intuitive understanding, non-empirically supported logic, etc.) are
not considered part of knowledge; "...nonquantitative approaches
to the study of human behavior [are seen] as peripheral in so
ciological analysis" (Theodorson & Theodorson, 1969, p. 274).
A very real danger in a positivistic approach (as in any ap
proach to knowledge) is a supposition that "ultimate truth" awaits
the researcher.

This truth, furthermore, is unique to this method;

other ways of knowing are not respected, nor do they disclose
"ultimate truth" (See Chapter I for a discussion of truth).

The

positivistic approach, by closing other routes to the attainment
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of knowledge, suffers from a number of problems.
1.

Positivism tends to be ahistorical.

In its concern with

explanations and predictions, it tends to consider factors and vari
ables independently of history; that is, variables and factors which
can be quantitatively measured are the focus of theory and research
with the result that qualitative factors such as history and the
organization of society are often omitted for their explanatory
value.

(This is not meant to suggest that positivism requires an

ahistorical approach; rather, this has been the tendency in twen
tieth century sociology and criminology.)
2.

Positivism tends to support the status-quo, in the sense

that assumptions are made concerning the origins of order, values,
norms, consensus, etc.

The positivistic school often focuses on

"natural order" which is seen as a law of nature.

A belief that

society, like nature, is in equilibrium leads to the belief that
what is (the status-quo) is natural.
creativity in theory building.

These kinds of blinders stifle

For example, in the area of cor

porate crime, definitions of such crime tend to be limited to
legalistic ones— within the existing law— rather than focusing on
the harmful aspects of corporate behavior.
3.

Positivistic methods seldom question the existing relation

ships and definitions within the social order.

Current, existing

definitions are accepted as right and as the basis for further
theoretical development.

In the area of crime, for example, be

havior called criminal is assumed to be intrinsically real (Thio,
1978); that is, the historical and economic situations which led
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to the creation of certain "crimes" are ignored for examination of
antecedents, explanation, and prediction of behavior already defined
as crime.

Only recently have some criminologists (Quinney; Cham

bliss; Taylor, Walton, & Young) within the critical/radical frame
work examined the origins of law and crime.
4.

Positivists assume that it is possible to remove the ob

server from the observed and that it is possible to separate facts
from values.

This last criticism combines some elements of the

other criticisms.

The ahistorical nature of positivism allows the

observer to assume objectivity and a belief that one can separate
self from past and current political, economic, and social in
fluences.

Objectivity, however, exists only as an ideal type; all

individuals have values and influences on their lives which also
influence observations.

(See Chapter I for a more comprehensive

discussion of these issues.)
Theorists within the positivistic tradition are unlikely to
agree with theorists following non-positivistic theory (e.g., dia
lectical materialism).
tion of knowledge.

Paradigm disputes are based in the accumula

Kuhn advanced the idea that the process of

knowledge is not mere accumulation; rather, knowledge or science
progresses through a series of revolutions.

As the anomalies of

one paradigm become apparent, a new paradigm arises to challenge
the old.

An interesting point, made by Kuhn, is that while two

paradigms exist concurrently, there is much argument as to what
is "truth."

Each paradigm has different assumptions, concepts, and

methodology and the differences are hotly disputed.

The paradigm
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used in this research is the radical/conflict paradigm (spelled
out in Chapter I) and the methods utilized are conflict methods.

Philosophy and Techniques in Conflict Methods

Some sociologists (e.g., Lundman & McFarlane) argue that con
flict methodology is limited to the utilization of data-gathering
techniques.

Such views focus on the "invasion" of previously in

accessible research settings (e.g., large organizations) and the
issue of informed consent.

"Conflict methodologists, then, dis

tinguish themselves from consensus methodologists by denying elite
members of large scale organizations the right to refuse research
involvement" (Lundman & McFarlane, 1976, p. 508).

While the tech

niques are an important part of conflict methodology, they are
neither necessary nor sufficient for a conflict methodology.
The notion of "conflict strategies" (Nolen & Galliher's term)
provides a limited view of conflict methodology.
aspects vital to conflict methodology:

There are two

1) The philosophical inter

pretations of social science data and 2) the strategies used to
gather data.

The strategies per se of gathering data may be

either conflict or consensus strategies; it is the philosophical in
terpretation of the data that identifies a conflict methodology.
Collin argues that the role of the researcher requires in
terpretation or conceptual reconstruction of data.

Such inter

pretations, from the Marxian perspective, are influenced by the
economic, political, cultural, and social forces of society.

Since

values and reality cannot be separated, the researcher, regardless
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of paradigmatic preference, is constantly conceptually restruc
turing the data.

The conflict methodologist recognizes this inter

relationship and interprets data in a manner congruent with a
specified philosophical position.

Data without a philosophical in

terpretation, from this view, is not possible.
The data gathering techniques, the usual focus of attempts to
explain conflict methodology (e.g., Lundman & McFarlane), are not
limited by the paradigms in which they were developed; rather, with
the appropriate conceptual reconstruction of the data, any and all
data gathering techniques may be utilized within this framework,
"...any methodology may be adapted for use by conflict theorists and
no method is unusable...creative use of any methodology would result
in significant findings compatible with conflict theory" (Duke, 1976,
p. 205).

The techniques, in this particular case, are not incon-

gruent with traditional participant observation.

The techniques,

indeed, may have been developed within either the functionalist or
the conflict paradigm.

Participant observation, however, within

the functionalist paradigm assumes the "rightness" of the system
and occurs within the framework of positivism.

The assumptions of

positivism do not encourage a critique of the system nor a subjec
tive understanding of the processes under examination.

The ahis

torical nature of positivistic research, coupled with its emphasis
on stability and order, minimize its usefulness for analyzing
phenomena beyond a specific situational level; that is, positivism
tends to de-emphasize the processual nature of human events in its
enthusiasm for explaining the static details of those events.
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On the other hand, participant observation as an entree tech
nique of conflict methods is based on the assumption that the system
not only can, but must be questioned.

The purpose of participant

observation in the conflict paradigm is two-fold:

1) to provide

information about the phenomenon under study (as in the positivis
tic framework), and 2) to establish the links between the phenomenon
under study and the system in which it occurs.

In this way, proces-

sual and structural characteristics are available for interpretation
by the researcher.
In order for the methodology to be conflict methodology, two
conditions must be satisfied.

First, the entree techniques must

be consistent with the assumptions of the conflict paradigm.

That

is, care must be taken to include variables for observation which
examine process as well as structure.

Second, the data gathered

by these entree techniques must be interpreted within the framework
explicated by the conflict paradigm.

The philosophical implications,

then, of conflict methodology, lead to an interaction between data
gathering and theoretical interpretations within the assumptions of
the framework.
Conflict methodology begins with an awareness of the importance
of history.

The origin of law, and the subsequent legal system, is

not taken for granted; rather, it is viewed as the product of the
particular economic/political system in which it exists.

The em

phasis on process allows interpretation of the events with clear ex
plication of the values involved and requires that the events of the
trial be examined in terms of the wider society rather than as an
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isolated phenomenon.

In the conflict framework, then, the trial

process is viewed as a product of the system in which it exists.
The origins and functioning of the legal system reflect the unequal
distribution of power in the wider society.
The two frameworks provide vastly different interpretations of
the same event.

The differences can be attributed to the divergent

assumptions made about the legal system and the society.
assumptions are, in effect, statements of values.

These

The utility of

the value positions, and therefore the frameworks, is not at issue
here.

At issue is the appropriateness of the assumptions and the

value positions.

This appropriateness must be judged according to

the material conditions of our society.
To assume that the criminal justice system neutralizes power
differentials is inconsistent with the stratification system that
exists in our society.

Material conditions support the view of law

as a prize in the hands of the powerful by which their views can
be enforced.

According to Quinney (1970), law is "...formulated and

administered by those segments of society, which are able to in
corporate their interests into the creation and interpretation of
public policy" (1970, p. 39).

Methods:

Part II

Part 2

The proper methods for analysis in the conflict mode include
many of the methods used by conservative and functional sociologists
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(see previous section).

These include historical research of

documents , government statistics, etc., survey methods to determine
levels of consciousness, observation of conflict situations, ex
perimentation on societal levels, etc.

An important aspect of this

approach is that the "whole" must be considered; in other words, an
examination of the incidence of a phenomenon such as corporate crime
is of little use without consideration of the economic structure
and other structural features of the society in which such crimes
occur.

Research in this area must be tied to theoretical bases,

otherwise it is of little utility.

The methods, then, to be used in

this research, are selected for their usefulness in furthering the
development of more accurate theoretical models.

While description

is sometimes germane and interesting, it must be tied to general
theoretical utility to advance scientific thought.

The specific in-

te:.t of the methods used in this study is to contribute to theory
building within the area of corporate crime.

As discussed in the

previous section, the general framework used is the conflict/
Marxist framework and the theory used to guide the research is the
one delineated in Chapter II.

Data Gathering

The study of corporate crime requires a different type of
method than is generally used in traditional crime research.

The

subject is currently not amenable to survey research or other large
scale investigatory schemes.

Wheeler (1976) examines some of the

unique problems in studying corporate crime.

A most immediate con-
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c e m Is the matter of record-keeping,

"...our official record

keeping system makes it easier for us to study some things rather
than others" (Wheeler, 1976, p. 530).

As Wheeler points out,

records are kept on traditional crimes, but not on corporate crimes.
Besides dissuading potential examination of such crime, the lack of
records on corporate crime requires more energy and innovation in
attempts to determine the incidence (let alone the causes) of such
crime.
A second methodological reason for the dearth of studies in
corporate crime "is the sheer difficulty of locating and organizing
our inquiry so as to learn systematically and in detail about hidden
activities" (Wheeler, 1976, p. 530).

Wheeler argues that it is dif

ficult to gain access to groups and individual situations in which
corporate crime is involved.

In addition, the study of such crime

is avoided because "there is a degree of complexity to forms of
organized criminal activity of the white-collar variety that may
require a longer period of training and preparation before observers
are in a position to really make sense of the activity" (Wheeler,
1976, p. 530).
Such problems in researching corporate crime preclude the use
of many methods.

Since the field is largely in an exploratory stage,

we must seek to maximize our information about both corporate crime
and the processes involved in such crime,

"...this problem requires

carefully done qualitative investigations of selected cases" (Clinard
& Yeager, 1978, p. 265).

"...there is a pressing need for accumula

tion of case studies, for hypothesis development and testing, and
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for the kind of research that moves forward by careful, additive
processes" (Geis & Meier, 1977, p. 4).

In order to achieve a com

prehensive understanding of corporate crime, all aspects of and
processes related to the phenomenon must be examined.

This can best

be achieved through the case study method for it offers a total view
which other methods often lack.

The case study approach will be

used in this investigation.
Case studies require intensive and complete examination of the
entity under study.

(These entities may include individuals, or

ganizations, processes, etc.)

Proper data sources for case studies

include "any document that bears a relationship to a person's on
going definitions and experiences"

(Denzin, 1970, p. 223).

The

goal of the study is to use any documents or information which can
be systematically analyzed to contribute to an understanding of the
phenomenon at issue.

Data Sources.

There are a number of documentary and other

sources available for this study.

These include the criminal trial

and its records, records of the governmental regulatory agencies in
volved in controlling the automobile industry, court records of
civil cases, records of the Ford Motor Company, and media sources.
A most important data source is the criminal trial against the
Ford Motor Company which occurred in the early months of 1980.
Much information concerning the Ford organization and goals were re
vealed at the trial.

Copious and thorough notes of the trial

proceedings were made and these notes will be analyzed in a search
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for relevant factors contributing to the Ford decision to manufac
ture the Pinto.

The prosecutor for the case, Michael Cosentino, has

been contacted and has agreed to release records and information
to the researchers.

In addition, the clerk's office for the County

of Elkhart (Indiana) has been contacted and copies of the indictment
against Ford, the appeal by Ford, and the decision against the ap
peal have been made available.
Although the trial will be of prime importance as a data source,
corroborative information concerning the Ford Pinto and its problems
will also be obtained.

The National Highway Traffic Safety Adminis

tration (NHTSA) is a government agency mandated to regulate and
control the automobile industry.

The agency has the authority and

the duty to establish safety guidelines for automobiles on the
American market.

There is some evidence (Dowie, 1977) which sug

gests that NHTSA and the Ford Motor Company debated the matter of
the Pinto fuel system for some time before the Pinto was recalled.
Documents and reports from this agency should provide information in
understanding some of the processes involved in the commission and
suprression of corporate crime.
A number of documents relative to this matter have been re
viewed and pertinent materials have been gathered.

These documents

include both NHTSA documents, Ford documents (including Ford crash
tests), as well as communications between NHTSA and Ford.

An

analysis of the content of these documents will help isolate and
identify factors important to a theory of corporate crime.
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A third source of information involves court records of civil
suits.

Civil suits against the Ford Motor Company have mounted

since the controversy concerning the Pinto fuel system has become
public.

(An example of public feeling is indicated by the Grimshaw

case in which a California jury awarded Richard Grimshaw $125 mil
lion in punitive damages.)

These civil suits have revealed much in

formation concerning the actions of the Ford Motor Company and thus,
promise to be of considerable interest in this study.

Records of

such cases are public; thus, they are readily accessible.
Some records of the Ford Motor Company can be accesses.

Records

sent to stockholders, for example, can identify changes in or
ganizational management, organizational goals, changes in profit
structure, etc. which may be useful for this research.

The Ford

Motor Company library holds potential for information on the organi
zational structure of the corporation as well as changes and trends
in its economic position in the automobile industry.

These records

will be perused in an attempt to gain corroborative information for
this study.

In addition, some records of the Ford Motor Company

have entered the public domain through NHTSA and the criminal/civil
trials.

These too will be included under this data source.

The media have also been concerned with the Pinto controversy.
Major news shows on television, such as 60 Minutes (CBS) and 20/20
(ABC) have examined the Pinto problems.

Columnists Jack Anderson

and Paul Harvey have expressed opinions concerning the Pinto.
Dowie, in a journalistic expose, (Mother Jones, 1977) has amassed
quantities of data in his investigation of the Pinto.

All of these
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media examinations of the Pinto can be invaluable data sources for
this project.

Contacts have been made or are being made with these

various sources to gain access to the materials collected by these
diverse investigation teams involved in media presentations.

Other

media sources include publications such as Automotive News,
Business Week, and other industry-directed newspapers and magazines.
These publications often deal with changes and trends in market
structure, organizational management changes, and "inside" informa
tion concerning the impacts of organizational strategy, products,
industry markets, etc. upon a corporation.

These data sources will

also be explored in this research.

Validity and Reliability.

The use of a wide variety of data

sources are necessary to achieve good reliable and valid data.

In

doing any research, many scholars (e.g., Denzin, 1970; Webb et al.,
1966) argue that "triangulation is the best strategy" (Denzin, 1970,
p. 237).

The use of many data sources is viewed by Denzin as a

means to "maximize the validity of field efforts" (1970, p. 310).
The sources used here may be broken into two main types:

1) documen

tary sources which include public and private documents and 2) ob
servation which includes observations and notes made at the criminal
trial.
The documentary sources have already been described and include
public documents from NHTSA and civil trials and private documents
such as Ford documents and mediated reports.

There are advantages

and disadvantages to using these kinds of data.

A major advantage
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is that data gathered from documents is nonreactive (see Webb et
al.« 1966) and unlikely to be contaminated by the researcher.

In

addition, public documents are readily accessible, are cheap to
obtain, and they provide potential for examining trends and
temporal changes.

Documentary sources also, however, have a number

of limitations and disadvantages.
noted by Webb et al. (1966).
"selective survival."
private records.

Two major sources of bias are

These are "selective deposit" and

Both of these phenomena apply to public and

At some point, choices must be made as to what

documents to keep and which must be discarded.
bias into the preservation of documents.

This introduces

Someone or some group

makes decisions as to what is important enough to "deposit" for
perpetuity.

In addition, documents may be edited (e.g. Congres

sional Record) from the time events occurred until the time the
events are recorded.

This introduces a further potential for bias.

In the matter of private documents, the risk of selective deposit
is even greater since individuals and organizations frequently sift
out materials which are not favorable to themselves.

Thus, bias

may enter into the documents in a number of ways at the "deposit"
level.

Even assuming one could control for "selective deposit,"

thus establishing validity, the biases at the level of "selective
survival" must also be addressed.

Selective survival refers to mis

sing documents whose absence sheds suspicions upon the validity of
the data.

For example, are documents missing because of "house-

cleaning" or error or would their presence be threatening to a par
ticular group?

Unless the researcher is aware of gaps, the records
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may appear complete and the researcher may reach biased conclusions.
Since "the validity of the conclusions must rest on assumptions of
the adequacy of the original material," care must be taken to insure
the accuracy and thoroughness of the records.

One way to achieve

this is through the use of multiple data sources as proposed in this
research.

Another technique is the continuous evaluation by

Blumer's criteria (Mariampolski & Hughes, 1975) for evaluating social
science data.
data.

The four criteria are:

a)

representativeness of

This includes the problems of selective deposit and survival

already discussed.

Mariampolski and Hughes suggest the researcher

remain skeptical and assume bias exists.

Essentially, "items writ

ten without regard to their possible use as interpretive materials
should offer a wider representation of experiences and present fewer
problems..." (Mariampolski & Hughes, 1978, p. 107).

Since many of

the documents in question are quantified tests, internal memos,
public court records, etc., they fall into that broader genre,
regarded by Mariampolski and Hughes as "more representative."
dequacy of data.

This problem can be partially overcome by

ing for a broad range of responses and activities which indicate
all aspects of a phenomenon are covered.

Obvious gaps in

response require skepticism and further searching to fill the gaps,
c) reliability of data.

Two factors are relevant here:

of data source and accuracy of data transmission.

credibility

The credibility

of data sources for this study can be fairly well-established.

The

trial records are public records, and are credible in that they are
carefully recorded.

(The credibility of the trial witnesses, how
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ever, may not be as easily established.)

NHTSA sources and Ford

sources are appropriately stamped, lending them an air of credibil
ity.

(It must be noted, however, that a stamp and inclusion in

files is not a foolproof method of ascertaining credibility; a de
fense lawyer, in the criminal trial against Ford, effectively argued
that a revenge-seeking person may have placed incriminating docu
ments in Ford's files.)

Credibility in the case of media sources is

more difficult to determine.

Media approaches to controversial mat

ters may be oriented to horror and expose^ and require more skep
ticism as to their reliability.

Accuracy of transmission of data

is best determined through the use of corroborative documents which
present the same general data.

In this study, corroborative docu

ments are used wherever possible and indeed, there is much overlap
in information from trial records, NHTSA records, and Ford records,
d) validity of interpretation.

The study of social phenomena should

be reflexive; the use of document sources is probably more amenable
to reflexiveness than other forms of data gathering.

Immersion in

the data, along with a healthy skepticism which requires "just a
little more digging" will result in adjustment of theory and models
which explain the phenomena under study.

In other words, the

researcher is likely to have fewer blinders in a study of this sort
than a strictly quantitative study.

As Mariampolski and Hughes

(1978) note, "the historical sociologist is frequently forced to
find alternative ways of explaining relationships between the varia
bles under examination.

A careful argument supported by the cau

tious exposition of evidence which has gone through a skeptical
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analysis is the historical sociologist’s substitute for statis
tical inference" (Mariampolski & Hughes, 1978, p. 110).

The ad

vantages and disadvantages of using documentary sources are perhaps
best summed by Webb et al.:
We should recognize that using the archival
records frequently means substituting someone
else's selective
filter for your own. Although
the investigator
may not himself contaminate
the material, he may learn that the producer
or repository already has. A thoughtful con
sideration of the sources of invalidity may pro
vide intelligence on these, either by suggesting
astute hedges or new analyses to answer rival
hypotheses. In any event, the Chinese proverb
still holds:
The palest ink is clearer than the
best memory (Webb et al. 1966, p. 11).
The second major data
criminal trial.

source involved observation of the Ford

Simple observation, where

the researcher has

no

impact on the proceedings is also advantageous in that nonreactivity
is high.

An argument may be made that such nonreactivity prevailed

in this case.

The observers were part of a courtroom of spectators,

trial principals, and newspeople; the observer's note-taking was
hardly unique or threatening in that situation.

The advantages of

observation are that they allow the researcher to check on documen
tary sources and allow the systematic notation of data considered
important by the researcher.

A distinct disadvantage is that the

observer cannot remain constant in his/her observations; rather,
personal mood swings, boredom, differential attention, and other
behavioral differences may lead to uneven data gathering.

Again,

however, the use of multiple data sources can increase the validity
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and reliability of the data.

Coding

A problem with the documents and observations used in this
research is that they have not been indexed, nor are they presented
in a form which can be easily coded or quantified.

In essence, the

data are open-ended and require careful coding and rigorous content
analysis.

The coding of the data will involve a careful search for

the factors and variables related to corporate crime.

Market struc

ture, for example, will be ascertained by a review of industry jour
nals which present figures concerning market shares, percentages
of imports sold, factors affecting auto sales, etc.

Legal environ

ment can be determined by a study of NHTSA regulations, while Ford's
influence on that environment will require an examination of the
interaction between NHTSA and Ford and changes in the shape of
proposed versus final regulations compared with industry input into
the writing of the regulation.

Analysis

Qualitative data are extremely complex and require less pre
cise analytical techniques than quantitative data.

As previously

discussed, this type of analysis requires an interaction between
the researcher, his/her theory and data.

This is an interactive

process with the researcher constantly moving from the data to the
theory and back again until a "goodness-of-fit" is achieved.

In

this study, no hypothesis-testing will be attempted; a case study is
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intended to discover descriptive materials and theoretical ideas
rather than test hypotheses.

The research and analysis will be

focused by the research questions which specify key concepts and
linkages toward the development of a theoretical model.

Analysis

will consist largely of the discovery of classes of data which link
one theoretical concept to another.
will be largely descriptive.

The communication of the data

Primarily, the data will be described

and prioritized through verbal description, tables and graphs.

This

description of the data will be tied to the theoretical base deline
ated earlier in this work.

More importantly, the data will be

"interrogated" (Schatzman & Strauss' term, 1973) to find a data
response to theoretical questions.

Through.such a process of deduc

tion and induction, some understanding of this phenomenon may be
obtained.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER IV

The Evidence

The case study used in this work revolves around the Ford
Pinto.

The Pinto was Ford's first attempt at an American subcom

pact and it was first placed on the American market in 1971.

It was

a popular item with American consumers and 2 million were sold
during the first five years of production.

In 1977, Mark Dowie,

a journalist for Mother Jones, released an article in which he
claimed that Ford engineers and managers were aware of a deadly de
fect in the Pinto.

This defect involved an inadequate fuel system

which had a propensity to rupture and send gasoline into the pas
senger section of the automobile when Pintofe were rear-ended.

Any

spark, generated by friction, the car's electrical system, etc.
could ignite the gasoline, resulting in a fire which potentially
could be lethal for the occupants of the car.

Dowie's article led

to a great deal of publicity, an investigation of the Pinto by the
NHTSA, and a number of civil suits against Ford.

The accusations

made by Dowie were serious and comprehensive and provide a beginning
for a careful examination of this action by Ford.
Before proceeding to an analysis of pertinent documents and
issues, however, a brief discussion of the history of the Pinto,
the history of the NHTSA which is mandated to regulate the automo
tive industry, and the history of the standard regulating fuel
systems, is required to more accurately comprehend the issues in121
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volved in this matter.

History of the Pinto

According to the testimony of Harley Copp, a former Ford en
gineer who worked on the design of the Pinto, the Ford Pinto was
developed in the late 1960s.

Ford

.management began to think about

competing with Volkswagen and the Japanese subcompacts which were
cornering an ever-increasing share of the American automobile market
(from 1.6% in 1956 to 10.5% in 1968).

According to Copp, Lee

Iacocca, then President of Ford, both originated and implemented
the design and manufacture of the Pinto.

The objectives for the

Pinto included a 2000 pound and $2000 total cost for the vehicle.
These objectives were stated by Copp, by Camps, a design engineer
on the Pinto project, and by Olsen who presented a paper on the
Pinto's objectives at a congress for the Society of Automotive En
gineers (1971).

In his paper, Olsen notes that "...the Pinto was

to be a true subcompact in overall size and compete directly with
the subcompact imports" (1971, p. 1).

In citing objectives, Olsen

says:
... it had to be a true subcompact in overall
size and weight, but with interior package im
provements. The Pinto design meets this ob
jective very well for it really is a small car,
and the weight is less than 2000 pounds as
shipped from the factory.
The second objective was that it had to be
designed for low cost of ownership based on ini
tial price, fuel consumption, reliability, and
serviceability. The base Pinto meets this ob
jective— the price is $1919...
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The third objective was to design a car
that would have clear product superiority over
other subcompacts in appearance, comfort, fea
tures, ride and handling, and performance
(Olsen, 1971, pp. 1-2).
Olsen’s description of the Pinto’s objectives are summarized in
the following figure taken from his paper (Olsen, 1971, p. 2).

1.

True Subcompact
.Size
.Weight

2.

Low Cost of Ownership
.Initial Price
.Fuel Consumption
.Reliability
.Serviceability

3.

Clear Product Superiority
.Appearance
.Comfort
.Features
.Ride and Handling
.Performance

Figure 2.

Pinto Objectives

Copp, during the Pinto criminal trial (but outside of the jury
presence) noted that in the very preliminary stages, then-President
Knudsen was opposed to developing a subcompact in the United States
and advocated development of a subcompact in Europe where engineers
were used to small cars.

Dowie (1977) described, this disagreement

as a power struggle within the Ford management.

Iacocca persisted

and the car was a "rush project" according to Copp.

The styling of

the car, "a low, sporty look emphasized by a wide grille, ventless
door windows, curved side glass, fast windshield slope and flowing
fastback lines' (Olsen, 1971, p. 2) was determined by September,
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1968, according to Copp, and this presented problems for the en
gineers who worked on the project.

"Freezing" the styling meant

that engineers had little leeway in designing components of the car,
such as the fuel system.

Copp noted that the design of the Pinto

left engineers with little space for the spare, muffler, fuel tank,
etc., and called attention to the "weird shape" of the fuel tank as
an indication of the difficulty experienced by Ford engineers.
Frank Camps, a Ford design engineer, witnessed the inflexibility
of enginnering changes.

In a 1981 article, Camps notes that the

Pinto windshield could not pass the Federal Safety Certification
tests.
The windshield failure that occurred that day
in July 1970 was repeated many times that summer
and in the following months and years. My
problem was that I was directed to "forget"
about failures by such devious means as the
subtle manipulation of documents and crash
data. I was instructed to inform the federal
government only of our successful test crashes
and not the many failures (Camps, 1981, p. 119).
Camps goes on to add information concerning the restrictions sur
rounding the engineering of the Pinto:
Customarily, the engineering analysis of a
crashed vehicle brings out areas of design de
ficiencies that are arrested with a methodical
well-planned approach. Once the barrier crash
sequence is concluded, management equates crash
results with weight and cost factors to deter
mine what course to follox*. Not so for the Pinto.
In this case, we were to use a fix-it-with-aBand-Aid approach because management ruled at
the inception of the program that to be competi
tive this vehicle must weigh no more than 2000
pounds and cost no more than $2000 (Camps,
1981, p. 120).
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Copp stated that the Pinto received approval for production in
early 1969, before research crash tests had taken place.

He stated

that it was not "important" in the eyes of the Ford directors.
Dowie (1977), uncovered further evidence that the Pinto was rushed
into production before adequate tests were made.

He claims that the

Pinto tooling occurred while the Pinto was being developed.

"So

when crash tests revealed a serious defect in the gas tank, it was
too late.

The tooling was well underway" (1977, p. 21).

Camps

(1981) concurs that the car was rushed into production before ade
quate tests were made.

"The simple fact was that we were already

tooled for production before our certification testing program be
gan.

Any substantive design changes would have jeopardized Ford's

production schedule" (Camps, 1981, p. 120).
Ford did eventually crash test the Pinto and some earlier pro
totype versions of the car.

In respect to the fuel system, rear-

end crash tests, beginning in 1970 (Test Number 1616) and continuing
from that time to the "fix" (an industry term indicating appropriate
procedures and parts to be used in raising a car to standard) in
1978, showed that the Pinto was not capable of wishstanding a 20 mph
rear-end impact without a substantial amount of damage to, and
leakage from, the fuel system.

Ford's own tests, marked "confiden

tial," repeatedly told of fuel system failure in the Pinto sedans.
These failures were verified by Copp in civil trials and the criminal
trial and were confirmed by independent tests ordered by the NHTSA
in 1979.

In 10 tests of Pintos manufactured from 1971 to 1976,

Pinto fuel tanks leaked Stoddard Solvent (a non-flammable substitute
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for gasoline) at varying rates ranging from 6 ounces per minute to
total tank leakage in one minute ("Fuel System Integrity," 1979).
When Dowie*s expose of the Pinto was released (September,
1977), a number of issues were raised concerning the history of the
Pinto.

A basic issue revolved around the percentage of Pintos in

volved in rear-end crashes and fires.

Ford claimed their Pintos

had no higher incidence, proportionately, of fires resulting from
rear-end crashes than any other car.

Ford claimed (Misch, 1977)

that Pinto fire-related deaths amounted to 1.4% of total fire deaths
while Pintos made up 1.8% of all passenger cars on the road (1975
figures).

Ford's figures were based on statistics reported by

Fatality Analysis Reporting Service (FARS), a data bank which com
piled national accident statistics.

The NHTSA, after investigating

the FARS data, found Ford's figures inaccurate and discovered at
least twice as many fire fatalities as those reported by Ford
(Murray, 1977).

Even more surprising, a 1973 Status Report

(Locati & Franchini, 1973) indicated that in 1973, Ford cars con
stituted 20% of the cars on the road and yet Ford automobiles had
35% of all the ruptured fuel systems reported in accidents.

Ford

itself, in response to NHTSA requests for information acknowledged
35 accidents involving rear-end crashes and resultant fuel system
failures in Pintos in which 25 people suffered fatal injuries and 32
people suffered varying degrees of burns and other injuries
("1971-1978 Pinto Fuel Systems," 1978).

In addition, in a survey by

R. L. Polk (referred to by Consentino in the criminal trial, Feb
ruary 2, 1980), evidence was presented that "Pinto fires account
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for .8% of all accident fatalities while fires in all other 1973
cars account for .4% of accident fatalities."

A number of civil

cases (Kaminski vs. Ford, Grimshaw vs. Ford) were brought against
Ford and judgements against Ford were common.

A landmark case was

Grimshaw vs. Ford in which a jury awarded the plaintiff $128 mil
lion.
By 1978, the NHTSA had made an initial determination that a
defect did exist in the fuel system of the Pinto and its Mercury
companion, the Bobcat (Dugoff, 1978).

The NHTSA sent Ford a notice

of a hearing to answer the NHTSA charges.

Ford, rather than facing

an involuntary recall and more adverse publicity, agreed to volun
tarily recall the Pintos and Bobcats.

Misch, a Ford Vice-President,

however, stated that Pintos were no better or worse than any other
small car, but that the NHTSA had found that Ford could reduce the
"risk of fuel leakage" and thus Ford, "to end public concern" would
offer the modifications (Misch, 1977).

Ford subsequently offered

a "fix" which failed independent crash tests ordered by the NHTSA.
This first modification utilized a polyethelene shield over the
front of the tank and a longer filler neck sealed to the tank.

The

next "fix" included the above, but added a better sealing gas cap.
This "fix" also failed crash tests.

The next "fix" deleted brittle

"U" bolts, added a hanger strap reinforcement, and all of the above
fixes.

In tests, puncture holes still appeared on the tank because

the polyethelene shield became loose.

In the final "fix," approved

by the NHTSA on August 18, 1978, all of the above remedies plus an
additional small polyethelene shield and a rounding off of sharp
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corners of the mounting bracket were implemented (Lederman, 1978).
Ford began sending out recall letters to Pinto and Bobcat owners in
September* 1978.

History of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

The NHTSA was created in 1966.

The Congress of the United

States enacted the National Highway and Motor Vehicle Safety Act and
stated the purpose of both the Act and the agency created as a
result of the Act (NHTSA) as follows:
...Congress hereby declares that the purpose
of this Act is to reduce traffic accidents and
deaths and injuries to persons resulting from
traffic accidents. Therefore, Congress de
termines that it is necessary to establish
motor vehicle safety standards for motor
vehicles and equipment in interstate commerce;
to undertake and support necessary safety re
search and development; and to expand the na
tional driver register" (NHTSA, 1966, p. 179).
The NTMVS Act consists of three titles with 42 different sec
tions.

The three titles address 1) motor vehicle safety standards,

2) tire safety, and 3) research and test facilities.

The following

list summarizes the content of the various sections:
Title Ij, Part A - Motor Vehicle Safety Standards
Section 101
Names the Act
Defines and gives general provisions
Section 102
Procedures for ordering standards
Section 103
Provisions for establishing an ad
Section 104
visory council
Section 105
Procedures for dealing with con
troversy over orders
Section 106
Research rights of NHTSA
Section 107
Admonishment to cooperate with
other federal and state agencies
Section 108
Agency rights to records, call for
conformity to standards, and liabil
ity under common law
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Section 109
Section 110
Section 111
Section 112
Section 113

Section
Section
Section
Section
Section
Section
Section
Section
Section

114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122

Section 123

Section 124
Section 125

Penalties for violations
Agency right to recall, fine, sue
Manufacturers responsibilities in
recalls
Authority to inspect
Procedures for manufacturers to
oppose, amend, comment, etc. on
standards
Procedure to certify cars to dealers
Job description for secretary of bureau
Antitrust laws upheld
Repeal of previous rules
Use of public test facilities
Rights of bureau secretary
Call for annual report
Money allocations for bureau
Effective date of Act (when first
Standard is issued)
Procedure to handle publications and
comments, includes list of exemp
tions from public domain
Procedures for people to call for
orders
Order for seat belts

Title I, Part B - Discovery, notification, and remedy
Section 151
Order for manufacturer to notify
of defect (whether standard exists
or not)
Section 152
Secretary's duty to warn and proce
dures for determination of defect
Rules for notification
Section 153
Section 154
Manufacturers' choices to remedy
Section 155
Enforcement of notification
Section 156
Petition to show reasonable notifi
cation and/or remedy
Section 157
Exemptions
Order for manufacturer to notify
Section 158
bureau of fix or remedy
Section 159
Tire rules
Statement of warrenty obligations
Section 160
Title II - Tire Safety
Section 201
Tire labeling required
Must meet load standards
Section 202
Uniform quality grading system
Section 203
Section 204
No sale of regrooved tires
Supersedes old orders
Section 205
Section 206
Safety standards for tires must be
established within one year of act
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Title III - Research and test facilities
Section 301
Mandate for bureau to plan and
construct test facilities
It should be obvious from the foregoing that the scope of the
Act is broad and that the Act grants much power to the bureau which
it created.

Various sections of the Act are more pertinent to this

study than others, and these will be discussed in more detail as
they relate to the specific research questions.
The NHTSA began issuing standards in 1968.

These standards

covered many items involved in automobile manufacturing, including
performance standards for brakes, windows, tires, controls, warning
devices, crash protection, windshield retention, etc.

The standard

involved in the Ford Pinto case is Federal Safety Standard 301 which
sets guidelines for fuel systems in the form of fuel tanks, fuel
tank filler pipes, and fuel tank connections under the general title
of Fuel System Integrity ("Summary Description," 1976, p. 3).

Standard 301 - Fuel System Integrity

The NHTSA has a policy of rule-making which allows petitioners
or the agency to propose a rule.

Following such proposals, a notice

of rule-making is issued (in the Federal Register) and interested
parties have 90 days in which to respond to the proposed rule.
Responses may include cost-benefit analyses, arguments opposed to
or in support of the proposed rule, and/or may include any addi
tional information to the matter at issue.

Following such "com

ments," the NHTSA will review the matter and either amend the pro
posed rule (starting the comment/amend process all over again) or
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may accept the rule as proposed.

Rules are seldom Implemented after

only one notice, and Standard 301 was no exception.
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 301 was first
issued in 1967.

It basically stated that fuel spillage following a

30 mph front barrier impact could not exceed one ounce per minute
from the fuel tank, filler pipe, and their connections.

The NHTSA

also issued in 1967 "advanced notice of rule-making" which would
alter the standard to include rear and side impacts, as well as
rollover fuel spillage.

An advanced notice of rule-making indicated

that such a rule would soon be proposed to be effective in the near
future.

In 1968, a new notice of rule-making, requiring 20 mph

rear and side impact crash tests, was issued.
be effective commencing January 1, 1970.

This standard was to

In 1970, another notice of

rule-making was issued, adding a 30 mph rear impact standard to be
effective in January, 1973.
effect.

Again, the proposal was not put into

On August 20, 1973, James B. Gregory, then administrator of

the NHTSA, issued a "Preamble to amendment to MVSS 301," along with
a revised standard.

In this amendment, the standard remained at a

30 mph rear-end collision, but allowed one ounce per minute fuel
spillage during the tests rather than zero fuel spillage as had been
proposed.

This was changed because "the proposal that there he

zero fuel spillage was almost universally opposed for cost/benefit
reasons" (Gregory, 1973, p. 1).
The notice of rule-making was sent out for comment and on March
21, 1974, further amendments were made.

The amendments concerned

the use of a static rather than dynamic rollover test and the use of
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Stoddard Solvent (a less flammable fuel than gasoline) rather than
gasoline.

The amendments were adopted and the new notice of rule-

making specified September 1, 1975 as the effective date of the
standard.

Gregory issued another preamble to amendment on November

21, 1974.

In this notice, testing procedures were clarified, the

NHTSA disregarded negative cost/benefit analyses, and refused to
lengthen the time for implementation.
On August 6, 1975, a sixth amendment to Standard 301 was given.
Again, changes in test procedures were clarified.

Changes were

minimal and the standard was to be effective 180 days after the
publication of the notice (February, 1976).

A petition for recon

sideration led to the final rule issued in October, 1975.

The im

plementation of the standard was delayed until September 1, 1976 so
that manufacturers would have sufficient lead time to conclude
testing.

The final standard called for a 20 mph lateral impact

moving barrier of 4000 pounds, and a 30 mph front-end and rear-end
moving barrier impact.

Corporate Crime?

Before examining the research questions in relation to this
case study, the issue of definition must be addressed.

Was Ford's

action in the case of the Pinto actually a corporate crime?

In the

very broad definition, as given in Chapter I, Ford's action certain
ly did "destroy or threaten to destroy the basic liberties of in
dividuals and groups within society."

The crime becomes even more

heinous (thus a more serious crime, although that is not a criterion
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for the definition) upon the examination of evidence which suggests
that Ford knew of the potential threat to human life, but neglected
to fix or call public attention to the defect.
A number of documents indicate that Ford had prior knowledge of
the Pinto's defective fuel system.

Earlier Ford models, which

utilized a similar gas tank design, were criticized for their poor
performance in fuel system integrity.

In a letter written to the

Department of Transportation (DOT) on September 11, 1968, Coast
Guard Captain Williams (Director of Safety) complained of the dropin tank where the floor of the trunk consists of the top of the
fuel tank (Williams, 1968).

A frequency distribution of passenger

car fires and "collision-ruptured fuel systems" by passenger cars
in use (July 1, 1973) showed that Ford failures constituted 35% of
all fires while Ford products made up only 20% of all passenger
cars in use (Locati & Franchini, 1973).

According to Hare, attorney

for the plaintiff in Kamiski v s . Ford (1977), "Ford, themselves, ac
cepted a figure of six or seven hundred deaths from fires in auto
mobile collisions" (Kaminski v s . Ford, 1977, p. 7).
Hare's arguments are most convincing when he discusses proof
of Ford's prior knowledge:
I want to go to their own crash tests. What
does Ford know, not guess, not whether they've
read the literature in their big library, but
what do they actually know before they turn
this Pinto loose. They've got crash tests on
other cars, the ones they are modeling after.
Tests after tests, after tests failures,
penetrations, fill tube pulling out, leaks on
Falcons, Mustangs, Mavericks, they've got those
crash tests...every single crash test a
failure...every single test conducted by Ford
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on their own Pintos in a rear-end collision
to demonstrate this hazard— 100% failed. And
they release it, and don't tell the public and
they don't tell the government, and they don't
make a single change (Kaminski vs. Ford, 1977,
pp. 15-16).
Testing of Pinto fuel systems began before Pintos were put on
the market.

Four tests on Pinto prototypes, called "special

Mavericks," were conducted on May 12, 1969 (Test order T-0109 and
T-0111), June 26, 1969 (T-0210), and November 7, 1969 (T-0386).
resultsof these tests were that the

The

fuel system was lacking inte

grity and leaked fuel at speeds less than 20 mph.

Additional test

were conducted throughout the life of the Pinto and most of these
indicated failure of the Pinto fuel system.

The table below sum

marizes a few of Ford's own tests on the Pinto.
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Table 1
Ford Motor Company Tests of Pinto

Test

Date

Car

1.615

10/9/70

1970 Capri
w/over axle
tank
1971 Pinto
Sedan
Pinto with
rubber bladder
1971 P. Sedan

1.616

10/10/70

1.657

12/2/70

1.668

12/15/70

1.682

1/7/71

1.716

1/15/71

Stiffened rear
end, heavier
1971 w/bladder

2.666
2.679
2.736

9/26/73
10/17/73
1/21/74

Pinto prototype
Pinto Wagon
74 prototype

2.832

7/1/74

Runabout/Mustang
tank

2.934

10/22/74

74 Pinto
Sedan

2.955

11/25/74

74 Pinto
Sedan

2.976

1/8/75

75 Wagon

2.989

2/12/75

2.063
3.096

5/27/75
6/26/75

75 Pinto
Sedan
75 Pinto Sedan
75 Pinto Runabout

3.097

6/26/75

75 Pinto Runabout

3.123

7/24/75

75 Wagon

3.320
3/278

5/3/76
6/10/76

77 prototype
77 Bobcat

Outcome

no leakage
Filler pulled
out, punctures
Tank punctured,
bladder held
Filler out, ex
cessive leakage
no leakage
punctured, filler
out, bladder held
Excessive leakage
Excessive leakage
Filler out, strap
broke, leakage
Punctured by
differential, ex
cessive leakage
Filler out, strap
broke, puncture,
excessive leakage
Tank tore, seam
burst, excessive
leakage
Tank folded after
contact with axle
excessive leakage
excessive leakage
excessive leakage
Puncture, filler out,
excessive leakage
Multiple punctures,
leakage
Filler out, ex
cessive leakage
excessive leakage
excessive leakage
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In the above table, note that test number 1.615 Involved a 1970
Capri with an over-the-axle fuel tank.

This particular fuel system

passed the rear-end impact test, indicating that Ford had the tech
nology to strengthen the Pinto's fuel system integrity.

Similarly,

in test 1.657 and 1.761, Pintos with rubber bladders were able to
pass the rear impact test.

Note also that test 1.682 shows that

fuel leakage could have been avoided with a heavier car with a stif
fened rear-end.

Hare, in Kaminski vs . Ford, discussed the failure

rate of all the Ford tests— some fifty or more tests, according to
Ford documents ("Rear Crash Tests, 1978).

Hare said, "A hundred

percent failure of the tests for the purpose of seeing if it's safe,
a hundred percent failure; no warning, no notice, no change"
(Kaminski v s . Ford, 1977, p. 12).
Ford's tests were further substantiated by independent tests
ordered by the NHTSA.

In tests of 12 Pintos (See Table I I ) f u e l

system damage, sufficient to cause fuel spillage beyond the accep
table one ounce per minute, was consistent.
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Table 2
NHTSA-Contracted Tests of Flnto

TEST

DATE

1
3
5
7
9
1.1
1.4
1.6
1.7
1.9

MODEL

1971
1972
1972
1971
1971
1972
1974
1976
1974
1976

2/1
2/15
2/16
2/20
2/23
2/27
3/21
3/22
3/23
'3/28

(Sources:

tf-n___ 1

Pinto
Pinto
Pinto
Pinto
Pinto
Pinto
Pinto
Pinto
Pinto
Pinto

OUTCOME

Sedan
Sedan
Sedan
Sedan
Sedan
Sedan
Sedan
Sedan
Sedan
Sedan

Fire
Fire
Leakage> 6oz/pra
Leakage> lOOoz/pm
Leakage> 10 oz/pm
Leakage> 12 oz/pm
Leakage> 500oz/pm
Leakage> 450oz/pm
Leakage> lOoz/pm
Total tank contents

r»_

a -j a \
"Ruel System Integrity,"If i1979)

An investigative report on the Pinto by the Office of Defects
Investigation includes the following corroborative information:
Reports of 55 barrier crash tests conducted...on both
production vehicles and vehicles with experimental com
ponents and/or modified structures...were provided,
including tests of Mercury Bobcats. While these tests
were reportedly performed, in part, in connection with
proposed NHTSA rule-making activities, three items
developed a history of consistent results:
a. At impact speeds as low as 21.5 miles
per hour with a fixed barrier (Crash Test 1616),
the fuel tank was punctured by contact with the
differential housing and/or its bolts, or with
some underbody structure.
b. Under similar test conditions as (a),
above, the fuel filler neck was pulled out of
the tank completely.
c. Again, under similar conditions as (a),
above, structural and/or sheet metal damage to
the vehicle was sufficient to jam one, or both of
the passenger doors closed ("Alleged fuel tank
and Filler neck damage," 1978, p. 7).
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Ford's prior knowledge is verified by studies done by Ford in
which the cost of remedying the defect was examined.

A Ford confi

dential Cost Engineering Report dated February 9, 1971 examines the
costs of two alternative fuel tanks to meet the "30 mph Safety Stand
ard" (Mancini, 1971).

The first proposal consists of a fuel tank

over the rear axle along with a body sheet metal barrier at a pro
posed cost over the 1971 model of 19.95.

The second proposal in

volved a tank-in-tank with polyurethane foam between the tanks.
This plan added an additional $5.08 to the cost of the 1971 model.
In 1977, the NHTSA undertook an investigation of the Ford
Pinto.

In a letter dated September 8, 1977, Lynn Bradford asked

Ford to respond to a number of questions concerning the Pinto fuel
system.

Questions 1, 2, 4, and 5 were directed specifically to the

changes Ford made to strengthen fuel system integrity.

In response

to those questions, Ford said that 82 changes had been made rela
tive to the fuel system.

Those items particularly concerned with

fuel system integrity in rear-end impacts did not occur until model
year 1977 when a plastic shield was added between the fuel tank and
straps, the filler tube was lengthened, revised tank straps and
brackets were added, a tank shield was added, and special bolts were
added.

Note from the above that it took a combination of methods to

enable the Pinto to eventually pass Standard 301.

As the Office of

Defects Investigation Enforcement, NHTSA, reported, "Review of the
test reports in question suggested that Ford had studied several al
ternative solutions to the numerous instances in which fuel tank
deformation, damage of leakage occurred during or after impact"
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("Alleged fuel tank and filler neck damage," 1978, p. 1).
The 1977 Pintos were reengineered to better meet Standard 301.
Indeed, Ford, In an advertising campaign boasted of "Another Design
Feature.

Since the 1977 model year, all Pinto Sedans included re

designed fuel system features:

a new, longer filler pipe, and a

polyethylene shield for improved puncture resistance" (Bloch, 1978,
p. 2).
The evidence indicates that Ford was indeed aware of the
problems and the potential threat to life of the Pinto.

While this

is not a criterion of corporate crime, it makes the act more delibe
rate and probably more serious.

The other aspect of corporate crime

involves actions on behalf of the corporation as opposed to actions
in the interests of particular individuals.

Was this indeed a

corporate act as opposed to an individual act?
Camps (1981) outlines the influence of the corporate benefit
in the case of the Pinto.

Camps was one of many engineers working

on the Pinto, and one of his major duties was to see that the Pinto
was certified.

When the Pinto windshield could not be certified

because of the retention requirement, Camps said, "We intentionally
channeled some of the kinetic energy generated in the crash away
from the windshield and transmitted that energy via the driveshaft
to the differential housing, causing contact with the gas tank.
The corporate reasoning was sound.

Windshield retention was a

federally mandated area of certification.

Fuel system integrity,

at that time, was not" (1981, p. 120).
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Camps repeatedly called the Pinto problems to the attention of
corporate management.

He states, "After pointing out that I faced

the dilemma of either serving the best interest of the Ford Motor
Company or submitting to the directives of my immediate superiors,
I charged that "certain members of management are totally aware of
violations of federal law as they relate to windshield strength and
retention and have willfully and knowingly suppressed this informa
tion" (Camps, 1981, p. 123).

Camps went to the highest echelons

in his attempt to change corporate policy.

"I met in October with

Jack Eckhold, the Director of Safety for the Ford Motor Company.
Mr. Eckhold was gracious and disarming, but when we parted after two
hours of discussion, he escorted me to the door with the final com
ment:

Mr. Ford does not take too kindly to "whistle-blowers" and

added that it would be prudent for me to keep my mouth shut" (1981,
p. 125).

Camps sums up his experience as follows:
My experience at Ford also taught me a disheart
ening lesson about the distorting effects that
the company can have upon the individual worker.
After I brought my concerns to the attention of
the Office of General Counsel, I sought among my
co-workers— as did Diogenes— an "honest man" to
stand with me against management. I thought I
had found two or three persons who would support
my claims. But my hopes were quickly dashed. I
discovered that my colleagues, who previously
. had shared my views, had received promotions in
grade and substantial salary increases by fol
lowing orders. Needless to say, they were no
longer interested in voicing their displeasure
with company safety-testing procedures. It is
not surprising that a corporation with un
limited resources can buy or intimidate people
(Camps, 1981, p. 127)

The Grand Jury in Elkhart recognized that the Pinto defect was
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a corporate rather than an individual act when they stated:
"... through the acts and omissions of its agents and employees
acting within the scope of their authority with said corporation..."
("Indictment," 1978, p. 1).

Cosentino, the prosecuting attorney in

the criminal case reiterated more than once that the corporation,
not individuals within it, were on trial.

"We never from the

beginning said that we intended to indict individuals.

The inves

tigation, which covered hundreds and hundreds of hours, was directed
toward the corporation" (Schrieber, 1977, p. 3).
Harley Copp too, in testimony at the criminal trial, stated
that Ford knew of the Pinto's defects, that there were dangerous
design defects, and that individuals were helpless to change the
situation because "they were locked into style and cost" (Trial
Notes, February 2, 1980).

He added that engineers were kept from

exercising their best judgment by Lee Iacocca (then President) whose
"ambition overshadowed his morality" (Trial Notes, February 12,
1980).
With the exception of Iacocca, who individually could gain
prestige, increased bonus, job security, etc., by the successful
meeting of Pinto's 2000 pound/2000 dollar objectives, other in
dividuals within the Ford group had little individual vested in
terest in the action.

Iacocca was involved in overseeing the pro

ject rather than its actual development and testing.

No single in

dividual can be identified as having committed the act of manufac
turing a defective car; rather, it appears to have been a corporate
act— that is, an action by a corporation or its agents— in the in-
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terest of the corporation.

The corporate interest appears to have

been, primarily, one of profit.

Thomas Feaheny, a Ford engineer,

commented, ’’This is a complex business.
must appeal to the buyer.

Whatever we do, however,

It's got to sell or we have lost the

ballgame" ("72 Ford models," 1969, p. 43).

Research Questions

The Ford case, then, meets the criteria of corporate crime and
is a suitable case for investigation.

The factors involved in this

crime will become evident through examination of the individual
research questions.

Research Question 1

How did the two principles of capitalism affect the behavior
of Ford?
A. How was Ford influenced by the principle of maximiza
tion of profit?
The principle of maximization of profit is quite evident in
documents pertinent to the Ford matter.

Henry Ford II, in a Look

magazine interview (1968, cited by Camps, 1981) said, in response to
a question about the biggest problem at Ford, "That's easy— making
more money" (p. 121).
ployees.

Such sentiments have been echoed by Ford em

Camps, 1981, states, "Our main purpose as Ford employees

was to increase corporate profits" (p. 120).

In a 1969 speech at

Harvard Business School, Henry Ford II addressed the issue of cor
porate influence over the quality of life.

He stated, "...we

should start thinking about changes in public values as opportuni
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ties to profit by serving new demands" ("Ford sees danger," 1969, p.
6).

He further added, "We have to think more like entrepreneurs and

innovators, and less like administrators and problem solvers" (1969,
p. 6).

Henry Ford II concluded his speech by noting the increase of

expenditures required to meet increasing government standards, but
implied that meeting such demands provided a greater opportunity
for profit.

Thomas Feaheny also expressed concern over profits by

noting that appeals to the buyer were crucially important.

"It's

got to sell or we have lost the ballgame," he stated to a panel
sponsored by the National Association of Independent Insurers
("72 Ford Models," 1969, p. 43).
Profits at the Ford Motor Company appeared to be a matter of
concern during the late 1960s and early 1970s.

Table 3 shows the

net profit of Ford from 1969 to 1975, and it is evident that, ex
cept for a two year surge in 1972 and 1973, the trend in profitabil
ity has been downward.
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Table 3
Trends in Profit for Ford Motor Company

YEAR

NET PROFIT FOR FORD

NET PROFIT FOR ALL MANUFAC
TURING CORPORATIONS

1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975

7.0
5.9
5.2
6.3
7.5
7.0
2.5
2.3

8.7
7.1
5.0
5.5
6.5
7.9
6.1
7.7

Source:

Compiled from Quarterly Financial Reports, 1971-1975,
U.S. Federal Trade Commission and Statistics of Incomes,
1960-1970,.U.S. IRS.

Profit margins have worried Ford.

"In 1971, before the oil crisis,

Ford was complaining that its profit margin, at 4.1% of sales com
pared unfavorably with an average 5.7% for the thirty companies in
the Dow-Jones industrial index and 4.7% for the nation's largest
industrial firms" ("The Ford Motor Company," 1978, p. 8).
The importance of the profit motive for Ford is nicely summed
up by the CIS (Counter Information Service) report:
Profits mean power, and power protects and main
tains profits. The Ford Motor Company will not
tolerate constraints on its behavior, and its
multinational operation, and sheer economic
muscle give it a great deal of independence of
and control over conditions in any one country
("The Ford Motor Company," 1978, p. 9).
In the matter of
recalls,

the Pinto affair, the loss of profits, through

adherence to standards, adjustments to the fuelsystem,

etc., repeatedly surface as an explanation for Ford's failure to
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"fix" a known defect.

Hare, for example, in asnwering the question

as to why Ford did not fix the Pinto, remarks,
The answer to this question goes back to the
original management motivation for the develop
ment of the Pinto which was in response to a
management felt necessity to obtain a competi
tive position in the subcompact market; in other
words, for profit (Kaminski v s . Ford, 1977, p. 20).
Harley Copp, in testimony at the criminal trial, responded again and
again that increased costs (and by inference, decreased profits)
were the reason for Ford's inaction.
Question (by the prosecuting attorney): Did Ford know the
crush space was inadequate?
Answer (By Copp):
Question:
Answer:

They knew it.

What did they do about it?
Nothing, because of costs.

Question (concerning reinforcement of the Pinto):
else?
Answer:
Question:
Answer:

Nothing significant.
Why not?
Costs of tooling, etc.

Question (concerning filler tube pullout):
do anything?
Answer:

Anything

Why didn't they

Costs.

Question (concerning floor pan welds): Did Ford know of the
problem?
Answer:
Question:

They knew.
What did they do?

Answer: Nothing.
Question:

Why?
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Answer:

Redesign costs.

Question (concerning the shape of the gas tank): Did Ford
know of the defects?
Answer:
Question:
Answer:

Sure, it was a basic engineering principle.
Why didn't they do anything?
Cost.

Question: Can you tell us how reduction in the 1973 Pinto
fuel system integrity came about?
Answer:
Question:
Answer:

To save $6.55.
How did $6.55 affect policy concerning the Pinto?
Improved profitability.

(Trial Notes, 2/7/80)

Trial notes also show the attention paid to the issue of
profitability by both Ford and the prosecution.

Neal, the chief

defense attorney, during the voir dire asked prospective jurors,
"Do you think corporations have a right to make a profit?" (Trial
Notes, 1/7/1980).

Consentino later asked, "Do you think corpora

tions have a right to make a profit at the expense of safety?"
(Trial Notes, 1/7/1980).

Consentino continued this line of reason

ing in his opening statement by arguing that Ford management vetoed
possible remedies for the defect because they were "too costly" and
that "Ford chose profit over safety" (Trial Notes, 1/15/80).
Much was made at the criminal trial, as well as in civil suits,
of Ford's use of cost-benefit analysis to determine whether or not
safety features were cost-effective.

The highly publicized document

at issue here is the Grush-Saunby report which was used by Ford in
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response to Notice 2 of.proposed rule-making, Standard 301-Fuel
System Integrity.

The Grush-Saunby report examined only one aspect

of the standard, but is useful as illustrating the arguments used by
Ford:
The cost of implementing the rollover portion of
the amended Standard has been calculated to be
almost three times the expected benefit, even
using very favorable benefit assumptions. The
yearly benefits of compliance were estimated
at just under $50 million, with an associated
customer cost of $137 million. Analyses of
other portions of the proposed regulation would
also be expected to yield poor benefit-to-cost
rations (Grush & Saunby, 1973, p. 3).
In addition, Ford complains, "The above listed product changes result
in an increased Retail Price Equivalent (the customer sticker price
with no provision for Ford profit)..." (Eckhold, 1973).
The Grush-Saunby report led Jack Anderson to title a column,
"Ford Motor Company put profit ahead of lives," in which Anderson re
veals, "Buried in secret files of the Ford Motor Company lies evi
dence that big auto makers have put profit ahead of lives" (Anderson
& Whitter, 1976).

In Grimshaw v s . Ford, a civil suit, Mr. Hews, at

torney for the plaintiff comments:
... the documents we have referred to were kept
in the ordinary course of business; that they
represented two approaches by the company, one,
the approach of corporate savings, and the
other as it related to the cost, and the other
the conversion of human lives into a dollar and
cents figure as it related to corporate cost of
making the change" (Grimshaw v s . Ford, 1977, p. 7).
Ford, in the Indiana criminal trial argued that "NHTSA requires such
cost-benefit analysis" (Trial Notes, 1/14/1980), and that the GrushSaunby "document can be misconstrued" (Trial Notes, 1/14/1980).
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Mr. Hews, in Grimshaw v s . Ford, argued that Ford has misinterpreted
the extent of the NHTSA cost-benefit analysis program.

He argued

that the article in question (used by Ford to justify Grush-Saunby)
was prefaced with the statement, "That we are in no way attempting
to measure the value of human life" (Grimshaw v s . Ford, 1977, p. 9).
There is evidence, then, to support the importance of the profit
principle in the case of Ford.

Many individuals within Ford, as

well as Henry Ford II, argue that profit-making is a primary concern
at Ford.

The influence of the principle of maximization of profit

is poignantly realized through an examination of the Grush-Saunby
report In which human lives were assigned dollar values and those
benefits were subsequently weighed against the costs of remedying
the defects.
B. What influence did Ford have on the political
economy? Were there interlocks between Ford and
the political sector?
This question is rather difficult to answer.

There are indica

tions that Ford and the other automobile companies form an oligopoly
which wields considerable economic power.

For example, "The Cost of

Living Council exempted the auto industry from Phase IV wage and
price controls on December 10, 1973.

In exchange, GM. Ford, and AMC

agreed not to raise prices by more than $200 on average-sized 1974
cars nor more than $150 on compact and subcompacts unless forced to
by "unforeseen major economic events" (Costello, 1974).
The interrelationships of the automobile industry and the
political process are indicated in a number of ways.

U.S. Secretary

of State William Rogers (1971) told executives of large corporations,
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including Ford, that "... the Nixon administration is a business
administration.

Its mission is to protect American business” ("The

Ford Motor Company," 1978, p. 6).

In return (as it were) Ford

contributed to the Committee to Re-elect the President (Nixon), a
sum of $133,441.
(2074, p. 3).

$102,776 of this was a secret contribution

Of the total Ford contribution, $49,776 was a personal

contribution from Henry Ford II (Aspin, 1973, p. 3).

The press

release from Congressman Les Aspin (D-Wisc) noted the "solid evidence
of the endless trade-off between big business and the Pentagon.

It

shows unmistakably the stake big business has in maintaining a
bloated military budget" (Aspin, 1973, p. 3).
The above is not surprising in view of the interlocks between
Ford and the political system.

Robert McNamara, for example, held

various executive positions at Ford from 1946 to 1961.
was appointed Secretary of Defense.
posite (public to private) direction.

In 1961 he

Other interlocks go in the op
Douglas W. Toms, who headed

NHTSA from 1969 through 1973, is now the President of a recreational
vehicle company which does "substantial business" with Ford.
A further example of the interrelationship of the automobile
industry and the polity came to light in a document concerning White
House involvement in the regulation process.

This memo "...sets

out the statement of White House concern for the air bag and other
regulatory burdens on the auto industry" (Heffelfinger, 1971).

The

memo refers to the RECAT (Regulatory Effects on the Costs of Auto
motive Transportation) which addresses the question, "How far can
and should the government enter into regulation and establishment of
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standards for automotive design and inspection?11 (Heffelfinger,
1971).

The memo suggests that active White House involvement in

weakening regulatory power is occurring.
The lack of activity of the NHTSA was not going unnoticed.
Ralph Nader in a 1968 communication to then-head of NHTSA, William
Haddon, wrote:
The Bureau must take increasing care that the
companies do not make laughing stocks out of
already anemic standards in their self-deter
mined levels of production safety. The Bureau
was not established to lag behind one, two, or
more years, but to lead, repeat, to lead"
(Nader, 1968).
Again in 1973, the DOT (Department of Transportation) was taken to
task for its slowness in responding to safety measures.

Congress

man John Moss (D-Calif) talked of "adding amendments to pending
motor-vehicle legislation, if DOT fails to act" ("Fiery Car Col
lisions," 1973, p. 8).

In 1976, the Oversight and Investigations

committee of the House Commerce Committee sharply criticized NHTSA
for "the virtual halt of the federal motor vehicle safety program
over the last two years" ("Virtual halt of vehicle safety," 1976,
p. 1).

Noting the provision in the National Traffic and Motor

Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 for comments on proposed rules, the sub
committee stated, "the vast majority of written comments are sub
mitted by the regulated industry..." ("Virtual halt of vehicle safe
ty," 1976, p. 1).

The subcommittee also accused NHTSA of bowing to

"increased resistance from industry" thus losing effectiveness.

In

addition, the subcommittee chided that lack of NHTSA action was also
due to "political interference in NHTSA rule-making by the White
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House Domestic Council, the Office of Management and Budget, and
others" ("Virtual halt of vehicle safety," 1976, p. 2).
In sum, the evidence suggests that Ford did have some degree
of influence on the political economy through interlocks between it
self and the public sector though interlocks in and of themselves
are not conclusive.

In addition, there are suggestions that lobby

ing and/or other efforts on the part of Ford and the auto industry
affected the ability of the regulatory agency, NHTSA, to effectively
regulate the automobile industry.

Research Question 2

-Did Ford attempt to manipulate the prevailing legal environ
ment? Were political actions taken to promote Ford's in
terests?
There are three main areas in which Ford actively attempted to
shape the legal environment in which it operated.

These are!

1) Ford's activities in response to the proposed National Highway
and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 2) Ford's lobby efforts in
response to Standard 301 (the Federal Standard for fuel system
integrity), and 3) Ford's activities in response to the NHTSA in
vestigation into the alleged deficiencies of the Ford Pinto fuel
system.

Ford's Lobby Efforts Against the Safety Act.

The CIS report

on the Ford Motor Company summarizes Ford's response to the National
Highway and Motor Vehicle Safety Act:
People who know him cannot remember Henry
Ford II taking a stronger stand than the one he
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took against the regulation of safety design.
By 1965, most pundits and lobbyists saw
the handwriting on the wall and prepared to ac
cept government "meddling" in the last bastion
of free enterprise (the automobile industry).
Not Henry. With bulldog tenacity, he held out
for defeat of the legislation to the very end,
loyal to his grandfather's invention and to the
company that makes it. But the Safety Act passed
the House and Senate unanimously and was signed
into law by Lyndon Johnson in 1966.
While lobbying for and against legislation
is pretty much a process of high-level backslapping, press-conferencing and speech-making,
fighting a regulatory agency is a much subtler
matter. Henry Ford II headed home...and a plane
load of the Ford Motor Company's best brains
flew to Washington to start the "education" of
the new federal auto safety bureaucrats.
Their job was to implant the official indus
try ideology in the minds of the new officials
regulating auto safety. Briefly summarized,
that ideology states that auto accidents are
caused not by cars, but by 1) people and 2) high
way conditions ("The Ford Motor Company," 1978,
p. 44).
Henry Ford II continued to oppose government "interference"
in the area of automobile regulation.

In a 1969 speech to Harvard

Business School, he argued that the "danger of losing our business
freedom

is greater than ever" ("Ford sees danger,"

added that Ford is "now

1969, p. 6)and

spending $500,000 a year in the U.S. and

Canada to keep up with government standards and catch up with public
expectations with respect to automobile safety and air pollution."
Ford's involvement in shaping the regulatory environment is
also suggested in press reports surrounding the 1973 RECAT (Regula
tory Effects on the Cost of Automotive Transportation) report.
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As

previously mentioned, the committee which produced RECAT, a sixteen
man panel appointed by then-President Nixon, recommended that care
ful examination be paid to the costs of regulation within the auto
industry.

For example, in regard to airbags, the RECAT report sug

gests that not enough lives and property would be saved to justify
the cost of mandated airbag installation.
The role of Ford in the initiation of the RECAT committee was
disclosed (or at least suggested) by the Center for Auto Safety,
then a Ralph Nader consumer group:
Ralph Nader's CAS questions the curious sequence
of events that occurred about the time the
study began. Last April 27, accompanied by Ford
Motor Company President Lee Iacocca, Henry Ford
II met with President Nixon to discuss "matters
relating to the auto industry." Ford denies
suggesting RECAT, but two days later a White House
memorandum circulated through various Federal
departments proposing a cost study. Now, shortly
before oral arguments on the airbag regulation
are scheduled to begin in Cincinnati Federal
Appeals Court, RECAT pops up. This week, Iacocca
said, "the report comes none too soon" to show
the dangers of boosting consumer costs without
carefully considering the nation's economy
("A backlash against new-car standards," 1972,
p. 23).

Lobby Efforts Against Standard 301.

Standard 301 was first

proposed in 1967, but was not finally approved until 1975 with im
plementation required in September, 1976.

During this time, Ford

was actively involved in providing input into the rule-making pro
cess.
Ford's actions and motives in delayihg the Standard have been
addressed in court.

Hews, for example, in Grimshaw v s . Ford, states:
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The next document is entitled "Fuel System
Integrity Program Financial Review."...I bracketed
a portion on page 2 which points out in the
document... that it was company policy to delay
any fuel tank changes until forced to adopt them by
a law established by the government and to do every
thing to delay that law as long as possible (Grim
shaw v s . Ford, 1977, p. 6).
Hews goes on to add:
...no matter what figure you accept, what they did
is they took a mode and they misrepresented it in
its presentation to the federal government in order
to delay the passing of 70-20 (Standard 301) and
in order to save corporate profits by delaying the
passage of the legislation (Grimshaw v s . Ford,
1977, p. 8).
Camps (1981) concurs in this reasoning when he states, "The
corporate reasoning was sound.
mandated area of certification.
was not.

Windshield retention was a federally
Fuel system integrity, at that time,

Let unsuspecting customers beware.

Our main purpose as

Ford employees was to increase corporate profits" (Camps, 1981, p.

120).
The actual manipulation by Ford involves a provision in the
rule-making process of NHTSA that requires a period of time following
publication of proposed rules, during which comments may be made to
the proposed rules.
of times.

Ford took advantage of this provision a number

In response to the first notice of proposed rule-making,

Ford on November 30, 1970 (the full 90 days allowed for comments
to proposed rule-making) objected to a number of the technical as
pects of the provision.

Briefly, they opposed a zero-fuel-spillage

clause and a fixed barrier impact, noted that rear-end impacts with
fire "appear to be a small percentage in relation to total accidents"
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(Eckhold, 1970, p. 2) and thus the benefits were not great enough to
justify the costs, and argued that the Implementation of the stand
ard should be delayed because, "the Company cannot contain the
design, development, prove-out, and tooling changes involved to
meet that level by January 1, 1972" (Eckhold, 1970, p. 4).
time, Ford does state:

At this

"It is believed, however, that it would be

possible to meet the 20 mph movable barrier impact specified in the
previous proposal by January 1, 1973, if allowance is made for a
minimal amount of fuel loss and the demonstration procedures specify
unladen vehicle" (Eckhold, 1970, p. 5).
The NHTSA responded with a second notice on August 20, 1973.
In this proposed rule-making action, a 30 mph standard was proposed
(the previous standard called for 20 mph).

Ford responded to this

notice by producing the Grush-Saunby cost-benefit analysis which
claimed that the costs of at least part of the standard far out
weighed the benefits.

Citing a statement in the NHTSA's Program

Plans Book which reads, "Approval of rule-making plans is based on
a careful analysis of safety payoff in terms of lives saved and re
duction in injuries and on estimates of costs to the consumer"
(Grush & Saunby, 1973, p. 2), Ford argued that the proposed rule
should be abandoned.

In addition, Ford argued that:

The above listed product changes result
in an increased Retail Price Equivalent (the
customer sticker price with no provision for
Ford profit) to assure conformance to the
amended Standard of $18.95 for the average pas
senger car...For the rollover requirement alone,
the Retail Price Equivalent is $11.20 for a
passenger car" (Grush & Saunby, 1973, p. 2).
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Ford concluded by saying that the Standard yeilded extremely poor
cost-benefit ratios and should, therefore, be amended.
In response to Notice 3 which was published November 21, 1974,
Ford stated that NHTSA had violated procedures.

"We submit that

this amendment was made without providing any opportunity for manu
facturers to comment..." (Eckhold, 1974, p. 1).

Ford was particu

larly concerned with testing procedures and techniques which, they
argued, increased "the stringency of the Standard's performance re
quirements" (Eckhold, 1974, p. 1).

The entire position, in this

case, was devoted to changes NHTSA had made in testing procedures.
Ford was not the only interested commentator in respect to
Standard 301.
comments.

Other auto industry representatives also submitted

AMC, for example, asked for more "lead time" to meet

the Standard.

The NHTSA has stated that the Standard had been pro

posed more than three years earlier, hence implementation should be
hasty.

AMC, however, argued that "the Administration expects the

automotive industry to initiate active production engineering
programs each time a notice of proposed rule-making is issued"
(Stewart, 1975, p. 1).

NHTSA did agree, and once more the effective

date of the Standard was delayed.
The CAS (Center for Auto Safety) also had an interest in the
Standard, urging in 1968 that standards be promptly implemented so
that "companies do not make laughing stocks out of already anemic
standards" (Nader, 1968).

They updated their particular concern

over Standard 301 in 1972, after 2 years of waiting, with a letter
to NHTSA calling for quick implementation ("Fuel Fed Fires," 1967).
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Again in 1973, they urged NHTSA to implement the Standard (O’Meara,
1973).

Manipulation of the Recall.

Another example of Ford's manipu

lation of the legal environment concerns Ford’s efforts and abili
ties to delay the investigation of the Pinto after NHTSA had ordered
an examination of the alleged defects.
On September 8, 1977, the NHTSA requested information from Ford
regarding the Pinto fuel system.

Ford responded as follows:

September 19, 1977
As Mr. Schroeder informed you, considerable effort
is required to locate and organize the large number of
design changes which have been made since 1971 to the
"fuel tank, fuel filler neck and associated hardware"
and to the "underbody structure on all sides of the
fuel tank." Further, as Mr. Schroeder explained, your
letter dated September 8, 1977 was received on September
12, 1977, leaving insufficient time for Ford to retrieve
and review historical records and compile all of the
necessary information for submission to the administra
tion by September 29, 1977. It was agreed that a work
plan and a timetable would be provided to you concerning
any of the requested information which we could not sub
mit by the September 29 due date.
Accordingly the following information is provided
relative to the individual questions cited in your in
quiry. We expect to be able to submit our response to
questions 1, 2, 4, 5, and 7 by September 29, 1977.
Questions 3 and 6 require that considerable effort be
expended to obtain and review voluminous information
which could be pertinent to your questions. Initially,
detail and assembly drawings must be obtained for the
1971 to 1977 Pinto rear underbody and bumper-related
components...In addition, engineering changes which
affect those components must also be defined. We are
informed by Body and Electrical Product Engineering
that these records are on microfilm in a remote storage
location, and thus, the retrieval process is very time
consuming. Body and Electrical Product Engineering has
organized a task force which is working on an overtime
basis to retrieve necessary information and identify
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and catalogue the relevant design changes. In addi
tion, all design changes to the bumper-related com
ponents must be analyzed and correlated with fuel
tank changes to determine the effect If any, on the
distance of the nearest object aft of the fuel tank.
Based on the timing estimates received from the Body
and Electrical Product Engineering Office, we expect
to be able to submit our response to questions 3 and
6 on or about October 11, 1977. It is requested
therefore, that the due date for these two questions
be extended to that date (Eckhold, 1977, pp. 1-2).
January 19, 1978.

NHTSA sent another request to Ford containing 28

specific questions for Ford to answer.

February 20, 1978.

Ford responds with the following telegram:

As Mr. Schroeder informed you considerable effort
must be expended by several affected activities to
locate, gather and review information and historical
records and establish their applicability to your
investigation. Your letter received on January 23,
1978 does not provide sufficient time for Ford to
retrieve and compile all of the necessary information
for submission of our response to the administration
within the 20 working days specified.
Based on timing estimates developed by the
affected activities, we expect to be able to submit
our response to questions 1 through 9 by February 22,
1978. Due to a snow emergency that was imposed in
southeast Michigan on January 26 and 27, 1978 our
timing estimates were adjusted accordingly.
To locate and compile the materials covered by the
balance of the questions 10 - 29 requires the coor
dinated input of several affected organizations
operating at various times in sequence. A large number
of test reports must be reviewed along with various
engineering changes and other correspondence to
ascertain their interrelationships. As a result of
these reviews other documents may be identified that
could fall within the scope of various of the ques
tions. Since voluminous records of several organiza
tions must be searched for applicable materials the
overall research becomes very time-consuming.
We are working diligently with elements of the
company that are believed to have records that may

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

159
relate to the subjects of your Inquiries. As soon as
a dependable timing estimate is available we will ad
vise you as to when it would be possible for us to
respond to the balance of your inquiry (Sorenson, 1978a,
pp. 1-2).
February 22, 1978.

Ford sent a partial list of answers to the

specific questions asked by NHTSA and concluded the letter with:
In accordance with my telegram to you of Feb
ruary 20, as soon as a dependable timing estimate is
available we will advise you as to when it would be
possible for us to respond to the balance of your
inquiry (Sorenson, 1978b, p. 7).
February 28, 1978.

Ford sent out a revised estimate of the time re

quired to respond to NHTSA*s investigation:
This is to report in accordance with my telegram
to you of February 20, 1978, that it now appears that
we should be able to reply to your questions 11, 12, and
16-19 by March 23, 1978.
At this time we are still unable to establish an
estimate of the time that will be required to complete
the process, described in my telegram, that is required
to locate, evaluate and ascertain the relationships of
the numerous documents and materials from various Ford
operating components that may relate to the subject
matter of the balance of your inquiry. We are diligent
ly pursuing that task and, as soon as a dependable
estimate is established, I will advise you further
(Sorenson, 1978c).
March 22, 1978.

NHTSA requested more information in response to the

questions it had asked:
By letter dated February 22, 1978, the Ford Motor Com
pany (Ford) provided a partial response to the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration's (NHTSA) letter
of January 19, which requested certain information
relevant to the investigation of fuel tank damage in
rear-end collision of subcompact cars, including the
Ford Pinto. By your letter of February 28, a projected
date of March 23 was given for furnishing answers to
questions 11, 12 and 16-19; we fully expect that this
information will be produced in Washington, D.C. within
this time frame.
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Approximately three weeks have elapsed since your
last response, and no further indication has been given
as to your anticipated delivery of answers to the
remaining questions. We cannot permit further delay in
Ford's providing information which we have required to
be produced by our earlier written request. Therefore,
you are hereby directed to furnish your responses to
all unanswered tiems within five days of your receipt
of this letter. We expect that this information will
also be delivered to our Washington, D.C. Headquarters
within that five-day time limit. Failure or refusal
to furnish this information may result in injuctive
sanctions and the imposition of civil penalties, or
other actions as may be deemed appropriate by our
Office of Chief Counsel (Bradford, 1978).
March 23, 1978.

Ford sent answers to questions 11, 12, 16, 17, 18,

and 19 and concluded their letter with the following:
We have not yet established an estimate of the time
required to complete our response to the remainder of
your inquiry. As we indicated in our letter of Feb
ruary 28, 1978, we will advise you as soon as a de
pendable timing estimate is established (Sorenson,
1978d, p. 5).
April 3, 1978.

Ford replied to the NHTSA threat of an injunction as

follows:
We find it difficult to believe that you fully
appreciate the highly subjective nature of the as-yet
unanswered questions or the magnitude of the task that
is involved in obtaining the information and locating
whatever documents and other materials Ford may have
that would be responsive to your request. The purpose
of this letter is to invite your attention to the
content of the "unanswered items" of your January 19
letter request and describe the efforts we have
undertaken in attempting to comply with the onerous
requirements specified in those "items." We are con
fident that, upon closer examination of the questions,
you will agree with us that a return date of "...with
in 5 days of (Ford's) receipt of (your) letter..." is
an insufficient amount of time in which to comply.
Indeed, we are hopeful that you will give favorable
consideration to modifying the wording of your January
19 letter along the lines suggested below and establish
a realistic time limit for the balance of our response.
To the extent that we can do so with a sufficient de-
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gree of confidence that a response is reasonably com
prehensive and accurate we have also set forth informa
tion now known to us as certain of the "unanswered
items."
In summary, Ford has neither failed nor refused to
respond within reasonable periods to any of your re
quests of January 19, including the "unanswered items"
referred to in your letter of March 22. Rather, we
have diligently pursued the information and related
materials that must be located if we are to complete
our response with reasonable confidence that we are
doing so accurately and comprehensively.
We fully intend to continue that effort. We
cannot, however, do the impossible, and, in our opinion,
it is unreasonable for the Administration to demand
that we do so (Eckhold, 1978, p. 1., p. 6).
May 8, 1978.

NHTSA notified Ford that it had made an initial deter

mination of a defect and called for a public hearing on the matter,
to be held June 14, 1978.
May 17, 1978.

Ford responded with a request for delay.

This is to request a postponement for forty-five
or more days of the public proceeding heretofore
scheduled for June 14, 1978 in Washington, D.C., on the
Administration’s initial determination of May 8, 1978
regarding an alleged defect related to motor vehicle
safety in certain 1971-1976 Pinto and Bobcat automo
biles.
The requested postponement is necessary to afford
Ford Motor Company minimally adequate time in which to
review the technical bases on which the Administration's
determination rests, an essential prerequisite to our
ability meaningfully to prepare data, views and argu
ments for presentation at the proceeding. That review
necessarily will require careful engineering examina
tion of the test procedures employed in, and the data,
films and reports that resulted from, tests conducted
for the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
by Dynamic Science Incorporated of Phoenix, Arizona,
as well as thorough technical examination of the
vehicles tested in that program (Misch, 1978, p. 1).
June 9, 1978.

Ford finally agreed to a "voluntary" recall.
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The foregoing shows how Ford quite effectively was able to
manipulate the legal environment to postpone any action on the Ford
Pinto for nearly a year from the time NHTSA opened the investigation
until the recall.
A final indication of Ford’s ability to manipulate the legal
environment involves Ford’s activities to keep knowledge of the
Pinto's problems out of the public domain.

As early as 1975, Ford

petitioned NHTSA to treat Pinto test crashes as "confidential" and
NHTSA granted such treatment (Berndt, 1975).

In 1978, the CAS pe

titioned for items pertaining to the Pinto matter to be released to
the public domain (Ditlow, 1978).

In November, 1978, NHTSA did

agree to release the crash tests results (Claybrook, 1978), but some
other items pertinent to the matter remain confidential.
In sum, there appears to be substantial evidence that Ford was
able to manipulate the legal environment to some extent in an attempt
to gain its own interests.

Ford succeeded primarily in achieving

delay in implementing a standard as well as delaying the finding of
defect.

Research Question 3

How was the market structure influential in Ford's action?
Was the market stable, concentrated, and/or threatened? Was
Ford's share of the market threatened?
The automobile industry in the United States is characterized
by its oligopolistic nature.

The history of early automobile

manufacturers is summarized in Table 4.
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Table 4
Entry Into and Exit from the Automobile Industry

Year

1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
Source:

Number of
Entrants

Number of
Exits

Remaining
Firms

13
12
5
6
1
10
18
1
3
12
20
8
10
6
8
1
10
12
5
4

1
1
2
1
0
2
1
18
2
8
7
7
6
7
6
6
4
6
1
9

12
24
35
38
43
44
52
69
52
53
57
70
71
75
74
76
71
77
84
88
83

White, The Automobile Industry, 1977, p. 170

During the 1920s, General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler took the
leadership in the automobile industry.

Ford and GM both moved into

overseas markets as well as into vertical integration; that is, they
began manufacturing component parts such as transmissions, electrical
products, etc.

As White describes the results:

By the end of the 1920s, then, the auto
mobile industry had taken on a shape that has
persisted to the present. Three large firms
dominated the automobile market, accounting for
4.6 million units in 1929. The smaller firms
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still appeared to be successful, but they no
longer posed a serious threat to the position
of the Big Three (White, 1977, p. 176).
The Big Three, who were the market leaders, continued to be
relatively stable, with GM surfacing as the overall leader by 1933.
Table 5 summarizes market shared of the Big Three from 1913 to 1955.

Table 5
New Car Market Shares

Year

GM

Ford

1913

12.2

39.5

n.a.

48.3

n.a.

1923

20.2

46.0

1.9

31.9

n.a.

1929

32.3

31.3

8.2

28.2

n.a.

1933

41.4

20.7

25.4

12.5

n.a.

1937

41.8

21.4

25.4

11.4

n.a.

1946-50

41.8

21.4

21.6

15.1

0.2

1951-55

46.2

25.7

18.6

8.9

0.6

Source:

Chrysler

Other U.S.

Imports

White, 1977, p. 180

It is obvious from the foregoing that the market is highly concen
trated.
White noticed a change in automobile manufacturers' policies
concerning small cars.

Noting that, "the Big Three have tradi

tionally been unenthusiastic about small cars" (White, 1977, p. 193)
because they are less profitable than large cars, White discusses
the impetus behind the U.S. manufacturers decision to enter the
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small car market as coming externally.

"The external pressures have

come from foreign manufacturers— Imports.

In the late 1950s, con

sumer tastes had turned toward smaller cars, and foreign manufac
turers were ready and eager to meet the demand.

Imports grew from

0.5% of the market in 1954 to 10.2% in 1959" (White, 1977, p. 194).
The Big Three responded with smaller cars (although larger than the
imports) in 1959, but during the 1960s, the "compacts grew in size,
luxury, and price" (White, 1977, p. 195).

The import share of the

market began increasing again, and by 1969, Ford and GM decided that
"low-profit customers were better than lost customers" (White, 1977,
p. 194).

They began designing new small cars.

The percent-share

of the market captured by the imports through 1975, is summarized in
Table 6.
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Table 6
Import Percent of the Automobile Market

Year

Percent of Industry

1956

1.65

1957

3.46

1958

8.13

1959

10.17

1960

6.47

1962

4.89

1963

5.10

1964

6.00

1965

6.11

1966

7.31

1967

9.32

1968

10.48

1969

11.14

1970

14.8

1971

15.1

1972

14.6

1973

15.2

1974

15.8

1975

18.2

Source:

Automotive News, 1969 and 1976
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1969 was an especially good year for imports with seven con
secutive monthly records for imported new car registration in
creases.

As Automotive News reported in October, 1969, "Imported

cars accounted for better than one out of every eight new car re
gistrations. .

(p. 2).

In the 1969 Automotive News Almanac, a new

trend in U.S. auto manufacturing was disclosed:

"This is the year

that domestic makers start putting their chips down in the small car
game where imports have been doing most of the winning in recent
years.

The name of the game, as Detroit sees it, is "Subcompact""

("U.S. Subcompacts," 1969, p. 86).
The particular threat appeared to come from the German Volks
wagen, which captured 58.13% of the import market in 1967, 57.17% in
1968, and 51% in 1969 ("U.S. Subcompacts," 1969, p. 86).

The im

pact of the threatened market meant that "Ford (was) fighting to
maintain its share of a restricted market in the USA" ("The Ford
Motor Company," 1978, p. 4).

Furthermore, "Ford, which for years

extolled the virtues of competition and the free enterprise system,
is now sufficiently worried by imports to be talking about the pos
sibility of import tariffs to protect the home producers" ("The
Ford Motor Company," 1978, p. 4).
The evidence suggests that the market was indeed threatened and
that imports were claiming an ever-increasing share of that market.
Ford, in 1968 and 1969, had a new car in the plans, the Pinto, which
would directly challenge the imports.

As Hare comments,

"... the original management motivation for the development of the
Pinto...was in response to a management felt necessity to obtain a
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competitive position in the subcompact market..." (Kaminski v s .
Ford, 1977, p. 20).

Hare, in summarizing Ford's defense asked,

Mr. Tubben, Ford Motor Company, do you have any
statistics or figures to contradict that? No.
What do you design your cars to do? To compete
with the foreign imports, to compete with Euro
pean and Japanese cars; that is, the reason we
are doing it (Kaminski v s . Ford, 1977, p. 18).
In the criminal trial, Mr. Neal, in his opening statement said
"The Pinto program was started— yes, in response to the foreign mar
ket.

Ford felt American workers should make cars for American

drivers" (Trial Notes, 1/15/80).

Harley Copp reiterated the ra

tionale in testimony in the criminal case against Ford:
Consentino:
Pinto?
Copp:

Are you familiar with the planning of the Ford

Yes.

Cosentino:

What first gave rise to its planning?

Copp: The success of foreign subcompacts on the market—
about 15%.
Copp reaffirmed his understanding under cross-examination:
Neal:

Wouldn't a car manufacturer rather make larger cars?

Copp:

Yes.

Neal: Weren't American manufacturers trying to regain some of
the market grabbed by foreign cars— 15% and rising?
Copp:

Yes.

Neal:

Don't car manufacturers have to compete?

Copp:

Absolutely.
(Trial Notes, 2/11/80)

The evidence strongly suggests that market structure is im
portant in terms of decisions to manufacture certain types of auto
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mobiles.

The Ford Motor Company was threatened by the imports'

penetration into the automobile market, and their decision to
manufacture a subcompact car was shaped by that threat.

Research Question 4

What was the hierarchy of goals within the Ford Motor Company?
Did the utilitarian goals of production and profit making
supersede other goals? Did the goals of private profit making
clash with public interest goals?
While many goals may be associated with an organization, the
goals of particular interest in the Ford case are the goals of pro
fit making and the public interest goal of safety in automobiles.
There is evidence that Ford was concerned with both types of goals.
The goal of profit making was previously seen to be an important
goal of Ford.
The public interest goal of safety has also been addressed by
Ford.

In a 1970 communication to NHTSA, Ford notes:
Aside from cost, there are valid safety related
arguments which speak against increasing the test
severity of rear-end impacts...We believe that the
public interest cannot be served until the facts
reveal where these equities are balanced...Ford
recognizes the Bureau's desire to eliminate any
unreasonable risk of injury to the motoring
public. We concur in this goal and believe that
fuel system integrity is a proper subject to ad
dress in accomplishing this aim. But as noted
above, we must examine the facts in order to
balance all of the safety features of the vehicle
(Eckhold, 1970, p. 3).

Similarly, for some models of cars (e.g., Capri and Fiesta), Ford
"advertisements boast of safety of fuel tank system" (Trial Notes,
1/4/80).
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On a broader level, the "Canons of Ethics for Engineers"
released October 1, 1956 "represent the ethics which the Ford Motor
Company expects of its engineers" ("Canons of Ethics For Engineers,"
1956, preface).

Pertinent sections relevant to the public interest

include the following:
Section 4: He (the engineer) will have due regard for
the safety of life and health of the public and employees
who may be affected by the work for which he is responsi
ble.
Section 11: He will guard against conditions that are
dangerous or threatening to life, limb, or property
on work for which he is responsible, or, if he is not
responsible, will promptly call such conditions to the
attention of those who are responsible.
Section 12: He will present clearly the consequences
to be expected from deviations proposed if his en
gineering judgment is over-ruled by nontechnical au
thority in cases where he is responsible for the tech
nical adequacy of engineering work.
Section 23: He will not directly or indirectly injure
the professional reputation, prospects, or practice of
another engineer. However, if he considers that an
engineer is guilty of unethical, illegal or unfair
practice, he will present the
information to the proper
authority for action ("Canons
of Ethics For Engineers,
1956, pp. 4-6).
The obligation to Ford engineers is summarized in the foreword of
the statement of ethics.

"It is his duty to interest himself in

public welfare and to be ready to apply his special knowledge for
the

benefit of mankind" (Canons of Ethics For Engineers, 1956, p. 3)

In 1976, Henry

Ford II sent down a new policy letter entitled "Stand

ards of Corporate Conduct" in which he addressed ethics:
To succeed and even to survive, Ford Motor Company
must have the trust and confidence of its many
publics. A good reputation is a priceless busi
ness asset which can be earned only through consis-
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tently trustworthy behavior...particular care
should be taken to act legally in those areas
where the law is evolving rapidly...Among those
areas are...vehicle safety and emissions...(Camps,
1981, p. 125).
While there is evidence, then, that Ford goals included both
profit making and purblic interest, the crucial issue hinges around
the ranking of these goals within the corporation.

There are a num

ber of documents which suggest that the profit making goal was more
important to Ford than the public interest goal.
A strong suggestion of the preponderant influence of the profit
motive involves Ford’s extensive use of cost-benefit analysis to
determine whether improvements to the fuel system of Pintos can be
justified on a cost-effective basis.

As early as 1965, ArjayMiller

of Ford testified before the Senate that:
In racing, we are now using fabric gas tanks as
safety devices. This is one way we can test out
something which, if it proves out, may be a feature
that you will see later on our standard cars. Five
years from now, you may be asking, "why didn't you
put it on three years ago?" ("Traffic Safety," 1965,
p. 990).
In 1971, Ford ordered tests of improvements to "drop in" fuel
tanks.

A confidential cost engineering report estimated two dif

ferent types of alternatives.

These included the fuel tank over the

rear axle with a body sheet metal barrier and a tank-in-tank with
polyurethane foam between the tanks.

Costs of the devices were

$9.95 and $5.08 respectively (Mancini, 1971).

Ford used those and

other figures to argue that:
...The vehicle changes required to meet the cri
teria of this Standard (301) must be weighed
against:
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1. the cost of modification to meet the criteria,
and
2. the benefits to be derived from avoiding such
deaths and injuries as now actually result from
the kinds of fires that the amended Standard could
be expected to prevent (Eckhold, 1973, p. 1).
Ford went on to attack the Grush-Saunby (1973) report which stated
that NHTSA had over-estimated fire-related crashes which actually
were closer to "600 to 700 fire deaths each year" and thus the roll
over portion of the standard was not cost-effective while "analyses
of other portions of the proposed regulation would also be expected
to yield poor benefit-to-cost ratios" (Grush & Saunby, 1973, p. 12).
In the criminal trial, Harold MacDonald— "father of the Pinto"
— concurred when he stated, "In response to 70-20 (Standard 301), I
felt the standard was too severe and the time period too short.
Literature suggested that fires for rear impact were rare and oc
curred usually under high speeds— speeds too high for manufacturers
to do anything about it" (Trial Notes, 2/18/80).
NHTSA, although commonly agreeing somewhat with cost-benefit
analysis, disagreed with Ford's conclusions:
The NHTSA does not accept Ford's argument. Ford
postulated a cost-benefit analysis based upon the
purported effect of only one aspect of the Stand
ard. This agency is in disagreement not only with
Ford's narrow analysis; but with the figures it
relies upon in reaching their conclusions. In
determining the cost-benefit ratio of the stand
ard, the NHTSA took into account the impact of the
standard as a whole and considered the cost of
model changes and new tooling as well as the number
of lives currently lost due to fuel system fires
and the number of lives expected to be saved
through implementation of the standard. Although
the NHTSA uses cost-benefit analysis as a decision
making tool, it is not a perfect one, depending
necessarily on extremely imprecise assumptions
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concerning benefits to be achieved ("Federal Motor
Vehicle Safety Standards," 1974, p. 10597).
There are many indications that Ford was aware that the Pinto
would not be serving the public interest goal of safety.

The crash

tests and examination of alternatives address Ford's knowledge of
the matter.

In addition, as early as Summer, 1970, Ford, in an

internal document noted:
The 20 and 30 mph rear fixed barrier crashes will
probably require repackaging the fuel tanks in
a protected area such as above the rear axle...Im
proved seals for the filler cap and filler pipe
connections will also be required (Quoted in "19711978 Pinto Fuel Systems Reference," 1978, p. 6).
Within the same document, Ford ordered baseline tests to de
termine what action must be taken to meet the standard requirements.
Their knowledge of the problem, then, went back to late 1970.

Never

theless, the public interest goal of safety was not met because, ac
cording to Copp, "it was company policy to delay any fuel tank
changes until forced to adopt them by a law established by the go
vernment. .." (Grimshaw v s . Ford, 1977, p. 6).

Evidence also emerged

during the criminal trial:
Consentino: Did Ford know prior to sale that Ford Pinto could
not withstand crashes of more than 25 mph?
Copp:

Yes.

Cosentino:

How did they know?

Copp: From tests they had run on Pintos modified to represent
the '73 fuel system— changes in structure of the rear of the
base Pinto— they put 73 components in 73 sedan and tested it
with anthropomorphic dummies. This was a fixed barrier 20 mph.
Consentino:
opinion?

Any other crash tests (that helped shape your
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Copp:

The test of Capri.

Cosentino:
Copp:

It withstood 43 mph car-to-car.

What does that show you?

That it can be done.

(Cosentino questions Copp concerning the proposed standards and
Ford's reaction to them.)
Cosentino: Then what?
Copp:

The standards were sent out for review.

Cosentino:
Copp:

Did Ford agree with those standards?

Vehicles were built and tested that met the standard.

Cosentino: What is the relationship of balanced design to fuel
system safety regarding the safety of passengers in the 1973
Pinto?
Copp: Balanced design would result in ability to withstand 40
to 50 mph. With fire being the cause of death or maiming of
passenger, the interior protection should be- balanced with fuel
system integrity.
Cosentino:
Copp:

What is the survivability of passengers?

Maintenance of life by exclusion of fire.

Cosentino:

Did Ford built Pinto with balanced design concept?

Copp: No, the 73 Pinto could take rear-end impacts of 40 to
50 mph. The passengers would have survived without the fire.
(Trial Notes, 2/6/80 & 2/7/80).
Another indication for the lack of attention to public interest
goals concerns the objectives of the Pinto.

Hare, in a brief to an

Alabama circuit court, states:
Ford designed and manufactured the Pinto to be
used by members of the public as a means of
transportation on the public roads. It is the
duty of an automobile manufacturer to exercise
due care in the design and construction so that
the vehicle provides reasonable protection to
its occupants within its "environment of use."
The above is not merely an accurate statement of
law— Ford admits that they, in fact, accept it as
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a basic and essential design objective; that is,
it is an actual engineering "undertaking" on their
part (Kaminski v s . Ford, 1977, p. 6).
In the engineering objectives for the Pinto, presented to the
Society of Automotive Engineers by F. G. Olsen (1971), however,
safety is not an objective.

When Ford pleaded ignorance of the

hazard of the Pinto, Hare (Kaminski vs. Ford) notes:
What do the other experts say? Automotive design
check lists: Gas tank placed in location vulnera
ble to crush damage, these are on the cars they
are modeling themselves out of, fill tank, fill
tube, you make a safe fill tube. Same article
talks about a check valve, this is back in 1965,
these were fuel systems designed in 1966. M o d e m
research indicates that the fuel tank can be built
today, in 1966 capable of preventing hazardous
fuel spillage (1977, pp. 8-9).
Hare goes on to illustrate that the "state of the art" was such that
Ford had knowledge of remedies as well as knowledge of the hazard.
Furthermore, he argues:
Then they did the Ford ESW where they had safety
as a stated objective. 60 miles an hour with the
gas tank above the axle, 38 inches of static crush,
not a leak...Safety wasn't a stated objective (in
Pinto) and they didn't accomplish it...They never
planned to accomplish safety, they never did ob
tain it (Kaminski v s . Ford, 1977, p. 19).
Ford argued in the criminal court that as there was no Federal
Standard in effect when the car (a 1973 Pinto) was manufactured,
Ford was not. guilty of reckless homicide.

Cosentino, the prosecutor

attempted to get at the issue of public interest goals:
There is not now or ever been standards regarding
fuel tank placement on the Pinto, so if Ford
strapped the tank to the rear bumper they would
not be violating a Federal Standard. That can't
mean that Ford has no responsibility to place it
in a safe place (Trial Notes, 1/14/80).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The evidence, then, suggests that the Ford organization does
place values on both the goals of profit making and the public in
terest.

The public interest goal of safety, however, appears to be

ranked below the goal of profit making.

The use of cost-benefit

analysis to determine the cost-effectiveness of safety suggests that
the profit making goal supersedes the public interest goal.

Research Question 5

What was the nromative environment of the Ford organization?
What are the important goals? How are these transmitted?
The normative environment at Ford is ambiguous.

Officially,

Ford supports a "Canon of Ethics for Engineers" which requires that
engineers follow guidelines which are summarized in the foreword:
Honesty, justice, and courtesy form a moral
philosophy which, associated with mutual interest
among men, constitutes the foundation of ethics.
The engineer should recognize such a standard, not
in passive observance, but as a set of dynamic
principles guiding his conduct and way of life.
It is his duty to practice his profession according
to these Canons of Ethics.
As the keystone of professional conduct is
integrity, the engineer will discharge his duties
with fidelity (to his employers and the public) and
with fairness and impartiality to all. It is his
duty to interest himself in public welfare and be
ready to apply his special knowledge for the
benefit of mankind. He should uphold the honor and
dignity of his profession and also avoid associa
tion with any enterprise of questionable charac
ter. In his dealing with fellow engineers, he
should be fair and tolerant (1956, preface).
In the specific sections of the document, Ford admonishes engineers
to exchange information with other engineers, to further public
knowledge, have regard for life and health, avoid conflicts of
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interest, inform superiors of hazardous practices, etc.
In addition, the problem of engineering responsibilities has
been delineated within the profession.

The Ford Motor Company

recommends that its engineers "cooperate in extending the effective
ness of the engineering profession by interchanging information and
experience with other engineers and students and by contributing to
the work of engineering societies, schools, and the scientific and
engineering press" ("Canons of Ethics," 1956, p. 4).

Information

regarding normative conduct for engineers is disseminated within
nrofessional journals.
common.

Articles suggesting appropriate behavior are

Alpert, for example, states:
Where our galloping technology has created prob
lems for society our responsibilities as engineers
are clear...We will recognize and discharge our
responsibility as engineers within our society
either voluntarily or involuntarily (1970, p. 27).

Alpert goes on to add that engineers, operating through the business
environment, must be cognizant of the social good, not mere profit.
Similarly, Riccardo, former President at Chrysler, admonished en
gineers :
They (the public) expect a bigger contribution to
social progress. And the public is dead-serious
in making these demands. We cannot ignore the
angry voices making new demands on our time and
talents...we must remember that our basic job
remains what it always has been— produce auto
mobiles that are safer, have fewer undesirable
emissions, are more durable, more reliable..we
and the government can work in an atmosphere of
cooperation, not confrontation... (Riccardo, 1970,
p. 33).
Thus engineers within Ford are faced with an official normative
environment which supports morality, honesty, safety, whistle

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

blowing, if necessary, etc.

Officially too, however, is the norma

tive environment of profit making.

Camps said, "Our main purpose

as Ford employees was to increase profits" (1981, p. 120).

Henry

Ford II commented about Ford's biggest problem, "That's easy— making
more money" (Camps, 1981, p. 121).

While the two normative environ

ments are not necessarily disjoint, they may become disparate when
the requirements of any one are given more weight than the other.
The normative environment within which the Pinto was developed
was shaped by the engineering objectives.

The engineering objec

tives for the Pinto emphasized size and weight.

Evidence has pre

viously been provided which suggests that the objectives locked en
gineers into certain kinds of fuel systems.

The importance of this

for the normative environment is illustrated by the following
timony from the criminal case:
Cosentino: You mentioned the names of Olsen, Freers, and
MacDonald and stated that they were good engineers?
Copp: . Yes.
Cosentino: Were they free to exercise their best judgment
for fuel system integrity on the 73 Pinto?
Copp: No they were locked into a design which restricted
their judgment.
Cosentino:
Copp:

Lee Iacocca.

Cosentino:
Copp:

Who restricted them?

Was Iacocca a responsible man?

I think his ambitions overshadowed his morality.

Cosentino:

Were others free to exercise good judgment?

Copp: N o .
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tes

Cosentino: Were engineers locked in by measurements prior
to hardpoint approval?
Copp:

Yes.

Cosentino:

Did styling approval restrict engineers' judgment?

Copp: Engineers were left with a minimal amount of space.
you don't believe it, look at the shape of that fuel tank!

If

(Trial Notes, 2/12/80)
Within such a normative environment, some goals may be virtually
ignored because of the importance of other goals.

In the case of

the Pinto, the public interest goal of safety was ranked lower than
the size and weight, thereby setting up a normative environment in
which good engineering judgment was constrained.
When such normative environments prevail, individuals within
the company may have difficulty convincing others to change the
hierarchy of goals.

When Dowie was researching his expose? he found

that:
Some of the people lied to me. I was interviewing
one of the men at the Ford Motor Company and while
we were talking, four young Turks overheard part
of our conversation. I walked out of the executive's
office, and two of the younger men were out in the
hall. They came up to me and said, "We don't know
who you are and what you were asking about, but
that man told you a complete lie and we would like
to tell you the truth. We can't talk now, but would
you meet us at home after work?" So I went to one
of their homes after work and they gave me basically
the whole inside story. They are corporate whistle
blowers ... They wanted to straighten it out. They'd
been crusaders to clean up the Pinto all along,
these two young guys, and they told me about the
inside struggle and how high up the controversy
went in the company (Winston, 1978, p. 11).
Dowie goes on to add:
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In investigating corporations, corporate PR
people have told me things that I knew were bold
face lies. But they thought they were telling me
the truth, they believed what they were telling me...
PR people are lied to by top management (Winston,
1978, p. 12).
It is difficult to determine how goals and the normative en
vironment are transmitted through the corporation.

Official norms,

such as the Canon of Ethics, are freely disseminated.

More difficult

to ascertain are instructions to follow some norms at the expense
of others.

Dowie*s last comment states that top management actually

lies to underlings, thereby communicating a certain normative en
vironment.

A more complex explanation, and more subtle, emerges from

Camps' analysis of his role as a whistle-blower in the Pinto matter:
In those early days of Pinto testing, Ford's manage
ment was adamant that the vehicle be certified to
comply with Federal Standards without delay— no
questions asked— to meet the challenge of Volkeswagen...Orders came down from the Glass House (our
in-house term for Ford's headquarters) to certify
the Pinto at all costs— even if it meant changing
long-standing procedures...In my position as
principal design engineer, I became a part of the
Ford scheme. I was expected to be loyal to the
company's policies and to ignore my own uneasiness
about the safety of the cars we were approving...
some people might reasonably ask why I waited more
than two years— until early 1973— before putting
my concerns in writing. The answer is simple! I
was afraid of losing my job...I was worried that
a written memo to my superiors might put an abrupt
end to my career at Ford.
On February 18, I sent what was to be the
first of many letters to Ford's management expres
sing my deep concern about the questionable proce
dures used in safety testing the Pinto...After
pointing out that I faced the dilemma of either
serving the best interests of the Ford Motor Com
pany or submitting to the directives of my imme
diate superiors, I charged that "certain emembers
of management are totally aware of violations of
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federal law...I concluded by stating that I did
not wish to be "made the scapegoat for the ques
tionable integrity of others."
It was subsequent to my many letters to manage
ment that I found in my 1973 appraisal a general
downgrading of factors relating to my performance.
My concern about safety was duly noted, but with dif
ferent results than I had anticipated. The punative
action was beginning; ultimately it would lead to
my being demoted to a position that did not involve
vehicle testing. Refusals on my part to concur with
management's appraisal of my work resulted in a
steady decrease in involvement in the normal ac
tivities of a senior principal design engineer. I
was not included in various management development
programs; and I was shuttled from one inconsequen
tial job to another.
In other words, my punishment was to be
banished to a corporate purgatory where all manner
of disbelievers, boat rockers, and whistle blowers
reside...
After months of delay, I met with Jack Eckhold,
the Director of Safety for the Ford Motor Company.
Mr. Eckhold was gracious and disarming, but when we
parted after two hours of discussion, he escorted
me to the door with the final comment, "Mr. Ford
does not take too kindly to whistle blowers," and
added that it might be prudent for me to keep my
mouth shut. Otherwise I might find myself out of
a job (Camps, 1981, pp. 119-125).
Although the communication of the normative environment and
goals are not clearly certain, some clues concerning their trans
mission are revealed in Camps' account.

The management at Ford sent

down specific orders to "certify the Pinto at all costs."
was expected to be loyal to the company's goals.

Camps

Camps attempted to

communicate his concerns, but was repeatedly rebuffed by superiors.
The management communicated their disapproval of Camps' action by
demoting him to a less threatening position.

When these "subtle"

clues were not sufficient, Camps was told to keep his mouth shut by

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

a high ranking official.

Because management has sanctions, positive

and negative, at its disposal, it has the ability to manipulate the
actions of its employees.

For years, Ford's inaction, in response

to Camps’ concerns, communicated what company policies were to Camps
as well as to his fellow employees.
The transmission of corporate goals and norms occurs on an offical level— the "Canons of Ethics" and "Standards of Corporate Con
duct"— as well as on a more discreet level in which employees are
made aware, by means of subtle and not-so-subtle actions on the part
of management, of the corporate policies.

In the case of the Pinto,

the discreet level formed the operative environment in which the
Pinto development occurred.

The normative environment required that

the safety objective be placed lower than the size and weight objec
tives.

Problems in the Pinto performance were to be overcome within

the scope of the engineering objectives.

Research Question 6

How are decisions made within the Ford organization? How is
rationality valued? What are the rules for decision-making? .

The answer to this research question is, to a large extent, re
petitive of answers to the other research questions.

The importance

of the profit motive, for example, indicates that decision-making is
largely influenced by costs of a product.

As Copp repeatedly an

swered in response to prosecution questions, cost was often the basis
for decision-making:

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Consentino: What is your opinion of the fuel system integrity
of the Pinto?
Copp:

It is inadequate compared to other cars.

Consentino:
Copp:

In what respects?

The crush zone— distance from axle totank

Consentino:
Copp:

Did Ford know the crush space was inadequate?

They knew it.

Cosentino:
Copp:

Why is this inadequate?

For profits.

Cosentino:
Copp:

to bumper.

What did they do about it?

Nothing, because of costs.

Cosentino:

Were there other problems?

Copp: The filler tube. As the rear-end collapsed, the left
rear quarter panel buckled the filler tube. The pull out
provided natural means of escape for fuel.
Cosentino:
Copp:

They knew.

Cosentino:
Copp:

What was Ford's knowledge of thisproblem?

Why didn't they do anything?

Costs.

Cosentino:

Were there other problems?

Copp: The fuel tank had sharp edges immediately in front
of it.
,
Cosentino:

Identify them.

Copp: The differential, axle casting, left shock absorber,
etc. were two to three inches from the main portion of the
fuel tank.
Cosentino:
Copp:

Did Ford have knowledge of this problem?

They knew.

Cosentino:

What did they do?
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Copp:

For the 73 Pinto?

Cosentino:
Copp:

Nothing.

Why?

Costs of redevelopment.
(Trial Notes, 2/7/80).

Even more suggestive of the basis of <decision-making is the
following interchange where Copp, based on an unadmitted internal
Ford document, states that Ford made the conscious decision to save
money by not modifying the Pinto:
Cosentino:
standard?
Copp:

No.

Cosentino:
Copp:

Did the 73 Pinto meet the 30 mph moving barrier

Why?

Because in a meeting, Ford decided to save $6.55.

(Objection and arguments; objection overruled)
Cosentino: Can you tell the court how the reduction in the 73
Pinto fuel system integrity came about?
Copp:

Yes, to save $6.55.

Cosentino:

How do you know?

Copp: The results of PRM (Product Review Meeting) and my own
knowledge.
Cosentino:
Copp:

Who attends PRMs?

The upper eschelon— managers, executives, etc.

Cosentino: Do the decisions that come out of PRMs help affect
corporate policies?
Copp: Some effects. Corporate policies generally are set by
officers of the corporation.
Cosentino:
Pinto?
Copp:

How did the $6.55 affect policy concerning the

Improved profitability.
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(Trial Notes, 2/7/80).
Finally, as previously discussed (Research Questions 2 and 4)
Ford conducted tests to determine the costs of bringing its cars'
performance up to the level demanded by 301, by examining alterna
tive fuel systems as early as 1970 and 1971.

The cost estimates

of over-the-axle tank ($9.95) and tank-in-tank ($5.08) were minimal
per car, yet Ford did not act on either suggestion.
The basis for Ford decision-making appears to be "rationality."
This is indicated by Ford's heavy reliance on cost-benefit analysis
in the decision-making process.

The Grush-Saunby cost-benefit

analysis has been previously discussed.

In this analysis, Ford

placed a dollar value on lives, then compared lives and injuries
saved with the costs of implementing that particular portion' of
Standard 301.

Ford justifies or rationalizes such analyses on the

following basis:
Wheeler (attorney for Ford): This document (GrushSaunby) is prejudicial— it especially says Ford
must not accept a dollar value on life. This is
the cost-benefit one. Ford does not concur with
the values and declines to adopt the figures here.
NHTSA requires such cost-benefit analysis, (em
phasis mine) This document can be misconstrued.
On page 3, referred to product change, not the
statement, "no provision for Ford profit" as it
has been construed to be (Trial Notes, 1/14/1980).
Wheeler is referring to the letter from Ford to NHTSA in which Ford
estimates the "Retail Price Equivalent" increase for bringing cars
up to then-proposed Standard 301.

A phrase within that letter, "the

customer sticker price with no provision for Ford profit" (Grush &
Saunby, 1973, p. 3), worried Wheeler who thought the jury might

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

question Ford's concern with profit rather than meeting the pro
posed standard.

(Incidentally, the document was not admitted.)

Another example of the importance of cost-benefit analysis was
given by Copp.
Cosentino:
Copp:

Did you have any cost-benefit analysis?

Yes.

Cosentino:

What does it mean?

Copp: It's estimates of costs and review of costs by them
selves or in comparison with something else. Design costs
are direct labor and direct material costs of one design
versus another. It's used for decision purposes. A specific
group of people specialized in this but we did itourselves.
Cosentino:

Why is it important?

Copp: Because cost is a major criterion for decisions.
you missed your cost objectives, you were up the creek!

If

(Trial Notes, 2/4/1980).
An indicator of rationality as used by Ford involves Ford's
defense at the criminal trial as well as Ford's news release in
response to Dowie's allegations.

Ford comments,

It is true, for example, that early Pinto models
did not pass rear-impact tests at 20 mph. It is
not true, however, that these test results mean
the early Pintos were unsafe compared with the
range of other cars of that era, or on any other
basis of rational judgment...The truth is that in
every model year the Pinto has been tested and
met or surpassed the Federal fuel system integrity
standard applicable to it. It simply is unreasona
ble and unfair to contend that a car is somehow
unsafe if it does not meet standards proposed for
future years or embody the technological improve
ments that are introduced in later models (Misch,
1977,; pp. 3-4).
Within this argument, Ford uses the delaying of the official Stand
ard— a delay actively supported by Ford— as a rationalization for
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not including technical innovations which were known and tested
in 1970, until ordered to do so by the government.

The situation

was summarized in a news article, "...this is a cost-conscious in
dustry and it rarely moves on safety matters until pushed firmly by
government, public opinion, or disaster" ("The Pinto Controversy,"
1977, p. 4A).
There is evidence, then, that Ford utilizes rationality,
through cost-benefit analysis in its decision-making process.

While

other factors may also enter in, there appears to be a concerted
attempt on the part of Ford to base decision-making on minimized
costs.

Summary of the Evidence

The evidence varies by research question with some questions
being answered more thoroughly than others.

The research questions

are all addressed somewhat by the available data and preliminary,
if somewhat tentative, answers to the questions can be discerned.
The following brief overview of answers to the particular research
questions indicate general directions suggested by the data.
Research Question 1A:

There is much evidence that maximiza

tion of profit is an important aspect of the Ford Motor Company.
Ford found profits decreasing and was eager to find new avenues of
profit making (e.g., the subcompact market, profit from new public
demands, etc.).

Many representatives of Ford argue that profit

making is the primary concern of the organization.
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Research Question IB:

Evidence suggests that interlocks exist

between Ford and the political sector and that these interlocks
were influential in shaping the regulation of the automobile indus
try, though not necessarily sufficient to fully protect the auto
mobile manufacturers.
Research Question 2:

The evidence of Ford's attempt to in

fluence the legal environment is overwhelming.

Techniques of de

laying the NHTSA in its inquiries were plentiful so that it appears
as though Ford was able to manipulate, to a certain extent, the
very agency mandated to regulate it.
Research Question 3:
centrated and threatened.

The market structure was seen as con
Evidence was presented which indicated

that Ford entered the subcompact market because foreign shares of
that market were increasing while domestic shares of that market
were decreasing.

The evidence shows the importance of the market

structure in determining which products to manufacture.
Research Question 4:

Ford was concerned with the goals of

production and profit over the goals of public interest, although
concern for public interest goals was also expressed.

The engineer

ing objectives for the Pinto, which did not include safety, super
seded other values which mi>;ht have been connected with the manu
facture of this product.
Research Question 5:

The normative environment of Ford is am

biguous and encompasses an official environment of morality, jus
tice, and honesty, along with an unofficial environment which stres
ses norms to "go along with management" at all costs.

The trans
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mission of the unofficial environment and norms is subtle and in
volves various company powers such as the ability to promote, de
mote, fire, etc.
Research Question 6:
be based on rationality.

Decision-making within Ford appears to
Cost-benefit analysis, for example, is

a tool by which decisions are made concerning appropriate actions
within the corporation.
In this section, the evidence has been reported.
ance of the evidence is another matter.

The import

The importance and weight

of the evidence in regard to the theory set out in Chapter II must
be examined if an increased understanding of corporate crime (at
least this corporate crime) is to occur.

That will be the task in

the next chapter.
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CHAPTER V

The Conclusions

In this section! some sense must be made of the findings
presented in the last chapter.

Since the examination of the Ford

Pinto matter is a case study, nothing definitive can be said con
cerning the relationship of the evidence to the theoretical ideas
posited in Chapter II.

The evidence, however, does suggest direc

tions and approaches to be further investigated in the study of cor
porate crime.

In this chapter, then, the evidence will be combined

with the theory in a search for pertinent factors which should be
further investigated to enhance an understanding of the etiology of
corporate crime.

The Importance of the Evidence

One note must be made; much of the evidence is scanty, some
evidence is not properly documented, and some evidence has been
challenged by Ford.

(A ploy at the criminal trial, for example,

was for Ford to deny authentication of documents which Cosentino
tried to admit into evidence.
ments were stamped "Ford."

This occurred even when the docu

Ford lawyers claimed it was possible

that a revenge-seeking janitor might slip false documents into
files, or that typographical errors might have been made.)

The

evidence offered in the previous chapter is not always offered for
"the truth of the matter," but should be weighed for its importance
190
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191
The Profit Motive

In the first research question, the importance of the prin
ciple of profit-maximization was explored.

It was seen that profit

was indeed a motivating factor in the actions of Ford.

Henry Ford

II, himself, made statements concerning the desirability of profits
as well as urging that business look to new public demands such as
safety as "opportunities to profit."

Henry Ford II reiterated on

more than one occasion the main goal of the Ford Motor Company; that
is, profits.

It also appears as though Ford profits were falling— a

situation which was probably not well-received by stockholders and
managers of Ford, and possibly this provided an impetus for actions
to regain profit levels.
There is little doubt that the profit motive plays an important
role in the goals and operation of the Ford Motor Company.

This is

hardly surprising, for United States corporations operate on that
premise.

The key question here is the influence of the profit mo

tive on the activities of Ford.

Was the threat to Ford's profits

a contributing factor in this corporate crime?

This question can

not be answered definitively, but certainly the emphasis on profits
suggests that the answer is yes.

Recall Harley Copp's testimony

concerning Ford's knowledge of the Pinto's deficiencies and Ford's
ability to remedy those deficiencies.

In all cases, he responded

that "costs" and "improved profitability" were the reason Ford did
nothing.

The profit motive was obviously an important factor in

this corporate crime.

It may have contributed significantly to
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Ford's decision to continue the manufacture of a defective auto
mobile.

Further, an examination of the profit structure and the

slipping market shares indicate that Ford was probably an "organiza
tion in crisis."

Such a situation may have contributed to Ford's

decision to rush into production and sell a product (any product)
which might stabilize the corporation's profit and market situation.

Interlocks

The next research question addressed the influence of Ford in
the political economy.

Essentially, the question is whether or not

the economic power wielded by Ford spilled over into the political
sector.

There is no doubt that interlocks have existed between

Ford and the political sector.
to government positions.

Individuals have traveled from Ford

The automobile industry has traditionally

had much clout in Washington.

The NHTSA has also come under cen

sure for bowing to the will of automobile manufacturers instead of
regulating them effectively.
The importance of the evidence regarding Ford's influence in
the political sector is related to Ford's ability to obtain politi
cal benefits to enhance its own position, often at the expense of
the public.

Henry Ford II's actions (or alleged actions) concerning

the RECAT report, though highly speculative, indicate that Ford had
an ear, if not an ally, in a very important and powerful position in
the political sector.
The extent of the influence is perhaps best indicated by the
action taken in 1973 by Congressman Moss.

He urged Congressional
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intervention if the DOT failed to act on motor vehicle legisla
tion.

Although the Safety Act had been effective since 1966, Moss

felt that very little effective regulation was coming from the
NHTSA.

The 1976 Committee on Oversight also criticized the lack of

action taken by the NHTSA in motor vehicle safety.

While it would

be highly speculative to state that activities of Ford led directly
to the ineffectiveness of regulatory agencies, the evidence strongly
suggests that Ford was able to influence the political sector to a
great extent and this influence, in turn, "took off the heat" in
regulation expenses which might have hindered Ford in their profitmaking goal.
While the examination of interlocks indicates that Ford was
able to somewhat influence the government, at least in the sense of
delaying standards and obstructing federal inquiries, it must be
recognized that Ford's economic power was insufficient to totally
gain their own interests.

The government was able to, eventually,

enforce the Safety Act so that automotive standards were imple
mented.

Ford's influence in the political economy was not abso

lute.

The Legal Environment

Ford's influence on the legal environment is closely tied to
its influence on the political economy.

Evidence indicates that

Ford not only actively attempted to manipulate the legal environ
ment, but also that it was highly successful in doing so.

From the

time of the NHMVS Act's proposal, Ford (and others) fought its pas-
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sage.

After the Act was passed, Ford attempted to weaken its ef

fects (via, for example, RECAT).

Most importantly, however, the Act

provided for interested parties to respond to proposed rules and
Ford used this provision to question, suggest amendments, and other
wise "interfere with" the regulatory process.

The nit-picking

(perhaps better described as adhering to the letter but not the
spirit of the law) by Ford is well exemplified in their response
to Notice 3 of proposed rule-making.

In this response, they ques

tion NHTSA’s testing procedures, arguing that the new procedures
change the standard, etc., thus new notices of rule-making, etc.
must be issued.

Such attention to procedures effectively diverts

attention from the intent of the standard; that is, increased auto
mobile safety.
Ford’s manipulations, in response to NHTSA demands for infor
mation, are a blatantly vivid example of delaying tactics.

Citing

reasons such as "remote storage locations" and the "magnitude of
the task" Ford managed to stall the NHTSA inquiry for nearly a year.
Again, Ford's manipulation of the legal environment is obvious.
Another example of Ford’s influence over the legal environment
involves information submitted to NHTSA by Ford, Ford petitioned
for and was successful in keeping much of the information concerning
the Pinto out of the "public domain."

In 1975, for example, John

Martin from Ford's Office of General Counsel, sent a letter to Frank
Berndt of NHTSA, thanking him for "confidential treatment" of test
results.

Those tests were not made public until 1978, despite

court cases then in progress and pending against Ford.
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Ford’s influence on the legal environment occurred at many
levels from arguments against passage of a regulatory act to activi
ties which hampered NHTSA in their attempt to ascertain whether or
not the Pinto was defective.

This type of influence gave Ford

much extra time in which to continue selling the Pinto without
modifications, thereby increasing the company's profits.

This in

fluence had a significant effect on Ford's ability to act in certain
ways.

Market Structure

The research question concerning the market structure within
which Ford operates shows that the market was concentrated and
threatened by the increasing share garnered by the imports.

The

imports went from a 1.6% market share in 1956 to an 18.2% market
share in 1975.

Ford, as well as other automobile manufacturers

attempted to regain a portion of that market by producing small
Cars of.their own.

Individuals testified that the Pinto was de

veloped to compete directly with Volkswagen which had, in the late
1960s, the greatest share of the import market.
Dowie (1977) has cited evidence as has Harley Copp, that the
Pinto was rushed into production in an attempt.to quickly regain s
share of the market.

Copp, for example, in the criminal trial,

stated that normal approval of a new car takes from 24 to 28 months,
while the Pinto was approved in 20.

This evidence, along with

evidence by Copp and Camps stating that engineers were locked into
a particular design, has been construed by Dowie to mean that Ford
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rushed Pinto into production by "tooling up" for the car before
crash tests were completed.

The reasoning is somewhat speculative,

although some evidence substantiates that reasoning.

The connection,

however, between the market structure and Ford's actions, while
suggestive, is not definitive.

Certainly there are indications that

the market structure had a significant influence on Ford's decision
to manufacture a subcompact; whether or not that led directly to
corporate crime must be conjecture.

Surely, however, it may be in

ferred that a decision to rush into competition with another auto
maker could mean that less care than usual might be taken over the
development of such a car.

Goals

There is every indication that the goals of profit-making at
the Ford Motor Company superseded the goals of public interest.
This is not to say that Ford was not interested in safety; rather,
safety was ranked lower in the hierarchy of goals than the goal of
profit-making.

Despite engineering goals which specifically evoke

"due regard for the safety of life and health of the public," Ford
relied heavily on cost-benefit analysis which put a price tag on
human life and safety and then disregarded those lives if the cost
in saving those lives exceeded the dollar benefits placed upon them.
Ford tested a number of alternative fuel systems— systems
which could sustain a rear-end impact better than the system which
was installed in the Pinto.

Ford Pinto systems, on the other hand,

repeatedly failed when tested in rear impacts.

The obvious logic is
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that Ford, in the interest of safety, should incorporate those al
ternative fuel systems in the Pinto.

As early as 1970, however,

Ford asked for the projected costs of implementing improvements
and then did not incorporate those changes because of the costs in
volved.

Obviously, in this case, the safety of fuel systems was a

lower-ranked goal than profit.
Of further interest, is Ford's response to Notice 2 of the
proposed rule-making (Standard 301).

In this response, Ford notes

that adherence to Standard 301 will result in an average increase of
$18.95 per passenger car with no provision for Ford profit (em
phasis mine).

Such a statement indicates, to some extent, the im

portance that Ford placed on profit over safety.
A further indication concerning the ranking of safety in the
hierarchy of goals at Ford concerns the engineering objectives of
the Pinto.

In Olsen's presentation to the Society of Automotive

Engineers, size, weight, price, fuel consumption, etc. were1
.all ob
jectives for the Pinto, but safety was not mentioned.

While this

in itself is not crucial since safety may have been an assumed ob
jective for all Ford cars, the subsequent actions taken concerning
the Pinto suggest that safety was not a key objective in this car.
In sum, there are probably many goals within the hierarchy of
goals at the Ford Motor Company.

Two of those goals, profit-making

and public safety, were compared, with profit-making seemingly a
higher-ranked goal than public safety.

In a clash of these two

goals, profit-making apparently took precedence over public safe
ty.

This ranking is suggested from the cost-benefit analyses con
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ducted within Ford in response to NHTSA's notices of rule-making.

Normative Environment

There is some ambiguity concerning the normative environment
at Ford.

On the one hand, engineers are expected to adhere to a

code of ethics and are expected to be concerned with problems crea
ted by technology.

On the other hand, however, they are ever cog

nizant of their roles as Ford employees and the primary responsibil
ity of that role— profit-making.

In the case of the Pinto, the

normative environment required that engineers get the car into pro
duction within the "hardpoint approval" design.

As Copp noted,

this meant engineers could not exercise their best judgment in
terms of making the car sound and safe from an engineering stand
point.
The normative environment may force certain activities as well
as beliefs.

Camps, in an effort to certify the Pinto's windshield,

directed impact energy to the driveshaft which often ended up punc
turing the fuel tank (via the differential) in rear-end impacts.
His activities, however, were congruent with the normative environ
ment which required that existing standards be met while pending
standards could be ignored.
Dowie addresses the problem of beliefs within a particular
normative environment.

He notes that corporate officials "...thought

they were telling me the truth, they believed what they were tel
ling me..." (Winston, 1978, p. 11).

Dowie claims that underlings

are lied to by top management and he also implies that management
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is responsible for transmitting the norms of the corporate environ
ment .
Camps1 experience suggests that the transmission of the norma
tive environment is more subtle than lies on the part of top manage
ment.

His experience suggests that Ford, through its ability to

promote, demote, fire,, and transfer is able to control the behavior
of its employees.

Furthermore, all kinds of tactics, such as overt

concern with safety, fruitless meetings with superiors, and sugges
tions that whistle-blowers don't get anywhere, are used to ensure
"appropriate" behavior on the part of employees.

Rationality

Rationality appears to play a big role in the decision-making
process at Ford.

Rationally, profit-making is most important and

thus, Harley Copp shows how the defective fuel system could be dis
regarded from a rational point of view.
The emphasis of cost-benefit analysis at Ford also suggests
heavy reliance on rationality.

Measuring effectiveness in terms of

costs and benefits is a logical way to make decisions.
system, however, morality is often ignored.

With such a

(This is not to imply

that morality must be excluded from cost benefit analysis.
analysis is certainly an effective tool for decision-making.

Such
Un

fortunately when hard-to-quantify factors, such as human life, are
put into the formula, the temptation to omit non-quantifiable as
pects of a cost or benefit is hard to resist.

For example, Ford's

estimate of $180,000 as the cost of a human life was unfairly and
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probably unequally matched against a potential profit savings.
The practice, at least at Ford, appeared to focus on dollars and
cents rather than the moral aspects of a decision.)

Thus, Ford

found it easy to place a price on human life so that it too could
be figured into cost-benefit analysis.

While this may make "ra

tional" sense, the "moral" sense is questionable.

It was not, how

ever, at issue for Ford since morality does not properly enter into
rational decisions.
Even more "rational" is the argument used by Ford at the
criminal trial in Indiana.

Ford argued that a 1973 Pinto did not

have to meet a minimum rear impact crash test because there was no
standard in effect at the time.

Ford was able to disregard its own

tests and alternative fuel systems because it made rational sense
to do so.

Only after the standard was finally made effective, did

Ford retool the Pinto to meet the new standard despite the fact that
it could have improved the fuel system integrity as early as 1970.
The problem of excessive rationality was succinctly stated by
a newspaper journalist:
If indeed, Ford placed the Pinto gas tank where
it can be pushed forward into a projecting dif
ferential bolthead and be punctured, it left a
fault that could have been detected by any first
year engineering student.
But supposing a young engineer saw the
hazard and spoke out about it. Would management
listen?
That is the key. If industry is to fight
off growing government meddling, it must make
its safety engineers superior to the cost ac
countants where safety is in question ("The Pinto
Controversy," 1977, p. 4A).
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Although Ford used rationality as a basis for decision-making,
an argument can be made that using such a narrow view of cost bene
fit analysis was not rational.

As previously discussed (See Chapter

I.I), a rational decision must be cognizant of the contextual values
and goals.

Cost benefit analysis is not necessarily immoral; rather,

Ford's use of the tool was made within an environment where one
goal— profit-making— superseded all other goals.

While Ford could,

and indeed did, argue that this was rational and acceptable behav
ior, the perception of "rationality" was based on a distorted hier
archy of goals in which safety was not even mentioned.

The Importance of the Theory

The responses to the research questions addressed in this study
indicate that corporate crime is a complex phenomenon.

In terms of

etiology, many factors appear to be important in the commission of
corporate crime.

The capitalist system, for example, appears to

"encourage" the possibilities of corporate crime through an emphasis
on profit-making.

In such a system, furthermore, economic power,

gained through profit-making, is often synonymous with political
power which allows some organizations and/or groups of people to be
more powerful than others.

This power may be used to enhance posi

tions at the expense of others.
A revelation appeared during the course of this study.

Ford,

apparently because of its economic power was able, in the criminal
trial, to manipulate information to such an extent that the prose
cution was precluded from accurately presenting its case.

Mr. Camps,
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for example, was not allowed to testify.

Some NHTSA documents were

not allowed to be entered into evidence.

Ford documents could not

be entered unless authenticated.

All of these, and other, attempts

to enter evidence against Ford were denied not because of the "truth"
of the documents, but because of technicalities.

The American jus

tice system relies on a jury of one's peers to decide guilt; in the
Ford case, the evidence presented to the jury of one's peers was
sketchy, fragmented, and inadequate.

How then can a jury make a

reasonable decision?
This is extremely important in terms of the theoretical model
delineated earlier in this work.

The power of corporations to work

within the system to gain their own ends is nowhere more apparent
than in the political economy.

The power wielded there allows cor

porations to manipulate not only the legal environment within which
they operate, but the very definitions of their conduct.

Ford was

vindicated in Winamac and the general public will believe that such
vindication stems from the reality of the situation.

Trial ob

servers and those individuals who perused the evidence (both ad
mitted evidence and not) will perceive a different reality.

The

crucial factor, however, is the corporation's ability to influence
the political economy and the ideology of society so that their
position is enhanced.

This not only gives them the ability to com

mit corporate crime, but also the ability to define what they are
doing as normal and proper.
In the case of the Ford Pinto, this tactic was used in civil
suits, the criminal trial, and news releases.

Again and again,
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Ford spokesmen stated that no crime was committed, no negligence
had occurred, and Pintos were as safe as any car because no stand
ard was in effect concerning rear-end impacts until 1976.

The

reasoning is that this should exonerate Ford of all guilt (and
damages).

Ironically, this logic is probably accepted by most

people at Ford as well as by the general public.

The activities of

Ford in delaying the standard are seldom considered, yet it was
seen that such tactics had a considerable effect in controlling the
regulatory environment.

This indicates the clout that Ford had in

shaping the politics of automobile regulation as well as Ford's
ability to shape ideology.

As previously stated, such abilities

give corporations much control over their activities.
The influence over the political economy as seen above filters
down to the specific legal environment within which particular cor
porations operate.

The automobile industry may not by a typical

example of a corporation's ability to manipulate that environment.
The examination of the market structure of the automobile industry
showed that it was oligopolistic and concentrated.

Less oligopolis

tic and concentrated industries may not be able to control their
environments as effectively as the automobile industry.

Thus, al

though control of the legal environment appears to be an extremely
important factor in the etiology of corporate crime in this case, it
may vary in importance depending on the structure of the particular
industry under study.
Market structure appears to have quite an influence on the ac
tivities of a corporation.

It only makes sense that in a system
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governed heavily by the profit motive, threats to a market or
market share will not be taken lightly.

In an oligopolistic market,

market shares are rather predictable; that is, threats to that mar
ket are not congruent with oligopolistic "arrangements."

There is

little doubt that most corporations would engage in activities to
regain lost market shares.

To the extent that the political

economy and legal environment can also be controlled, the necessary
activities may include corporate crimes as well as more reasonable
activities.

In a study of particular corporate crimes, then, the

market structure should be closely examined for contributions to
corporate crime.
At the organizational level, corporate crime appears to be
endemic.

Organizations within capitalist societies are structured

in such a way that rationality (without morality) tends to prevail
over a hierarchy of goals that is topped (in most corporations) by
the profit motive.

That highest ranked goal sets the pattern for

the corporation's activities and the rationale for those activities.
At Ford, for example, there was a heavy emphasis on costbenefit analysis.

Rationally, in their view, everything can be re

duced to dollars and cents and decisions should be based on whether
or not actions are of benefit (i.e., profitable) to the corporation.
Such reasoning is a good example of Ladd's (1970) analysis of ra
tionality versus morality.

Morality, according to Ladd, is not a

factor involved in decision-making in large organizations; rather,
rationality is the chosen tool.
nicely illustrates that.

Some evidence from the Ford Pinto

As Attorney Hare points out, the decision-

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

making process may have nothing to do with the morality of the in
dividual who is making the decision:
But Mr. Tubben takes the stand and I can see why
they chose him as a witness. He is one of the
most attractive, gentlemanly people I believe I
ever saw (Kaminski vs. Ford, 1977, p. 18).
Similarly, in the criminal trial, Harold MacDonald was described by
Harley Copp as a "safety-conscious" person.

These examples of in

dividuals seem incongruent with the picture painted of the bad cor
poration.

Ladd (1970), however, noted that there is a distinction

between acts within an official corporate capacity and within a
private capacity.

The organization demands that its employees act

in certain ways and sanctions those employees who blow the whistle
or rock the boat.

It appears as though private morality has very

little to do with decisions made on an organizational level.
The justification used by Ford (for not correcting the Pinto
fuel system integrity in the early 1970s) was that "everyone is
doing it."

While this may not be much of a defense (Prosecuting

Attorney Burner said, "Can a robbery defendent claim that others are
robbing and so therefore his activities are okay?" (Trial Notes,
2/13/80), it is probably common practice among large corporations.
Anything that cuts into profits should, rationally be eliminated.
The entire organizational environment stresses this rationality
thereby calling for certain, predictable decisions on the part of
corporate managers.
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206
Limitations of the Evidence and the Theory

The theoretical model presented earlier in this study appears
to have some practical value in approaching the study of corporate
crime.

Unfortunately, given the fact that the application of the

theory involved a case study, nothing definitive can be stated
from an examination of the data within this theoretical framework.
There are no samples, no statistics, no hypotheses, and no probabil
ity levels.
The data themselves are qualitative and there are obvious
holes and gaps.

Although attempts have been made to ensure the va

lidity and reliability of the data, in a study of this nature, the
probability of getting the whole story is rather slim.

Some docu

ments have been kept out of the public domain, while sources of
other documents are second or third hand so that authenticity cannot
be assumed.
In short, this study suffers from many methodological short
comings.

The study is exploratory.

It certainly has yielded some

interesting data and relationships to the theoretical premises set
forth.

In this study, the importance of structural features of a

society as contributing factors to the etiology of corporate crime
was shown to be pertinent in this one case of corporate crime.
Those structural factors should be more thoroughly explored in other
case studies and applications to further refine and develop the
explanatory power they provide.

Organizational factors also seemed

important to the understanding of corporate crime.

In this study,
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only a few organizational characteristics were examined; very likely,
there are many other aspects or organizations which should also be
studied to determine how they contribute to corporate crime.

In ad

dition, other explanations of organizational behavior could be ex
plored.

The notion of an organization-in-crisis, for example, may

provide a useful avenue for investigation.

An examination of the

leadership at Ford may indicate why managers rather than engineers
were given important decision-making capabilities.

Weber's (1958)

theory of organizations of scale may also be useful in understanding
the apparent lack of effective communication and rationale among
members of an organization and, indeed, may account for the par
ticular short-sightedness of the actions at Ford in regard to the
Pinto.
The limitations of this study should not negate its useful
ness.

Many important factors relative to corporate crime have been

uncovered.

Certainly evidence suggests further directions for

research in this vitally important area.

Further Issues

Where does one go from here?

Exploratory studies tend to whet

the appetite and probably raise more issues and questions than they
address.

This study is no exception.

Further study of the structural and organizational factors
relative to corporate crime is certainly needed.

More case studies,

similar to this one where data are sought from and substantiated
by a number of sources, will help build a body of studies which
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identify with more precision the contributing explanatory power of
the various factors.

Refinement is also needed.

Market structure,

for example, obviously influences corporate activities, but the con
nection between degree of market disruption and decisions to commit
crimes is not clear.

In addition, questions must be asked concern

ing non-oligopolistic markets.

How do threats to such markets in

fluence corporations within that specific industry?
Also of further interest is corporate crime within non
capitalist societies.

Are different factors applicable to corporate

crime in such societies?

Weber (1958) suggested that bureaucracy

led to certain types of behavior.

Is corporate crime, then, an in

evitable part of modern, bureaucraticized society?

These are ques

tions which must be carefully explored before an understanding of
the etiology of corporate crime can be achieved.

The theory de

lineated in this work can, as previously discussed, possibly be more
abstractly stated to include societies organized upon different re
lations of production.

The capitalistic goals of profit-making and

private ownership, for example, may be translated into goals of
prestige, productivity, quota-making, etc. within state socialist
societies.

An explication and testing of such factors may con

tribute to a more thorough understanding of corporate crime.
Even more important to an understanding of the etiology of cor
porate crime, is a careful examination of the power of corporations.
Although some examinations have been done (e.g., Barnet & Mueller,
1974; Baran & Sweezy, 1966), they have not tended to directly con
nect such power with the ability to commit corporate crime.

In
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this study, the evidence suggests that the power of corporations
helps to shape the entire milieu within which they operate, effec
tively allowing corporations to define what is criminal as well as
having the power to commit crimes.

The power factor must be care

fully examined at both structural and organizational levels to under
stand how corporate crime is possible.
Finally, the matter of social control of corporate power must
be investigated.

Evidence uncovered in this study suggests that

large corporations such as Ford are able to protect themselves from
the American justice system not only at the definitional level, but
also in the criminal justice system.

Through economic power, Ford

was able to present its case in criminal court and simultaneously
was able to prevent the prosecution from presenting its case.

Ad

ditionally, Ford had power over NHTSA to keep certain documents out
of the public domain.

All of these actions indicate power which is

not available to the average citizen.

The effects of this power on

the control of corporations must be examined.

Summary

In this study, an examination of corporate crime was under
taken.

After determining that corporate crime is costly in economic

physical, and social terms, the issues within the field were ex
amined.

A definition of corporate crime was given.

This definition

ignored legalistic views because of their biases and focused on a
social harm criterion.
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In an attempt to gain understanding of the etiology of cor
porate crime, a theoretical framework for examining the problem has
been developed.

This framework includes structural features such as

a capitalistic organization of society, the importance of a politi
cal economy, the importance of market structure, and the importance
of corporate influence over the legal environment, in understanding
corporate crime.

Corporations within this society are affected by

the structural features of society.

Corporations are organized ac

cording to capitalistic principles and effectively force their em
ployees into certain kinds of actions and activities.

It was

theorized that such organizational factors might have an influence
on corporate crime.
Data for this study came from the Ford Pinto matter.

Analyzing

various data from Ford documents, NHTSA documents, trial transcripts
etc., a number of research questions, which were guided by the
theoretical framework, were raised.

The data showed, that in this

case study, structural factors such as the profit motive, the
ability of corporations to influence the political and legal environ
ments in which they operate, and market structure were influential
in the ability of Ford to manufacture and sell a defective auto
mobile.

In addition, organizational factors, such as the hierarchy

of goals, the normative environment of the organization, and the
basis for decision-making within the Ford organization, were ex
amined for their explanatory power in understanding corporate crime.
Although this was a case study and offered no definitive state
ments to the problem of corporate crime, a number of directions for
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further research and examination were discovered.

To fully under

stand the etiology of corporate crime, more research is needed with
in the area.

This can best be accomplished through a number of case

studies which can further refine and develop the theoretical frame
work developed here.
The problem of corporate crime must not be ignored; it is a
costly and serious problem for all people in our society today.
Through further study and research, an understanding of the etiology
of corporate crime can be achieved.

Through such understanding,

some mechanisms for the social control of this serious problem may
be developed.
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FOOTNOTES

1.

This section is taken, in large measure, from a paper, "The
Philosophical Implications of Conflict Methodology: Theoretical
Bases for Researching the Ford Pinto Trial," written with Doris
Cubbernuss and presented at the ASC meetings, November, 1980.
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